Hello community, here is the log from the commit of package openssh for openSUSE:Factory checked in at 2018-10-23 20:33:50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssh (Old) and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssh.new (New) ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "openssh" Tue Oct 23 20:33:50 2018 rev:122 rq:642574 version:7.8p1 Changes: -------- --- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssh/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes 2018-05-25 21:36:02.498732936 +0200 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssh.new/openssh-askpass-gnome.changes 2018-10-23 20:34:05.768995508 +0200 @@ -1,0 +2,9 @@ +Tue Oct 9 10:52:15 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <[email protected]> + +- Update to 7.8p1: + * no actual changes for the askpass +- Format with spec-cleaner +- Respect cflags +- Use gtk3 rather than gtk2 which is being phased out + +------------------------------------------------------------------- --- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/openssh/openssh.changes 2018-10-01 09:04:56.611917305 +0200 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.openssh.new/openssh.changes 2018-10-23 20:34:06.312994858 +0200 @@ -1,0 +2,77 @@ +Wed Oct 17 08:42:12 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <[email protected]> + +- Remove the mention of the SLE12 in the README.SUSE +- Install firewall rules only when really needed (<SLE15) + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Oct 9 12:32:12 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <[email protected]> + +- Version update to 7.8p1: + * For most details see release notes file + * ssh-keygen(1): write OpenSSH format private keys by default + instead of using OpenSSL's PEM format +- Rebase patches to apply on 7.8p1 release: + * openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch +- Dropped patches: + * openssh-7.7p1-lastlog.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch +- Do not use env in script cavs_driver-ssh.pl +- Added pam_keyinit to pam configuration file [bsc#1081947] + +------------------------------------------------------------------- +Tue Oct 9 11:01:40 UTC 2018 - Tomáš Chvátal <[email protected]> + +- Format with spec-cleaner +- Reduce conditionals to support SLE12+ only +- Split out bundled patches to be normal patches applied over + the package (use -p1 for patches): + * openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-lastlog.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_getuid.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_geteuid.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch + * openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch + +------------------------------------------------------------------- @@ -1630,0 +1708 @@ + Old: ---- openssh-7.7p1-SUSE_patches.tar.gz openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc sshd.init New: ---- openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ openssh-askpass-gnome.spec ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_old 2018-10-23 20:34:08.204992598 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_new 2018-10-23 20:34:08.208992593 +0200 @@ -12,23 +12,22 @@ # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9) # published by the Open Source Initiative. -# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/ +# Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/ # %define _name openssh Name: openssh-askpass-gnome -BuildRequires: gtk2-devel -Version: 7.7p1 +Version: 7.8p1 Release: 0 -Requires: %{_name} = %{version} Summary: A GNOME-Based Passphrase Dialog for OpenSSH License: BSD-2-Clause Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH -Url: http://www.openssh.com/ +URL: http://www.openssh.com/ Source: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/%{_name}-%{version}.tar.gz Source42: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/%{_name}-%{version}.tar.gz.asc -BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build +BuildRequires: gtk3-devel +Requires: %{_name} = %{version} %description SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and @@ -40,14 +39,14 @@ %build cd contrib -make %{?_smp_mflags} gnome-ssh-askpass2 +export CFLAGS="%{optflags}" +make %{?_smp_mflags} gnome-ssh-askpass3 %install install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/ -install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass +install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %files -%defattr(-,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/gnome-ssh-askpass ++++++ openssh.spec ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_old 2018-10-23 20:34:08.232992564 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_new 2018-10-23 20:34:08.232992564 +0200 @@ -12,97 +12,39 @@ # license that conforms to the Open Source Definition (Version 1.9) # published by the Open Source Initiative. -# Please submit bugfixes or comments via http://bugs.opensuse.org/ +# Please submit bugfixes or comments via https://bugs.opensuse.org/ # -#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017 -%if ! %{defined _fillupdir} - %define _fillupdir /var/adm/fillup-templates -%endif - -%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1100 -%define has_fw_dir 1 -%else -%define has_fw_dir 0 -%endif - -%if 0%{suse_version} >= 1110 -%define has_libselinux 1 -%else -%define has_libselinux 0 -%endif - -%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1130 -%define needs_all_dirs 1 -%else -%define needs_all_dirs 0 -%endif - -%if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1140 -%define needs_libedit 1 -%else -%define needs_libedit 0 -%endif - -%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220 -%define uses_systemd 1 -%else -%define uses_systemd 0 -%endif - %define sandbox_seccomp 0 %ifnarch ppc -%if 0%{?suse_version} > 1220 %define sandbox_seccomp 1 %endif -%endif - %if 0%{?suse_version} >= 1500 -%define use_tirpc 1 +%bcond_with susefirewall +%bcond_without tirpc +%else +%bcond_without susefirewall +%bcond_with tirpc %endif - %define _fwdir %{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/SuSEfirewall2.d %define _fwdefdir %{_fwdir}/services %define _appdefdir %( grep "configdirspec=" $( which xmkmf ) | sed -r 's,^[^=]+=.*-I(.*)/config.*$,\\1/app-defaults,' ) -%{!?