Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Salz, Rich wrote:
>>> Suppose of certs A,B,C, that C signs
>>> B and B signs A. A is the final cert and lists B as issuer, so B
>>> must sign A. But B might also be signed by D. So either of the
>>> chains C,B,A or D,B,A would be valid. This can only work if the
>>> issuer specifies a public key rather than a whole issuer cert.
>>> I don't know for sure that x509 actually works that way.
>> You're correct. In particular, when D signs B and B signs D this is called
>> cross-certification, and is explained (sorta) in the PKIX documents.
>>
>> There are those who like it, and those who loathe it. I'm in the latter
>> camp. :)
> But doesn't this just mean I should serve A,B,C and D? Or can't I do
> that?
Not according to RFC 2246, section 7.4.2:
certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of X.509v3 certificates. The sender's
certificate must come first in the list. Each following
certificate must directly certify the one preceding it. Because
[...]
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