Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Tue, Apr 26, 2016 at 08:19:23AM -0500, Doug Hellmann wrote:
Excerpts from Guangyu Suo's message of 2016-04-26 07:28:42 -0500:
Hello, oslo team
For now, some sensitive options like password or token are configured as
plaintext, anyone who has the priviledge to read the configure file can get
the real password, this may be a security problem that can't be
unacceptable for some people.
So the first solution comes to my mind is to encrypt these options when
configuring them and decrypt them when reading them in oslo.config. This is
a bit like apache/openldap did, but the difference is these softwares do a
salt hash to the password, this is a one-way encryption that can't be
decrypted, these softwares can recognize the hashed value. But if we do
this work in oslo.config, for example the admin_password in
keystone_middleware section, we must feed the keystone with the plaintext
password which will be hashed in keystone to compare with the stored hashed
password, thus the encryped value in oslo.config must be decryped to
plaintext. So we should encrypt these options using symmetrical or
unsymmetrical method with a key, and put the key in a well secured place,
and decrypt them using the same key when reading them.
Of course, this feature should be default closed. Any ideas?
Managing the encryption keys has always been the issue blocking
implementing this feature when it has come up in the past. We can't have
oslo.config rely on a separate OpenStack service for key management,
because presumably that service would want to use oslo.config and then
we have a dependency cycle.
So, we need a design that lets us securely manage those encryption keys
before we consider adding encryption. If we solve that, it's then
probably simpler to encrypt an entire config file instead of worrying
about encrypting individual values (something like how ansible vault
works).
IMHO encrypting oslo config files is addressing the wrong problem.
Rather than having sensitive passwords stored in the main config
files, we should have them stored completely separately by a secure
password manager of some kind. The config file would then merely
contain the name or uuid of an entry in the password manager. The
service (eg nova-compute) would then query that password manager
to get the actual sensitive password data it requires. At this point
oslo.config does not need to know/care about encryption of its data
as there's no longer sensitive data stored.
That reminds me of the internals of the keyring library that some of the
openstack clients used to use. It would integrate with mac os keychain,
linux secret services and things like kwallet and windows secret
services via its abstractions (code @
https://github.com/jaraco/keyring/tree/9.0/keyring/backends); perhaps
oslo.config could integrate with that library (and overcome the issues
that the python-*-client libraries had with using it/ejecting support
for it).
There are probably other similar libraries with similar backends that
could be used also (but that's the one I know about). A pluggable
backend might be nice since then u can integrate with your own secret
service (for example I know yahoo has there own similar service).
Regards,
Daniel
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