On 02/01/2015 06:20 PM, Morgan Fainberg wrote:
> Putting on my "sorry-but-it-is-my-job-to-get-in-your-way" hat (aka security), 
> let's be careful how generous we are with the user and data we hand back. It 
> should give enough information to be useful but no more. I don't want to see 
> us opened to weird attack vectors because we're exposing internal state too 
> generously. 
> 
> In short let's aim for a slow roll of extra info in, and evaluate each data 
> point we expose (about a failure) before we do so. Knowing more about a 
> failure is important for our users. Allowing easy access to information that 
> could be used to attack / increase impact of a DOS could be bad. 
> 
> I think we can do it but it is important to not swing the pendulum too far 
> the other direction too fast (give too much info all of a sudden). 

Security by cloud obscurity?

I agree we should evaluate information sharing with security in mind.
However, the black boxing level we have today is bad for OpenStack. At a
certain point once you've added so many belts and suspenders, you can no
longer walk normally any more.

Anyway, lets stop having this discussion in abstract and actually just
evaluate the cases in question that come up.

        -Sean

-- 
Sean Dague
http://dague.net

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