I'm not terribly savvy regarding IoT, but I imagine that they do talk to something bigger. A server end, perhaps? What do we expect to run on that end? What happens, in that case, if SPECK makes its way into the TLS cipher suites? Would it be interesting to have OpenSSL interop with such devices?
Note: I'm not terribly partial either way, just thought that we need to look at it from a broader perspective... Cheers, Richard In message <a37c4b30-0f9d-4894-ad63-35b971ffe368@default> on Mon, 8 Jan 2018 13:58:59 -0800 (PST), Paul Dale <paul.d...@oracle.com> said: paul.dale> I'm wondering if one of the more specialised embedded cryptographic toolkits mightn't be a better option for your lightweight IoT TLS stack. There is a wide choice available: CycloneSSL, ECT, Fusion, MatrixSSL, mbedTLS, NanoSSL, SharkSSL, WolfSSL, uC/SSL and many others. All of them claim to be the smallest, fastest and most feature laden :) To sell to the US government, your first selection criteria should be "does the toolkit have a current FIPS validation?" From memory this means: ECT, nanoSSL or WolfSSL. paul.dale> paul.dale> The more comprehensive toolkits (OpenSSL, NSS, GNU TLS) are less suitable for embedded applications, especially tightly resource constrained ones. It is possible to cut OpenSSL down in size but it will never compete with the designed for embedded toolkits. Plus, the FIPS module is fixed and cannot be shrunk. paul.dale> paul.dale> The current OpenSSL FIPS validation only applies to 1.0.2 builds currently. FIPS is on the project plan for 1.1 but it isn't available at the moment. The US government is forbidden to purchase any product that contains cryptographic operations unless the product has a FIPS validation. No FIPS, no sale. paul.dale> paul.dale> paul.dale> Pauli paul.dale> -- paul.dale> Oracle paul.dale> Dr Paul Dale | Cryptographer | Network Security & Encryption paul.dale> Phone +61 7 3031 7217 paul.dale> Oracle Australia paul.dale> paul.dale> -----Original Message----- paul.dale> From: William Bathurst [mailto:wbath...@gmail.com] paul.dale> Sent: Tuesday, 9 January 2018 7:10 AM paul.dale> To: openssl-dev@openssl.org paul.dale> Cc: llamour...@gmail.com paul.dale> Subject: Re: [openssl-dev] Speck Cipher Integration with OpenSSL paul.dale> paul.dale> Hi Hanno/all, paul.dale> paul.dale> I can understand your view that "more is not always good" in crypto. The reasoning behind the offering can be found in the following whitepaper: paul.dale> paul.dale> https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/events/lightweight-cryptography-workshop-2015/documents/papers/session1-shors-paper.pdf paul.dale> paul.dale> I will summarize in a different way though. We wish to offer an optimized lightweight TLS for IoT. A majority of devices found in IoT are resource constrained, for example a device CPU may only have 32K of RAM. Therefore security is an afterthought by developers. For some only AES 128 is available and they wish to use 256 bit encryption. Then Speck paul.dale> 256 would be an option because it has better performance and provides sufficient security. paul.dale> paul.dale> Based on the above scenario you can likely see why we are interested in OpenSSL. First, OpenSSL can be used for terminating lightweight TLS connections near the edge, and then forwarding using commonly used ciphers. paul.dale> paul.dale> [IoT Device] -----TLS/Speck---->[IoT Gateway]-----TLS----> [Services] paul.dale> paul.dale> Also, we are interested in using OpenSSL libraries at the edge for client creation. One thing we would like to do is provide instructions for an highly optimized build of OpenSSL that can be used for contrained devices. paul.dale> paul.dale> I think demand will eventually grow because there is an initiative by the US government to improve IoT Security and Speck is being developed and proposed as a standard within the government. Therefore, I see users who wish to play in this space would be interested in a version where Speck could be used in OpenSSL. paul.dale> paul.dale> It is my hope to accomplish the following: paul.dale> paul.dale> [1] Make Speck available via Open Source, this could be as an option or as a patch in OpenSSL. paul.dale> [2] If we make it available as a patch, is there a place where we would announce/make it known that it is available? paul.dale> paul.dale> We are also looking at open-sourcing the client side code. This would be used to create light-weight clients that use Speck and currently we also build basic OAuth capability on top of it. paul.dale> paul.dale> Thanks for your input! paul.dale> paul.dale> Bill paul.dale> paul.dale> On 1/5/2018 11:40 AM, Hanno Böck wrote: paul.dale> > On Fri, 5 Jan 2018 10:52:01 -0800 paul.dale> > William Bathurst <wbath...@gmail.com> wrote: paul.dale> > paul.dale> >> 1) Community interest in such a lightweight cipher. paul.dale> > I think there's a shifting view that "more is not always good" in paul.dale> > crypto. OpenSSL has added features in the past "just because" and it paul.dale> > was often a bad decision. paul.dale> > paul.dale> > Therefore I'd generally oppose adding ciphers without a clear usecase, paul.dale> > as increased code complexity has a cost. paul.dale> > So I think questions that should be answered: paul.dale> > What's the usecase for speck in OpenSSL? Are there plans to use it in paul.dale> > TLS? If yes why? By whom? What advantages does it have over existing paul.dale> > ciphers? (Yeah, it's "lightweight", but that's a pretty vague thing.) paul.dale> > paul.dale> > paul.dale> > Also just for completeness, as some may not be aware: There are some paul.dale> > concerns about Speck due to its origin (aka the NSA). I don't think paul.dale> > that is a reason to dismiss a cipher right away, what I'd find more paul.dale> > concerning is that from what I observed there hasn't been a lot of paul.dale> > research about speck. paul.dale> > paul.dale> paul.dale> -- paul.dale> openssl-dev mailing list paul.dale> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev paul.dale> -- paul.dale> openssl-dev mailing list paul.dale> To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev -- openssl-dev mailing list To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev
