Hi, so basically my questions/thoughts about support for TC in OpenStack are based on a somewhat different attack model where the IaaS is actually not trusted.
That is in contrast with the Trusted Compute Pools, where the scheduler/trusted_filter is assumed to reject the host as a candidate for running the VM if it does not have a corresponding "trust value". However, nothing prevents a really evil IaaS deployment to ignore this trust value and go ahead, launch the VM and return it to the client. So there's an improvement suggestion focusing on that part. The model that I have in mind assumes both no trust in the IaaS setup/provider. So the gist is that: 1. Client could upload a secret encrypted with the public key of the authentication service (possible to include in the extra_specs) 2. The Attestation Service, after verifying the compute host could bind the secret to the hosts trusted configuration, so that the host can inject the secret into the VM With this approach, a malicious IaaS provider can still launch the VM on an untrusted host, but now he client can verify that the VM has been started on a 'trusted' host. So the questions around this are -- 1. Is the scenario of an untrusted IaaS deployment considered for Trusted Compute Pools? 2. Is there any work ongoing to extend Trusted Compute Polls for storage as well? Or otherwise put, what about the storage, is the solution to encrypt all data on the compute host prior to storing it in the object store? 3. Is there any work ongoing on the evaluation side, namely the evaluation of the trust attributes obtained from the host -- and do Trusted Compute Pools consider a binary value (trusted/untrusted) or a scale of security profiles? Cheers, /Nico. On 6 November 2012 19:07, Dugger, Donald D <[email protected]>wrote: > Nico-**** > > ** ** > > This is the appropriate place for discussions about Trusted Compute Pools > under OpenStack. Feel free to send out any ideas you have, I know I and > others would be very interested in what you have.**** > > ** ** > > --**** > > Don Dugger**** > > "Censeo Toto nos in Kansa esse decisse." - D. Gale**** > > Ph: 303/443-3786**** > > ** ** > > *From:* > [email protected][mailto: > [email protected]] *On > Behalf Of *Nicolae Paladi > *Sent:* Tuesday, November 06, 2012 8:35 AM > *To:* openstack > *Subject:* [Openstack] Plans for Trusted Computing in OpenStack**** > > ** ** > > Hi, **** > > ** ** > > I am involved in a project that aims to use TPM modules to ensure that**** > > the compute nodes run a 'trusted' software stack in a public IaaS > deployment.**** > > ** ** > > I've read about trusted computing pools ( > http://wiki.openstack.org/TrustedComputingPools)**** > > checked out the OpenAttestation project and seen a presentation from the > OpenStack**** > > summit (Putting Trust in > OpenStack<http://www.openstack.org/summit/san-diego-2012/openstack-summit-sessions/presentation/putting-trust-in-openstack>) > in order to get a better understading of where**** > > OpenStack is heading towards wrt TPM support.**** > > ** ** > > Are there any more resources, discussions, mailing lists that I could > check out and**** > > where I could potentially bounce ideas?**** > > ** ** > > Cheers, **** > > /Nico.**** >
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