If this is not going to break 99% of users + it improves the interface + the replacement to achieve the same is a few lines of code and is likely to occur in one place in an app, then it seems reasonable to change it to me.
> On 27 Jul 2020, at 11:08 am, Dr Paul Dale <paul.d...@oracle.com> wrote: > > The RAND_DRBG (crypto/rand/drbg_lib) APIs are quite some mess and sit badly > with the move to provider based infrastructure. > They are definitely being deprecated in master but without more, the extra > layer of indirection and additional complexity generating random numbers will > remain. > > The option I see are: > > 1. Remove, rather than deprecate, RAND_DRBG in 3.0. This is a breaking > change. > 2. Bypass RAND_DRBG and live with a breaking change (refer: > https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12509#pullrequestreview-455396828 > <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12509*pullrequestreview-455396828__;Iw!!GqivPVa7Brio!P_SYCN9POdf1ZT1I7v4h9G_oUTuels90DxKk1JmFkD7HcXsTPr9n0s3FX3XZZo_c2Q$>) > 3. Leave things as they currently are in master. > > The first two are breaking changes and will require an OMC vote. > > > Some pertinent points: > > 1. RAND_bytes will continue to work as is — this API is perfect for almost > everyone. > 2. The RAND_METHOD functionality remains — this allows wholesale replacement > of OpenSSL’s RNGs if desired. > 3. The name EVP_RAND is the working name and might change — this is not > relevant to this discussion. > 4. The RAND_DRBG APIs are unlikely to be widely used — they were introduced > in 1.1.1. The two users I know of (Akamai and NCP) are both fine with them > being removed. > > > Thoughts anyone? > > > Pauli > -- > Dr Paul Dale | Distinguished Architect | Cryptographic Foundations > Phone +61 7 3031 7217 > Oracle Australia >
