You can do annonymous SSL between the client and server and then niether has to give out the cert. The pre-master secret is encrypted in an ephemeral key generated by the server.
Thanks Baber :) >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 04/18/02 09:21AM >>> Well it might not be such a good design, but what I asked initially was only if it is possible to restrict apache from giving the cert out, and if that somehow can stop people from connecting to the server without having the certificate. This is necessary since I am using a stripped SSL implementation on the client side that does not support client authentication (The clients will be Digital-TV set-top-boxes with OpenTV OS). Thanks for all your responses, /Tobbe >>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 04/18/02 04:10PM >>> On 18 Apr 2002, Eric Rescorla wrote: > Erwann ABALEA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > > No. The client normally performs the verification of the challenge signed > > by the server. But it can eventually skip this verification, and go on > > talking SSL with the server... > No, this is incorrect most of the time (whenever you're doing static > RSA key exchange). The client ENCRYPTS the PreMasterSecret under > the server's public key. This necessitates knowing the public key. Yes, that's right. But to me it seems that enhancing access restriction using the server cert is not a good idea. That means the server cert is a secret known only by the trusted users. By definition, a certificate is public, so it cannot be a secret. And again, that's using symetric cryptosystems techniques with asymetric algorithms. It's a bad design (tm). -- Erwann ABALEA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - RSA PGP Key ID: 0x2D0EABD5 ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED] ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
