On Fri, 2013-06-28 at 07:01 +1200, Robert Collins wrote: > On 27 June 2013 04:55, Adam Young <ayo...@redhat.com> wrote: > > Right now Keystone provides so called bearer tokens: This means that whoever > > has a token can do whatever the token entitles him to do. If I > > manage to get somebody's token I can do whatever this person is able to do. > > To fix it, the other services that use tokens to: > > > > 1. Authenticate the identity > > 2. Match the name in the token to the identity that authenticated the > > connection. > > I am confused: HTTP is a message orientated protocol, connection based > authentication is a terrible antipattern. Do you really mean > 'connection' here?
More the HTTPs handshake i guess, the point is to have for example a client certificate or kerberos identity that is used to connect to the individual servers. When a token is generated from keystone we put into the token a reference to the kerberos or cert that was used to generate the token, then when this token is used on a server the auth_token middleware ensures that the same kerberos principal or certificate is used to make that connection as made the original. That means even if you get the token unless you have the cert/kerberos id you can't use it. The full blueprint is: https://blueprints.launchpad.net/keystone/+spec/authentication-tied-to-token > > If the names match then you can be sure that the user that connected to the > > service and presented a token is the same user that acquired the token from > > keystone in the first place. > > That would prevent the use case of 'create a token and hand it off' > which AIUI Heat depends on/will depend on. Yes it would, but this is where heat would need to make use of the trusts mechanism that was released with Grizzly, something that i understand is planned anyway. > > To make this happen we need to add authentication to the connections between > > clients and services. > > Again, if you mean actual TCP Connection here then this design is deeply > flawed. > > Whats the actual problem we're trying to solve (vs this proposed solution). > > -Rob > _______________________________________________ OpenStack-dev mailing list OpenStack-dev@lists.openstack.org http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