_initddir:%global _initddir %{_initrddir}} - -Name: openssh -BuildRequires: audit-devel -BuildRequires: autoconf -BuildRequires: groff -BuildRequires: zlib-devel -BuildRequires: pkgconfig(krb5) -%if %{needs_libedit} -BuildRequires: libedit-devel -%endif -%if %{has_libselinux} -BuildRequires: libselinux-devel -%endif -BuildRequires: openldap2-devel -BuildRequires: openssl-devel -BuildRequires: pam-devel -%if 0%{?use_tirpc} -BuildRequires: libtirpc-devel -%endif -%if %{uses_systemd} -BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsystemd) -BuildRequires: pkgconfig(systemd) -%{?systemd_requires} -%endif -PreReq: pwdutils %{fillup_prereq} coreutils -%if ! %{uses_systemd} -PreReq: %{insserv_prereq} +%define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX .hmac +%define CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE" +#Compat macro for new _fillupdir macro introduced in Nov 2017 +%if ! %{defined _fillupdir} + %define _fillupdir %{_localstatedir}/adm/fillup-templates %endif -Version: 7.7p1 +Name: openssh +Version: 7.8p1 Release: 0 Summary: Secure Shell Client and Server (Remote Login Program) License: BSD-2-Clause AND MIT Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH -Url: http://www.openssh.com/ -Source: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz -Source42: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc -Source1: sshd.init +URL: http://www.openssh.com/ +Source0: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz +Source1: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc Source2: sshd.pamd Source3: README.SUSE Source4: README.kerberos @@ -114,15 +56,61 @@ Source10: sshd.service Source11: README.FIPS Source12: cavs_driver-ssh.pl -Source100: openssh-%{version}-SUSE_patches.tar.gz -BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build -Conflicts: nonfreessh +Patch0: openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch +Patch1: openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch +Patch3: openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch +Patch4: openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch +Patch5: openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch +Patch6: openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch +Patch7: openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch +Patch8: openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch +Patch9: openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch +Patch10: openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch +Patch11: openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch +Patch14: openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch +Patch15: openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch +Patch16: openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch +Patch17: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch +Patch18: openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch +Patch19: openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch +Patch20: openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch +Patch21: openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch +Patch22: openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch +Patch23: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch +Patch24: openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch +Patch25: openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch +Patch26: openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch +Patch27: openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch +Patch28: openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch +Patch29: openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch +Patch30: openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch +Patch31: openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch +Patch32: openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch +Patch33: openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch +BuildRequires: audit-devel +BuildRequires: autoconf +BuildRequires: groff +BuildRequires: libedit-devel +BuildRequires: libselinux-devel +BuildRequires: openldap2-devel +BuildRequires: openssl-devel +BuildRequires: pam-devel +BuildRequires: pkgconfig +BuildRequires: zlib-devel +BuildRequires: pkgconfig(krb5) +BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsystemd) +Requires(post): %fillup_prereq +Requires(pre): pwdutils +Recommends: %{name}-helpers = %{version}-%{release} Recommends: audit Recommends: xauth -Recommends: %{name}-helpers = %{version}-%{release} -Conflicts: %{name}-fips < %{version}-%{release} , %{name}-fips > %{version}-%{release} -%define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX .hmac -%define CHECKSUM_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE" +Conflicts: %{name}-fips < %{version}-%{release} +Conflicts: %{name}-fips > %{version}-%{release} +Conflicts: nonfreessh +%{?systemd_requires} +%if %{with tirpc} +BuildRequires: libtirpc-devel +%endif %description SSH (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into and executing commands @@ -133,7 +121,6 @@ xorg-x11 (X Window System) connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. - %package helpers Summary: OpenSSH AuthorizedKeysCommand helpers Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH @@ -142,19 +129,18 @@ %description helpers Helper applications for OpenSSH which retrieve keys from various sources. - %package fips Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule HMACs Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: %{name} = %{version}-%{release} -Conflicts: %{name} < %{version}-%{release} , %{name} > %{version}-%{release} +Conflicts: %{name} < %{version}-%{release} +Conflicts: %{name} > %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: %{name}-hmac %description fips Hashes that together with the main package form the FIPS certifiable cryptomodule. - %package cavs Summary: OpenSSH FIPS cryptomodule CAVS tests Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH @@ -163,32 +149,21 @@ %description cavs FIPS140 CAVS tests related parts of the OpenSSH package - %prep -%setup -q -b 100 +%setup -q cp %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE11} . -# patch sources -PATCH_DIR="../SUSE_patches" -cat $PATCH_DIR/patch.series | while read p; do -%if %{suse_version} < 1330 - if echo "$p" | grep openssl_1.1.0.patch ; then - printf ">> skipping '$p'" - continue - fi -%endif - printf ">> applying '$p'\n" - patch -p2 < "${PATCH_DIR}/$p" -done -# set libexec dir in the LDAP patch +%autopatch -p1 + +#set libexec dir in the LDAP patch sed -i.libexec 's,@LIBEXECDIR@,%{_libexecdir}/ssh,' \ $( grep -Rl @LIBEXECDIR@ \ - $( grep "^+++" $PATCH_DIR/openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' ) + $( grep "^+++" openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch | sed -r 's@^.+/([^/\t ]+).*$@\1@' ) ) %build autoreconf -fiv -%ifarch s390 s390x %sparc +%ifarch s390 s390x %{sparc} PIEFLAGS="-fPIE" %else PIEFLAGS="-fpie" @@ -196,26 +171,19 @@ CFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector" CXXFLAGS="%{optflags} $PIEFLAGS -fstack-protector" LDFLAGS="-pie -Wl,--as-needed" -#CPPFLAGS="%{optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64" +#CPPFLAGS="% {optflags} -DUSE_INTERNAL_B64" export LDFLAGS CFLAGS CXXFLAGS CPPFLAGS %configure \ - --prefix=%{_prefix} \ - --mandir=%{_mandir} \ - --infodir=%{_infodir} \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/ssh \ --with-tcp-wrappers \ -%if %{has_libselinux} --with-selinux \ -%endif -%if %{uses_systemd} --with-pid-dir=/run \ --with-systemd \ -%endif --with-ssl-engine \ --with-pam \ --with-kerberos5=%{_prefix} \ - --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ + --with-privsep-path=%{_localstatedir}/lib/empty \ %if %{sandbox_seccomp} --with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \ %else @@ -228,46 +196,32 @@ --with-audit=linux \ --with-ldap \ --with-xauth=%{_bindir}/xauth \ -%if %{needs_libedit} --with-libedit \ -%endif --with-ssh1 \ --target=%{_target_cpu}-suse-linux \ ### configure end make %{?