Hi Paul,

I was not able to reproduce your problem using that snapshot. I set up an SSL server using SSLv23_server_method and set the options SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 as you did : I always have s->version equal to 0x0301 as expected and the test you mentioned is OK since s->client_version is also equal to 0x0301.
Same test can be done using the command line :
openssl s_server -accept 443 -key server.pem -cert server.pem -no_ssl2 -no_ssl3 -bugs

Can you post a sample code that exposes the problem?

By the way, I detected a double free in the implementation of ssl3_send_server_key_exchange in this snapshot. I'll see if it has been already corrected, otherwise I'll send a patch for it.

Cheers,
--
Mounir IDRASSI
IDRIX
http://www.idrix.fr

On 08/10/2010 18:55, Paul Suhler wrote:
Hi, everyone.

[I'm re-sending this to the developers list.]

I've found that when a server built with
openssl-1.0.1-stable-SNAP-20101004 receives a Client Hello from a client
specifying TLS 1.0 (version = 0x0301), the connection is rejected for a
bad version.  This appears to be implemented in ssl3_get_client_hello()
by:

         if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION&&  s->client_version>
s->version) ||
             (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION&&  s->client_version<
s->version))
                 {
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);

In the SSL_CTX, I'm setting options SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 |
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.  I see no options that would be forcing TLS 1.1 only.

However, RFC 4346 Appendix E says:

    Similarly, a TLS 1.1  server that wishes to interoperate with TLS 1.0

    or SSL 3.0 clients SHOULD accept SSL 3.0 client hello messages and
    respond with a SSL 3.0 server hello if an SSL 3.0 client hello with a

    version field of {3, 0} is received, denoting that this client does
    not support TLS.  Similarly, if a SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0 hello with a
    version field of {3, 1} is received, the server SHOULD respond with a

    TLS 1.0 hello with a version field of {3, 1}.

Am I misunderstanding the requirements of the RFC, or is this part of
the fix for the renegotiation exploit?  (I'm not renegotiating when this
happens; it's the initial connection attempt that's rejected.)

Thanks very much,

Paul
________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________
Paul A. Suhler | Firmware Engineer | Quantum Corporation | Office:
949.856.7748 | paul.suh...@quantum.com<mailto:paul.suh...@quantum.com>

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