Hello community,
here is the log from the commit of package xorg-x11-server for openSUSE:Factory
checked in at 2017-07-21 22:36:31
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/xorg-x11-server (Old)
and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.xorg-x11-server.new (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "xorg-x11-server"
Fri Jul 21 22:36:31 2017 rev:345 rq:510318 version:1.19.3
Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/xorg-x11-server/xorg-x11-server.changes
2017-07-08 12:25:29.949779207 +0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.xorg-x11-server.new/xorg-x11-server.changes
2017-07-21 22:36:42.700113566 +0200
@@ -1,0 +2,24 @@
+Fri Jul 14 13:52:36 UTC 2017 - sndir...@suse.com
+
+- disable Xwayland for s390x again; it was wrong to enable it;
+ there is no Wayland on s390x and will most likely never exist,
+ since there is no gfx card on such systems and no gfx emulation
+ either (bsc#1047173)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
+Thu Jul 13 13:20:07 UTC 2017 - sndir...@suse.com
+
+- u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch
+ If arc4random_buf() is not available for generating cookies:
+ * use getentropy(), if available (which was only recently added to
+ glibc)
+ * use getrandom() via syscall(), if available (there was no glibc
+ wrapper for this syscall for a long time)
+ * if all else fails, directly read from /dev/urandom as before, but
+ employ O_CLOEXEC, do an OsAbort() in case the random data couldn't be
+ read to avoid unsecure situations. Don't know if that's too hard a
+ measure but it shouldn't actually occur except on maximum number of
+ FDs reached
+ (bsc#1025084)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------
New:
----
u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Other differences:
------------------
++++++ xorg-x11-server.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.iw73J8/_old 2017-07-21 22:36:43.755964623 +0200
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.iw73J8/_new 2017-07-21 22:36:43.759964058 +0200
@@ -16,11 +16,13 @@
#
+%ifarch s390 s390x
+%define have_wayland 0
+%else
%define pci_ids_dir %{_sysconfdir}/X11/xorg_pci_ids
%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1330 || 0%{?build_xwayland}
%define have_wayland 1
-%else
-%define have_wayland 0
+%endif
%endif
%define build_suid_wrapper 0
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@
Patch212: U_Xi-Verify-all-events-in-ProcXSendExtensionEvent.patch
Patch213: U_Xi-Zero-target-buffer-in-SProcXSendExtensionEvent.patch
Patch214: U_dix-Disallow-GenericEvent-in-SendEvent-request.patch
+Patch215: u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch
Patch1000: n_xserver-optimus-autoconfig-hack.patch
@@ -342,6 +345,7 @@
%patch212 -p1
%patch213 -p1
%patch214 -p1
+%patch215 -p1
### disabled for now
#%patch1000 -p1
++++++ u_Use-better-fallbacks-to-generate-cookies-if-arc4rand.patch ++++++
>From 44a643812ce3c07cd38972abfa9dbd163529c192 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthias Gerstner <mgerst...@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2017 14:58:04 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Use better fallbacks to generate cookies if arc4random_buf(3)
is unavailable
References: bsc#1025084
If arc4random_buf() is not available for generating cookies:
- use getentropy(), if available (which was only recently added to
glibc)
- use getrandom() via syscall(), if available (there was no glibc
wrapper for this syscall for a long time)
- if all else fails, directly read from /dev/urandom as before, but
employ O_CLOEXEC, do an OsAbort() in case the random data couldn't be
read to avoid unsecure situations. Don't know if that's too hard a
measure but it shouldn't actually occur except on maximum number of
FDs reached
Reviewed-by: Stefan Dirsch <sndir...@suse.de>
---
configure.ac | 4 +-
include/dix-config.h.in | 6 +++
os/auth.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Index: xorg-server-1.19.3/configure.ac
===================================================================
--- xorg-server-1.19.3.orig/configure.ac
+++ xorg-server-1.19.3/configure.ac
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL(SPECIAL_DTRACE_OBJECTS, [
AC_HEADER_DIRENT
AC_HEADER_STDC
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([fcntl.h stdlib.h string.h unistd.h dlfcn.h stropts.h \
- fnmatch.h sys/mkdev.h sys/utsname.h])
+ fnmatch.h sys/mkdev.h sys/utsname.h sys/syscall.h])
dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
AC_C_CONST
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ AC_REPLACE_FUNCS([reallocarray strcasecm
AM_CONDITIONAL(POLL, [test "x$ac_cv_func_poll" = "xyes"])
AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [arc4random_buf])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([arc4random_buf getentropy])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([program_invocation_short_name], [], [], [[#include <errno.h>]])
Index: xorg-server-1.19.3/include/dix-config.h.in
===================================================================
--- xorg-server-1.19.3.orig/include/dix-config.h.in
+++ xorg-server-1.19.3/include/dix-config.h.in
@@ -167,6 +167,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getentropy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETENTROPY
+
/* Define to use libc SHA1 functions */
#undef HAVE_SHA1_IN_LIBC
@@ -244,6 +247,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/utsname.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_UTSNAME_H
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/syscall.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_memcmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_MEMCMP
Index: xorg-server-1.19.3/os/auth.c
===================================================================
--- xorg-server-1.19.3.orig/os/auth.c
+++ xorg-server-1.19.3/os/auth.c
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ from The Open Group.