_smp_mflags} -#make %{?_smp_mflags} -C converter - %install -make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} -#make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} -C converter +%make_install install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d -install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}/var/lib/sshd +install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd install -m 644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ -install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_initddir} -%if %{uses_systemd} -install -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} . install -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/sshd.service -ln -s /sbin/service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd -%else -install -D -m 0755 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_initddir}/sshd -install -m 0644 %{SOURCE10} . -ln -s ../..%{_initddir}/sshd %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd -%endif +ln -s service %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/rcsshd install -d -m 755 %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir} install -m 644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}%{_fillupdir} # install shell script to automate the process of adding your public key to a remote machine install -m 755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir} install -m 644 contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1 -sed -i -e s@/usr/libexec@%{_libexecdir}@g %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config +sed -i -e s@%{_prefix}/libexec@%{_libexecdir}@g %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config -%if %{has_fw_dir} -#install firewall definitions format is described here: -#%{_datadir}/SuSEfirewall2/services/TEMPLATE +%if %{with susefirewall} +#install firewall definitions mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir} install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}%{_fwdefdir}/sshd %endif @@ -284,7 +238,7 @@ # re-define the __os_install_post macro: the macro strips # the binaries and thereby invalidates any hashes created earlier. # -# this shows up earlier because otherwise the %expand of +# this shows up earlier because otherwise the % expand of # the macro is too late. %{expand:%%global __os_install_post {%__os_install_post for b in \ @@ -299,52 +253,36 @@ %pre getent group sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r sshd -getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d /var/lib/sshd -s /bin/false -c "SSH daemon" sshd -%if %{uses_systemd} +getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || %{_sbindir}/useradd -r -g sshd -d %{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd -s /bin/false -c "SSH daemon" sshd %service_add_pre sshd.service -%endif %post -%if %{uses_systemd} %{fillup_only -n ssh sshd} %service_add_post sshd.service -%else -%{fillup_and_insserv -n ssh sshd} -%endif -%set_permissions /etc/ssh/sshd_config +%set_permissions %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %preun -%if %{uses_systemd} %service_del_preun sshd.service -%else -%stop_on_removal sshd -%endif %postun # The openssh-fips trigger script for openssh will normally restart sshd once # it gets installed, so only restart the service here is openssh-fips is not # present rpm -q openssh-fips >& /dev/null && DISABLE_RESTART_ON_UPDATE=yes -%if %{uses_systemd} %service_del_postun sshd.service -%else -%restart_on_update sshd -%{insserv_cleanup} -%endif %triggerin -n openssh-fips -- %{name} = %{version}-%{release} %restart_on_update sshd %verifyscript -%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config +%verify_permissions -e %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %files -%defattr(-,root,root) %exclude %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %exclude %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs* -%dir %attr(755,root,root) /var/lib/sshd +%dir %attr(755,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/sshd %license LICENCE %doc README.SUSE README.kerberos README.FIPS ChangeLog OVERVIEW README TODO CREDITS %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh @@ -352,34 +290,23 @@ %verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %verify(not mode) %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/sshd -%if %{uses_systemd} -%doc sshd.init -%attr(0644,root,root) %config %{_unitdir}/sshd.service -%else -%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_initddir}/sshd -%doc sshd.service -%endif +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.service %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh %exclude %{_libexecdir}/ssh/ssh-ldap* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/* -%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/* -%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/* -%attr(0444,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/* +%attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/* +%attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/* +%attr(0444,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/* %dir %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d %config %{_sysconfdir}/slp.reg.d/ssh.reg %{_fillupdir}/sysconfig.ssh -%if %{has_fw_dir} -%if %{needs_all_dirs} -%dir %{_fwdir} -%dir %{_fwdefdir} -%endif +%if %{with susefirewall} %config %{_fwdefdir}/sshd %endif %files helpers -%defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %verify(not mode) %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ldap.conf %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/ssh @@ -387,13 +314,11 @@ %doc HOWTO.ldap-keys openssh-lpk-openldap.schema openssh-lpk-sun.schema %files fips -%defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0444,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %attr(0444,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %attr(0444,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/sftp-server%{CHECKSUM_SUFFIX} %files cavs -%defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh/cavs* %changelog ++++++ README.SUSE ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_old 2018-10-23 20:34:08.304992478 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_new 2018-10-23 20:34:08.304992478 +0200 @@ -1,11 +1,9 @@ -This is OpenSSH version 7.2p2 for SLE12 - There are following changes in default settings of ssh client and server: * Accepting and sending of locale environment variables in protocol 2 is enabled. -* PAM authentication is enabled. +* PAM authentication is enabled and mostly even required, do not turn it off. * root authentiation with password is enabled by default (PermitRootLogin yes). NOTE: this has security implications and is only done in order to not change @@ -26,4 +24,3 @@ ssh_config and sshd_config manual pages. For more information on differences in SUSE OpenSSH package see README.FIPS - ++++++ README.kerberos ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_old 2018-10-23 20:34:08.320992459 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_new 2018-10-23 20:34:08.320992459 +0200 @@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ for dialup users because they would lead to excessive delays if DNS was not reachable. -In order to disable these lookups, I had to change the default -configuration, disabling GSSAPI authentication. - If you do use Kerberos, please make sure you edit the server and client configuration files as follows: @@ -19,4 +16,3 @@ ... lots of other options ... GSSAPIAuthentication yes GSSAPIDelegateCredentials yes - ++++++ cavs_driver-ssh.pl ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_old 2018-10-23 20:34:08.332992445 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_new 2018-10-23 20:34:08.336992440 +0200 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -#!/usr/bin/env perl +#!/usr/bin/perl # # CAVS test driver for OpenSSH # ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-IPv6_X_forwarding.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 8df645ca39d64de025d8838c5713812e72308c92 Correctly parse DISPLAY variable for cases where it contains an IPv6 address (which should - but not always is - in (square) brackets). bnc#847710 - https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=847710 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c b/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c --- openssh-7.7p1/channels.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/channels.c @@ -4590,33 +4590,42 @@ x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. + * Note that IPv6 numeric addresses contain colons (e.g. ::1:0) */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); - cp = strchr(buf, ':'); + cp = strrchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* * buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the * display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } + + /* Remove brackets surrounding IPv6 addresses if there are any. */ + if (buf[0] == '[' && (cp = strchr(buf, ']'))) { + *cp = 0; + cp = buf + 1; + } else { + cp = buf; + } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-X11_trusted_forwarding.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent d25c96855fd67e997e25ec1198d953af33eb289c # enable trusted X11 forwarding by default in both sshd and sshsystem-wide # configuration # bnc#50836 (was suse #35836) Enable Trusted X11 forwarding by default, since the security benefits of having it disabled are negligible these days with XI2 being widely used. Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config @@ -17,9 +17,20 @@ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. -# Host * +Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no + +# If you do not trust your remote host (or its administrator), you +# should not forward X11 connections to your local X11-display for +# security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the +# remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your +# keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do. +# Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config +# file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to +# expire after twenty minutes after remote login. + ForwardX11Trusted yes + # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no -#X11Forwarding no +X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-X_forward_with_disabled_ipv6.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 44592f09f090e74432f608084069d30d808fda69 Do not throw away already open sockets for X11 forwarding if another socket family is not available for bind() diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c b/openssh-7.7p1/channels.c --- openssh-7.7p1/channels.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/channels.c @@ -4421,16 +4421,23 @@ x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__, port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); + /* do not remove successfully opened sockets if + * the request failed because the protocol + * IPv4/6 is not available (e.g. IPv6 may be + * disabled while being supported) + */ + if (EADDRNOTAVAIL == errno) + continue; for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) close(socks[n]); num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-allow_root_password_login.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 3bf0158be93bd08d60a30a320650ea7f9844ef50 Allow root login with password by default. While less secure than upstream default of forbidding access to the root account with a password, we are temporarily introducing this change to keep the default used in older OpenSSH versions shipped with SLE. diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c b/openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c --- openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/servconf.c @@ -265,17 +265,17 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) - options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD; + options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config @@ -24,17 +24,17 @@ # Logging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m -#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password +#PermitRootLogin yes #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0 @@ -709,17 +709,17 @@ DESCRIPTION none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports, respectively. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no. The - default is prohibit-password. + default is yes. If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5 @@ -1220,17 +1220,17 @@ Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Cm yes , .Cm prohibit-password , .Cm forced-commands-only , or .Cm no . The default is -.Cm prohibit-password . +.Cm yes . .Pp If this option is set to .Cm prohibit-password (or its deprecated alias, .Cm without-password ) , password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-audit.patch ++++++ ++++ 2264 lines (skipped) ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-blocksigalrm.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 2e66b48b2212113d9897a58aaada67557b7c4f35 block SIGALRM while logging through syslog to prevent deadlocks (through grace_alarm_handler()) bnc#57354 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/log.c b/openssh-7.7p1/log.c --- openssh-7.7p1/log.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/log.c @@ -46,16 +46,17 @@ #include <syslog.