Hello, > > That means, that padding didn't solve the problem of > > known-plaintext-, chosen-plaintext-, chosen-cyphertext- or > > adaptive-chosen-plaintext-attacks? What about OAEP padding? > > Can I use the public key as secret key and backwards? Then I can > use OAEP for "signing" with the secret public key :-) and use the > public secret key in Linux-PAM for "verify the signature". The > advantage therefor is that I can use OAEP random(?) padding to get > of the _same_ plaintext different chiffertexts. If you want to use OAEP in signing then you can first add OAEP to your data with RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP() and next use RSA_private_encrypt() with padding flag equal to RSA_NO_PADDING. When verifying you first call RSA_public_decrypt() with padding flag equal to RSA_NO_PADDING and next remove OAEP padding with RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() to get real data.
Best regards, -- Marek Marcola <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org User Support Mailing List openssl-users@openssl.org Automated List Manager [EMAIL PROTECTED]
