Hi,
I had to patch the security groups to add the following rule, otherwise
broadcast is blocked:
-m pkttype --pkt-type multicast -j RETURN
Ex:
In /opt/stack/quantum/quantum/agent/linux/iptables_firewall.py
def _allow_multicats_rule(self, iptables_rules):
iptables_rules += ['-m pkttype --pkt-type multicast -j RETURN']
return iptables_rules
def _convert_sgr_to_iptables_rules(self, security_group_rules):
iptables_rules = []
self._drop_invalid_packets(iptables_rules)
self._allow_established(iptables_rules)
self._allow_multicats_rule(iptables_rules)
From: Aaron Rosen [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, July 24, 2013 11:58 PM
To: Samuel Bercovici
Cc: OpenStack Development Mailing List; [email protected]; Avishay Balderman;
[email protected]
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Neutron] Chalenges with highly available service
VMs - port adn security group options.
On Wed, Jul 24, 2013 at 12:42 AM, Samuel Bercovici
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi,
This might be apparent but not to me.
Can you point to how broadcast can be turned on a network/port?
There is currently no way to prevent it so it's on by default.
As for the
https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/master/neutron/extensions/portsecurity.py,
in NVP, does this totally disable port security on a port/network or it just
disable the MAC/IP checks and still allows the "user defined" port security to
take effect?
Port security is currently obtained from the fixed_ips and mac_address field on
the port. This removes the filtering done on fixed_ips and mac_address fields
when disabled.
This looks like an extension only implemented by NVP, do you know if there are
similar implementations for other plugins?
No, the other plugins do not currently have a way to disable spoofing
dynamically (only globally disabled).
Regards,
-Sam.
From: Aaron Rosen [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
Sent: Tuesday, July 23, 2013 10:52 PM
To: Samuel Bercovici
Cc: OpenStack Development Mailing List;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>; Avishay Balderman;
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Neutron] Chalenges with highly available service
VMs - port adn security group options.
I agree too. I've posted a work in progress of this here if you want to start
looking at it: https://review.openstack.org/#/c/38230/
Thanks,
Aaron
On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 4:21 AM, Samuel Bercovici
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi,
I agree that the AutZ should be separated and the service provider should be
able to control this based on their model.
For Service VMs who might be serving ~100-~1000 IPs and might use multiple MACs
per port, it would be better to turn this off altogether that to have an
IPTABLE rules with thousands of entries.
This why I prefer to be able to turn-off IP spoofing and turn-off MAC spoofing
altogether.
Still from a logical model / declarative reasons an IP that can migrate between
different ports should be declared as such and maybe also from MAC perspective.
Regards,
-Sam.
From: Salvatore Orlando [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
Sent: Sunday, July 21, 2013 9:56 PM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] [Neutron] Chalenges with highly available service
VMs - port adn security group options.
On 19 July 2013 13:14, Aaron Rosen
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 1:55 AM, Samuel Bercovici
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hi,
I have completely missed this discussion as it does not have quantum/Neutron in
the subject (modify it now)
I think that the security group is the right place to control this.
I think that this might be only allowed to admins.
I think this shouldn't be admin only since tenant's have control of their own
networks they should be allowed to do this.
I reiterate my point that the authZ model for a feature should always be
completely separated by the business logic of the feature itself.
In my opinion there are grounds both for scoping it as admin only and for
allowing tenants to use it; it might be better if we just let the policy engine
deal with this.
Let me explain what we need which is more than just disable spoofing.
1. Be able to allow MACs which are not defined on the port level to
transmit packets (for example VRRP MACs)== turn off MAC spoofing
For this it seems you would need to implement the port security extension which
allows one to enable/disable port spoofing on a port.
This would be one way of doing it. The other would probably be adding a list of
allowed VRRP MACs, which should be possible with the blueprint pointed by Aaron.
2. Be able to allow IPs which are not defined on the port level to
transmit packets (for example, IP used for HA service that moves between an HA
pair) == turn off IP spoofing
It seems like this would fit your use case perfectly:
https://blueprints.launchpad.net/neutron/+spec/allowed-address-pairs
3. Be able to allow broadcast message on the port (for example for VRRP
broadcast) == allow broadcast.
Quantum does have an abstraction for disabling this so we already allow this by
default.
Regards,
-Sam.
From: Aaron Rosen [mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>]
Sent: Friday, July 19, 2013 3:26 AM
To: OpenStack Development Mailing List
Subject: Re: [openstack-dev] Chalenges with highly available service VMs
Yup:
I'm definitely happy to review and give hints.
Blueprint:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/18trYtq3wb0eJK2CapktN415FRIVasr7UkTpWn9mLq5M/edit
https://review.openstack.org/#/c/19279/ < patch that merged the feature;
Aaron
On Thu, Jul 18, 2013 at 5:15 PM, Ian Wells
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 18 July 2013 19:48, Aaron Rosen
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> Is there something this is missing that could be added to cover your use
> case? I'd be curious to hear where this doesn't work for your case. One
> would need to implement the port_security extension if they want to
> completely allow all ips/macs to pass and they could state which ones are
> explicitly allowed with the allowed-address-pair extension (at least that is
> my current thought).
Yes - have you got docs on the port security extension? All I've
found so far are
http://docs.openstack.org/developer/quantum/api/quantum.extensions.portsecurity.html
and the fact that it's only the Nicira plugin that implements it. I
could implement it for something else, but not without a few hints...
--
Ian.
_______________________________________________
OpenStack-dev mailing list
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
_______________________________________________
OpenStack-dev mailing list
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
_______________________________________________
OpenStack-dev mailing list
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
_______________________________________________
OpenStack-dev mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev