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include <vis.h> #endif #include "log.h" +#include <signal.h> static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; static int log_on_stderr = 1; static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO; static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH; static char *argv0; static log_handler_fn *log_handler; static void *log_handler_ctx; @@ -396,16 +397,17 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, { #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT; #endif char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ]; char *txt = NULL; int pri = LOG_INFO; + sigset_t nset, oset; int saved_errno = errno; log_handler_fn *tmp_handler; if (level > log_level) return; switch (level) { case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL: @@ -455,20 +457,28 @@ do_log(LogLevel level, const char *fmt, log_handler = NULL; tmp_handler(level, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx); log_handler = tmp_handler; } else if (log_on_stderr) { snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%.*s\r\n", (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf); (void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf)); } else { + /* Prevent a race between the grace_alarm which writes a + * log message and terminates and main sshd code that leads + * to deadlock as syslog is not async safe. + */ + sigemptyset(&nset); + sigaddset(&nset, SIGALRM); + sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata); syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf); closelog_r(&sdata); #else openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility); syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf); closelog(); #endif + sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } errno = saved_errno; } ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-ctr.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent cc1022edba2c5eeb0facba08468f65afc2466b63 CAVS test for OpenSSH's own CTR encryption mode implementation diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in --- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in +++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in @@ -19,16 +19,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ DESTDIR= VPATH=@srcdir@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper +CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ @@ -57,16 +58,18 @@ ENT=@ENT@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) +TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) + XMSS_OBJS=\ ssh-xmss.o \ sshkey-xmss.o \ xmss_commons.o \ xmss_fast.o \ xmss_hash.o \ xmss_hash_address.o \ xmss_wots.o @@ -199,16 +202,20 @@ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) +# FIPS tests +cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o + $(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ else \ @@ -339,16 +346,17 @@ install-files: $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-ctr.c b/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-ctr.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-ctr.c @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +/* + * + * invocation (all of the following are equal): + * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 + * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000 + * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <ctype.h> + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "cipher.h" + +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + +void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n" + " --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n" + " [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n" + "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n" + "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n"); + exit(1); +} + +void * +fromhex(char *hex, size_t * len) +{ + unsigned char *bin; + char *p; + size_t n = 0; + int shift = 4; + unsigned char out = 0; + unsigned char *optr; + + bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex) / 2); + optr = bin; + + for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) { + unsigned char c; + + c = *p; + if (isspace(c)) + continue; + + if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { + c = c - '0'; + } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') { + c = c - 'A' + 10; + } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') { + c = c - 'a' + 10; + } else { + /* truncate on nonhex cipher */ + break; + } + + out |= c << shift; + shift = (shift + 4) % 8; + + if (shift) { + *(optr++) = out; + out = 0; + ++n; + } + } + + *len = n; + return bin; +} + +#define READ_CHUNK 4096 +#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100 +char * +read_stdin(void) +{ + char *buf; + size_t n, total = 0; + + buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK); + + do { + n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin); + if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */ + break; + + total += n; + buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1); + } while (total < MAX_READ_SIZE); + return buf; +} + +int +main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + + struct sshcipher *c; + struct sshcipher_ctx cc; + struct sshcipher_ctx *ccp; + char *algo = "aes128-ctr"; + char *hexkey = NULL; + char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; + char *hexdata = NULL; + char *p; + int i; + int encrypt = 1; + void *key; + size_t keylen; + void *iv; + size_t ivlen; + void *data; + size_t datalen; + void *outdata; + + for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) { + if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) { + algo = argv[++i]; + } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) { + hexkey = argv[++i]; + } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) { + ++i; + if (argv[i] == NULL) { + usage(); + } + if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) { + encrypt = 1; + } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) { + encrypt = 0; + } else { + usage(); + } + } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) { + hexiv = argv[++i]; + } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) { + hexdata = argv[++i]; + } + } + + if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) { + usage(); + } + + SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + + c = cipher_by_name(algo); + if (c == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n"); + return 2; + } + + if (hexdata == NULL) { + hexdata = read_stdin(); + } else { + hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata); + } + + key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen); + + if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n"); + return 2; + } + + iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen); + + if (ivlen != 16) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n"); + return 