On Thu, Apr 10, 2008 at 3:36 AM, David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  Kyle Hamilton wrote:
>
>  > You can have B contact the server and obtain a signed "authorization
>  > certificate" for its key that uses custom extensions to specify 'is
>  > authorized to connect to A' for a given timeframe, and have that be
>  > the certificate that B presents when connecting to A.  Then, A looks
>  > for the 'authorized to connect to' list, finds itself in there, checks
>  > validity time, and makes the decision based on that.  No need to share
>  > the public keys, nor is there a need to tell both sides about it if
>  > the signature can be verified.
>  >
>  > If you want the server to mediate access between peers without having
>  > to have your clients constantly connected to the server, that's a way
>  > to do it.
>
>  Maybe I'm missing something, but it doesn't seem to me like that would work. 
> How does B know it is talking to A? If you expect the "is authorized to 
> connect to" certificate to contain both public keys, then how can you say "no 
> need to share the public keys"? And if not, how does B know it is talking to 
> A and A to B?

I'm assuming bidirectional authentication, and thus no need to
preshare the public keys.

B knows it's talking to A because of the CN of the certificate that A
presents as part of the SSL/TLS handshake.  A CN uniquely identifies a
given resource within the CA's identity-management realm.

A knows that it's talking to B because of the CN of the certificate
that B presents.  A also knows that B is authorized because of the
custom extension included in the certificate that B presents.  (The
format and specification of the custom extension are implementation
details; I'd suggest that since B knows that it's requested access to
A, then the server can pass the current means of contacting A as well
as the certificate that A can verify as allowing access.  Or, that
current information can just be part of the certificate that the
server issues to B.)

-Kyle H
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