On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 5:27 AM, Cédric Jeanneret <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 05/21/2018 03:49 PM, Luke Hinds wrote: > > A few operators have requested if its possible to limit sudo's coverage > > on both the under / overcloud. There is concern over `ALL=(ALL) > > NOPASSWD:ALL` , which allows someone to `sudo su`. > > > > This task has come under the care of the tripleo security squad. > > > > The work is being tracked and discussed here [0]. > > > > So far it looks like the approach will be to use regexp within > > /etc/sudoers.d/*., to narrow down as close as possible to the specific > > commands called. Some services already do this with rootwrap: > > > > ironic ALL = (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/ironic-rootwrap > > /etc/ironic/rootwrap.conf * > > > > It's fairly easy to pick up a list of all sudo calls using a simple > > script [1] > > > > The other prolific user of sudo is ansible / stack, for example: > > > > /bin/sh -c echo BECOME-SUCCESS-kldpbeueyodisjajjqthpafzadrncdff; > > /usr/bin/python > > /home/stack/.ansible/tmp/ansible-tmp-1526579105.0- > 109863952786117/systemd.py; > > rm -rf > > "/home/stack/.ansible/tmp/ansible-tmp-1526579105.0-109863952786117/" > > > /dev/null 2>&1 > > > > My feelings here are to again use regexp around the immutable non random > > parts of the command. cjeanner also made some suggestions in the > > etherpad [0]. > > Might be a temporary way to limit the surface indeed, but an upstream > change in Ansible would still be really nice. Predictable names is the > only "right" way, although this will create a long sudo ruleset. A > really long one to be honnest. Maintainability is also to be discussed > in either way (maintain a couple of regexp vs 200+ rules.. hmmm). > > As I understand it, the problem with predicable names is they also become predictable to attackers (this would be the reason ansible adds in the random string). It helps prevent someone creating a race condition to replace the python script with something more nefarious. Its the same reason commands such as mktemp exists. > > > However aside to the approach, we need to consider the impact locking > > down might have should someone create a develop a new bit of code that > > leverages commands wrapped in sudo and assumes ALL with be in place. > > This of course will be blocked. > > This will indeed require some doc, as this is a "major" change. However, > the use of regexp should somewhat limit the impact, especially since > Ansible pushes its exec script in the same location. > Even new parts should be allowed (that might be a bit of concern if we > want to really dig in the consequences of a bad template being injected > in some way [looking config-download ;)]). > But at some point, we might also decide to let the OPs ensure their > infra isn't compromised. > Always the same thread-of with Security vs The World - convenience vs > cumbersome management, and so on. > > > > > Now my guess is that our CI would capture this as the deploy would > > fail(?) and the developer should work out an entry is needed when > > testing their patch, but wanted to open this up to others who know > > testing at gate better much better than myself. Also encourage any > > thoughts on the topic to be introduced to the etherpad [0] > > > > [0] https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/tripleo-heat-admin-security > > [1] https://gist.github.com/lukehinds/4cdb1bf4de526a049c51f05698b8b04f > > > > -- > > Luke Hinds > > -- > Cédric Jeanneret > Software Engineer > DFG:DF > > > __________________________________________________________________________ > OpenStack Development Mailing List (not for usage questions) > Unsubscribe: [email protected]?subject:unsubscribe > http://lists.openstack.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openstack-dev > > -- Luke Hinds | NFV Partner Engineering | CTO Office | Red Hat e: [email protected] | irc: lhinds @freenode | t: +44 12 52 36 2483
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