2; + } + + data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen); + + if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n"); + return 2; + } + + ccp = &cc; + cipher_init(&ccp, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt); + + free(key); + free(iv); + + outdata = malloc(datalen); + if (outdata == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n"); + return 2; + } + + cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0); + + free(data); + + cipher_free(&cc); + + for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) { + printf("%02X", (unsigned char) *p); + } + + free(outdata); + + printf("\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c b/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c --- openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/cipher.c @@ -49,25 +49,16 @@ #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "fips.h" #include "log.h" -struct sshcipher_ctx { - int plaintext; - int encrypt; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp; - struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ - struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ - const struct sshcipher *cipher; -}; - struct sshcipher { char *name; u_int block_size; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ u_int auth_len; u_int flags; #define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h b/openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h --- openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h +++ openssh-7.7p1/cipher.h @@ -41,17 +41,25 @@ #include <openssl/evp.h> #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" #include "cipher-aesctr.h" #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 struct sshcipher; -struct sshcipher_ctx; +struct sshcipher_ctx { + int plaintext; + int encrypt; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp; + struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ + struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ + const struct sshcipher *cipher; +}; + const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); int ciphers_valid(const char *); char *cipher_alg_list(char, int); int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int); int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-cavstest-kdf.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 1e1d5a2ab8bddfc800f570755f9ea1addcc878c1 CAVS test for KDF implementation in OpenSSH diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in --- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in +++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in @@ -20,16 +20,17 @@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ DESTDIR= VPATH=@srcdir@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper CAVSTEST_CTR=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr +CAVSTEST_KDF=$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ @@ -58,17 +59,17 @@ ENT=@ENT@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@ MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) -TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) +TARGETS += cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) XMSS_OBJS=\ ssh-xmss.o \ sshkey-xmss.o \ xmss_commons.o \ xmss_fast.o \ xmss_hash.o \ xmss_hash_address.o \ @@ -206,16 +207,19 @@ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) # FIPS tests cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-ctr.o $(LD) -o $@ cavstest-ctr.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) +cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a cavstest-kdf.o + $(LD) -o $@ cavstest-kdf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) + # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ else \ @@ -347,16 +351,17 @@ install-files: $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-ctr$(EXEEXT) + $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/cavstest-kdf$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-kdf.c b/openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-kdf.c new file mode 100644 --- /dev/null +++ openssh-7.7p1/cavstest-kdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,387 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <[email protected]> + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety, + * including the disclaimer of warranties. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote + * products derived from this software without specific prior + * written permission. + * + * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of + * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 + * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is + * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and + * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.) + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF + * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE + * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH + * DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <openssl/bn.h> + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "kex.h" +#include "packet.h" + +static int bin_char(unsigned char hex) +{ + if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex) + return (hex - 48); + if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex) + return (hex - 55); + if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex) + return (hex - 87); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Convert hex representation into binary string + * @hex input buffer with hex representation + * @hexlen length of hex + * @bin output buffer with binary data + * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least + * half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted) + */ +static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen, + unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen) +{ + size_t i = 0; + size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen; + + for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) { + bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4; + bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]); + } +} + +/* + * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex + * and convert hex into bin + * + * Caller must free bin + * @hex input buffer with hex representation + * @hexlen length of hex + * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer + * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin + * + * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise + */ +static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen, + unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen) +{ + unsigned char *out = NULL; + size_t outlen = 0; + + if (!hexlen) + return -EINVAL; + + outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2; + + out = calloc(1, outlen); + if (!out) + return -errno; + + hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen); + *bin = out; + *binlen = outlen; + return 