On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 02:19:28PM -0600, David Benjamin wrote: > On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 2:01 PM Matt Caswell <m...@openssl.org> wrote: > > > > > On 31/01/2019 18:50, David Benjamin wrote: > > > We will see if this damage turns out fatal for KeyUpdate, but OpenSSL > > can at > > > least help slow its spread by issuing a fix > > > > That's precisely what PR 8096 does. > > > > > > > As a heuristic for API design: if the caller needs to know the > > implementation > > > details of OpenSSL to understand what this API does, the API is no good. > > > Existing code cannot possibly predict how OpenSSL's implementation will > > evolve > > > over time, so there is no way to use such an API in a future-proof way. > > Do not > > > introduce such APIs. > > > > The info callback has been around a *long* time. In fact OpenSSL did not > > introduce it at all - we inherited it from SSLeay. Arguments about whether > > it is > > a good API or not don't help the issue at hand. The API exists, > > applications use > > it, and so (for now at least) we continue to support it. > > > > Given that it already existed we had to make a decision about how it was > > going > > to work in the presence of TLSv1.3. We did what we believed to be the > > correct > > thing at the time. The changes were pretty minimal and we tried to keep > > things > > as close to what existing users of the callback would expect. It turns out > > we > > got it wrong. > > > > Right, but SSL_CB_POST_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_POST_HANDSHAKE_END are > new. It seems best to just omit it, so OpenSSL is not tied to the nebulous > notion of "post-handshake exchange". > > I.e. don't bracket post-handshake things with START/END at all.
Matt, do you have any comment on this? Can we go forward with this? Kurt _______________________________________________ openssl-project mailing list firstname.lastname@example.org https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-project