On Tue, 2015-03-03 at 14:43 +0000, Matt Caswell wrote: > > On 03/03/15 14:28, David Woodhouse wrote: > > On Tue, 2015-03-03 at 12:00 +0000, Matt Caswell wrote: > >> > >>> I'll look at adding test cases to exercise the DTLS_BAD_VER support, > >> to > >>> try to avoid this kind of thing happening in future. > >>> > >> > >> That would be fantastic to have. > > > > I look a quick look at this. Adding DTLSv1 and DTLSv1.2 support to > > ssl/ssltest.c isn't particularly hard, > > If you fancy taking on that task, that would be really useful just in > itself.
This works for 'ssltest -dtls1' but not with -bio_pair for some reason.
I got this far before concluding it wasn't going to be a helpful
approach...
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index c535a42..e550704 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2749,6 +2749,12 @@ const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
return ("TLSv1");
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return ("SSLv3");
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return ("DTLSv0.9");
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ return ("DTLSv1");
+ else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+ return ("DTLSv1.2");
else
return ("unknown");
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 89fb44a..511f674 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -787,6 +787,10 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
fprintf(stderr, " -ssl3 - use SSLv3\n");
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ fprintf(stderr, " -dtls1 - use DTLSv1\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -dtls12 - use DTLSv1.2\n");
+#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -tls1 - use TLSv1\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -CApath arg - PEM format directory of CA's\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -CAfile arg - PEM format file of CA's\n");
@@ -958,7 +962,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
int badop = 0;
int bio_pair = 0;
int force = 0;
- int tls1 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
+ int dtls1 = 0, dtls12 = 0, tls1 = 0, ssl3 = 0, ret = 1;
int client_auth = 0;
int server_auth = 0, i;
struct app_verify_arg app_verify_arg =
@@ -1136,6 +1140,16 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
no_protocol = 1;
#endif
ssl3 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls1") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ dtls1 = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dtls12") == 0) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ no_protocol = 1;
+#endif
+ dtls12 = 1;
} else if (strncmp(*argv, "-num", 4) == 0) {
if (--argc < 1)
goto bad;
@@ -1309,8 +1323,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto end;
}
- if (ssl3 + tls1 > 1) {
- fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl3, or -tls1 should "
+ if (ssl3 + tls1 + dtls1 + dtls12 > 1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "At most one of -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls1 or -dtls12should "
"be requested.\n");
EXIT(1);
}
@@ -1327,10 +1341,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
goto end;
}
- if (!ssl3 && !tls1 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force) {
+ if (!ssl3 && !tls1 && !dtls1 && !dtls12 && number > 1 && !reuse && !force)
{
fprintf(stderr, "This case cannot work. Use -f to perform "
"the test anyway (and\n-d to see what happens), "
- "or add one of -ssl3, -tls1, -reuse\n"
+ "or add one of -ssl3, -tls1, -dtls1, dtls12, -reuse\n"
"to avoid protocol mismatch.\n");
EXIT(1);
}
@@ -1403,6 +1417,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
meth = SSLv3_method();
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS
+ if (dtls1)
+ meth = DTLSv1_method();
+ else if (dtls12)
+ meth = DTLSv1_2_method();
+ else
+#endif
if (tls1)
meth = TLSv1_method();
else
> > So I'm torn between doing a minimal reimplementation of the server side
> > and making OpenSSL talk to that, or a dirty replay attack such as the
> > one I had when I was first working it out:
> > http://david.woodhou.se/dtls-test.c
> >
> The minimal reimplementation sounds like it might be the more flexible
> base to work from (and could even be the basis for future DTLSv1/1.2
> tests). But it also sounds like quite a bit more work to me. Either way,
> having *some* tests has got to be a lot better than *no* tests like we
> have now!
Well, the evil "override RAND_bytes() and replay" trick isn't actually
working any more. I think I need to disable all extensions so the
ClientHello precisely matches the one in my capture, or redo a capture
with the options that we currently send.... which all in all is probably
a fairly strong hint that I ought not to be doing the replay thing :)
--
dwmw2
smime.p7s
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