0; +} + +static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', + '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' }; +static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7', + '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' }; +static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u) +{ + if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l)) + return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin]; + return 'X'; +} + +/* + * Convert binary string into hex representation + * @bin input buffer with binary data + * @binlen length of bin + * @hex output buffer to store hex data + * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least + * twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted) + * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case) + */ +static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen, + char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u) +{ + size_t i = 0; + size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen; + + for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) { + hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u); + hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u); + } +} + +struct kdf_cavs { + unsigned char *K; + size_t Klen; + unsigned char *H; + size_t Hlen; + unsigned char *session_id; + size_t session_id_len; + + unsigned int iv_len; + unsigned int ek_len; + unsigned int ik_len; +}; + +static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct kex kex; + BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL; + int mode = 0; + struct newkeys *keys_client; + struct newkeys *keys_server; + struct ssh *ssh = NULL; + +#define HEXOUTLEN 500 + char hex[HEXOUTLEN]; + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex)); + + Kbn = BN_new(); + BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn); + if (!Kbn) { + printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n"); + ret = 1; + goto out; + } + + kex.session_id = test->session_id; + kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len; + + /* setup kex */ + + /* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */ + switch (test->ik_len) { + case 20: + kex.hash_alg = 2; + break; + case 32: + kex.hash_alg = 3; + break; + case 48: + kex.hash_alg = 4; + break; + case 64: + kex.hash_alg = 5; + break; + default: + printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len); + ret = 1; + goto out; + } + + /* implement choose_enc */ + for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) { + kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys)); + if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) { + printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n"); + ret = 1; + goto out; + } + kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len; + kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len; + kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16; + kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len; + } + + /* implement kex_choose_conf */ + kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len; + if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size) + kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size; + if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len) + kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len; + if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len) + kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len; + + /* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client + * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */ + kex.server = 1; + + /* do it */ + if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){ + printf("Allocation error\n"); + goto out; + } + ssh->kex = &kex; + kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn); + + keys_client = kex.newkeys[0]; + keys_server = kex.newkeys[1]; + + /* get data */ + memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); + bin2hex(keys_client->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_client->enc.iv_len, + hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); + printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex); + + memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); + bin2hex(keys_server->enc.iv, (size_t)keys_server->enc.iv_len, + hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); + printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex); + + memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); + bin2hex(keys_client->enc.key, (size_t)keys_client->enc.key_len, + hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); + printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex); + + memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); + bin2hex(keys_server->enc.key, (size_t)keys_server->enc.key_len, + hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); + printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex); + + memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); + bin2hex(keys_client->mac.key, (size_t)keys_client->mac.key_len, + hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); + printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex); + + memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN); + bin2hex(keys_server->mac.key, (size_t)keys_server->mac.key_len, + hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0); + printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex); + + free(keys_client); + free(keys_server); + +out: + if (Kbn) + BN_free(Kbn); + if (ssh) + ssh_packet_close(ssh); + if (kex.newkeys[0]) + free(kex.newkeys[0]); + if (kex.newkeys[1]) + free(kex.newkeys[1]); + return ret; +} + +static void usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n"); +} + +/* + * Test command example: + * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20 + * + * Expected result for example: + * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a + * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed + * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640 + * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308 + * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0 + * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479 + */ +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + struct kdf_cavs test; + int ret = 1; + int opt = 0; + + memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs)); + while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1) + { + size_t len = 0; + switch(opt) + { + /* + * CAVS K is MPINT + * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the + * following transformations already happened): + * 1. cut off first four bytes + * 2. if most significant bit of value is + * 1, prepend 0 byte + */ + case 'K': + len = strlen(optarg); + ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len, + &test.K, &test.Klen); + if (ret) + goto out; + break; + case 'H': + len = strlen(optarg); + ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len, + &test.H, &test.Hlen); + if (ret) + goto out; + break; + case 's': + len = strlen(optarg); + ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len, + &test.session_id, + &test.session_id_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + break; + case 'i': + test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); + break; + case 'e': + test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); + break; + case 'm': + test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); + break; + default: + usage(); + goto out; + } + } + + ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test); + +out: + if (test.session_id) + free(test.session_id); + if (test.K) + free(test.K); + if (test.H) + free(test.H); + return ret; + +} ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-disable_openssl_abi_check.