#ifdef HAVE_LIBBSD
#include <bsd/stdlib.h> /* for arc4random_buf() */
#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H
+#include <syscall.h>
+#endif
struct protocol {
unsigned short name_length;
@@ -302,18 +306,142 @@ GenerateAuthorization(unsigned name_leng
return -1;
}
+#if ! defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF)
+
+// fallback function to get random data directly from /dev/urandom
+
+static int
+GetUrandom ( char *buffer, size_t length )
+{
+ int random_fd = -1;
+ int res = -1;
+ size_t filled = 0;
+
+ // larger requests are typically rejected by getentropy() / getrandom()
+ // because they could block or return partially filled buffers
+ if( length > 256 ) {
+ errno = EIO;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+
+ if( random_fd == -1 ) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while( filled < length ) {
+ res = read(random_fd, (char*)buffer + filled, length - filled);
+
+ if( res == -1 ) {
+ // shouldn't actually happen acc. to man(4) random,
+ // but you never know
+ if( errno == EINTR ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ res = errno;
+ close(random_fd);
+ errno = res;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else if( res == 0 ) {
+ close(random_fd);
+ // no more bytes available? should not happen
+ errno = EIO;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ filled += res;
+ }
+
+ close(random_fd);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif // ! defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF)
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSCALL_H) &&
defined(SYS_getrandom)
+# define TRY_GETRANDOM
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TRY_GETRANDOM
+
+/*
+ * wrapper for the getrandom() syscall which was for a long time implemented
+ * in the Linux kernel, but not wrapped in glibc
+ */
+static int
+GetRandom ( char *buffer, size_t length )
+{
+ int res;
+ size_t filled = 0;
+
+ // larger requests are typically rejected by getentropy() / getrandom()
+ // because they could block or return partially filled buffers
+ if( length > 256 )
+ {
+ errno = EIO;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ while( filled < length )
+ {
+ /*
+ * glibc does not contain a syscall wrapper for this in older
+ * versions
+ */
+ res = syscall(SYS_getrandom, (char*)buffer + filled, length - filled,
0);
+
+ if( res == -1 )
+ {
+ if( errno == EINTR ) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else if( res == 0 )
+ {
+ // no more bytes available? should not happen
+ errno = EIO;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ filled += res;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* TRY_GETRANDOM */
+
void
GenerateRandomData(int len, char *buf)
{
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
arc4random_buf(buf, len);
#else
- int fd;
+ int ret = -1;
+# ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY
+ /* use getentropy instead */
+ ret = getentropy (buf, len);
+# elif defined(TRY_GETRANDOM)
+ /* try getrandom() wrapper */
+ ret = GetRandom(buf, len);
+# endif
+
+ if( ret == -1 ) {
+ // fallback to manual reading of /dev/urandom
+ ret = GetUrandom(buf, len);
+ }
- fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
- read(fd, buf, len);
- close(fd);
-#endif
+ if( ret == -1 ) {
+ // no error return possible, rather abort than have security problems
+ OsAbort();
+ }
+#endif // HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
}
#endif /* XCSECURITY */
