I can sympathize with Steve, having gone through a Common Criteria
certification and finally understanding that what I considered the
"truth" was misleading to the validators, leading to numerous
inconclusive verdicts.

As to the real-worldness aspect, this is often a 'checkbox' that gives
assurance that a 3rd party poked their educated nose into the product
and found it reasonable. 

My quandary is that I need a "productized" (or non-SNAPSHOT) version of
OpenSSL to work with the FIPS Object Module 1.2; I'm guessing it will be
0.9.8j.

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Steve Marquess
Sent: Tuesday, November 25, 2008 4:24 AM
To: openssl-users@openssl.org
Subject: Re: FIPS 1.2 Security Policy issues

Thomas J. Hruska wrote:
> According to the FIPS 1.2 Security Policy, Appendix A, Platform 8 
> cannot be built as FIPS compliant because 'x84-64 asm' is a 
> non-existent platform.  There is no such thing as x84.  It should say
>  'x86-64 asm'. Validation, from what I understand, only covers those 
> platforms listed. Strictly-speaking, x86-64 asm is not able to be 
> built as FIPS-compliant since it is not included in the list (despite
>  supposedly being a tested platform).
> 
> "2.  Verify that the SHA1 HMAC digest of the distribution file (see 
> Appendix B)."
> 
> What exactly am I verifying?  Either finish the sentence or remove 
> the word 'that'.  Since this sentence is grammatically incorrect 
> which leads the reader to believe there is more to the step than 
> mentioned, this step is thus incomplete.  Following a path of strict 
> logic, Appendix A, step 2's incomplete sentence makes it impossible 
> to perform a FIPS validated build for any platform.

Feedback on errors in the Security Policy is greatly appreciated, but
please note I can't make any corrections to the officially approved
version, it is frozen just like the source code.  I will have an errata 
page for the Security Policy in the User Guide which is coming out Real 
Soon Now.

> The most critical step of FIPS validated builds in the past was to 
> apply OS-level security measures to fipscanister (e.g. make specific 
> files read-only to everyone but root/admin.).  Is this done 
> automatically now? Or what section of the Security Policy did I skim 
> too quickly over that covers this?  If it isn't covered in the 
> Security Policy but needs to be done, does that invalidate the FIPS 
> validation?

Please take a look at some other Security Policy documents.  You will 
note that they have a very stylized format, using "FIPS-speak" where 
terms can have different meanings than in a software engineering 
context.  Think patent application instead of RFC.

I didn't fully appreciate that fact for the first validation and drafted

the initial Security Policy for a technical audience.  During the 
validation processes I was told, again and again, that I was confusing 
the issues with facts and so progressively removed said extraneous 
technical detail until we wound up with this most recent Security Policy

in the conventional style of other validations.  The removed material 
makes up the User Guide.

The righteous answer to your question is that the governing documents 
("scripture") for FIPS 140-2 are the FIPS 140-2 standard itself 
(http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf) and the 
Implementation Guidance document 
(http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
).

A more pragmatic answer is to note that strictly speaking almost no 
validated software module for general purpose computers is usable in the

real world.  Note for instance the standard Security Policy requirement 
for "single user mode".

> I realize these are nitpicks.  However, before I go through the 
> massive undertaking of putting together a FIPS build for Windows, I 
> need to know that these are non-issues.  The last time I tried to do 
> a FIPS build, it wasted two weeks of time better spent doing other 
> things.

I've wasted five years, welcome to the club :-)

-Steve M.

-- 
Steve Marquess
Open Source Software Institute
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

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