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent b13da8c3e99081cb92ab226d2c512241a82cd0d5 disable run-time check for OpenSSL ABI by version number as that is not a reliable indicator of ABI changes and doesn't make much sense in a distribution package diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac b/openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac --- openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac +++ openssh-7.7p1/configure.ac @@ -4895,16 +4895,29 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], [Define if you have BSD auth support]) BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes fi ] ) +# Whether we are using distribution (Open)SSL, so no runtime checks are necessary +DISTRO_SSL=no +AC_ARG_WITH([distro-ssl], + [ --with-distro-ssl Disable runtime OpenSSL version checks (good for distributions)], + [ + if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_DEFINE([DISTRO_SSL], [1], + [Define if you are using distribution SSL library and don;t expect its API/ABI to change]) + DISTRO_SSL=yes + fi + ] +) + # Where to place sshd.pid piddir=/var/run # make sure the directory exists if test ! -d $piddir ; then piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` case $piddir in NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c b/openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c --- openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/entropy.c @@ -209,19 +209,21 @@ rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m) #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ void seed_rng(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; #endif +#ifndef DISTRO_SSL if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay())) fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY if (RAND_status() == 1) { debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); return; } if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-disable_short_DH_parameters.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 681914438b1a02c1940d19204138e9b8eacfda7b Raise minimal size of DH group parameters to 2048 bits like upstream did in 7.2. 1024b values are believed to be in breaking range for state adversaries and the default moduli shipped with openssh have been around long enough to make it more likely for them to be broken. Also provide an option that allows the client to accept shorter (RFC4419 compliant) parameters. CVE-2015-4000 (LOGJAM) bsc#932483 Index: openssh-7.8p1/dh.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/dh.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/dh.c @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" +int dh_grp_min = DH_GRP_MIN; + static int parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) { Index: openssh-7.8p1/dh.h =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/dh.h +++ openssh-7.8p1/dh.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ u_int dh_estimate(int); * Max value from RFC4419. * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks. */ +#define DH_GRP_MIN_RFC 1024 #define DH_GRP_MIN 2048 #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 Index: openssh-7.8p1/kexgexc.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/kexgexc.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/kexgexc.c @@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" +/* import from dh.c */ +extern int dh_grp_min; + static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); @@ -63,7 +66,7 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); - kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; + kex->min = dh_grp_min; kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; kex->nbits = nbits; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) @@ -108,6 +111,12 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32 goto out; if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 || (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) { + if ((u_int)bits < kex->min && (u_int)bits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC) + logit("DH parameter offered by the server (%d bits) " + "is considered insecure. " + "You can lower the accepted the minimum " + "via the KexDHMin option.", + bits); r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } Index: openssh-7.8p1/kexgexs.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/kexgexs.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/kexgexs.c @@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" +/* import from dh.c */ +extern int dh_grp_min; + static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); @@ -82,13 +85,19 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int kex->nbits = nbits; kex->min = min; kex->max = max; - min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min); + min = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, min); max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max); - nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MAXIMUM(dh_grp_min, nbits); nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) { + if (kex->nbits < kex->min && kex->nbits >= DH_GRP_MIN_RFC) + logit("DH parameter requested by the client (%d bits) " + "is considered insecure. " + "You can lower the accepted minimum " + "via the KexDHMin option.", + kex->nbits); r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } Index: openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/readconf.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "dh.h" /* Format of the configuration file: @@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ typedef enum { oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand, oVisualHostKey, - oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, + oKexAlgorithms, oKexDHMin, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, @@ -291,6 +292,7 @@ static struct { { "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, + { "kexdhmin", oKexDHMin }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, @@ -312,6 +314,9 @@ static struct { { NULL, oBadOption } }; +/* import from dh.c */ +extern int dh_grp_min; + /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. @@ -1206,6 +1211,10 @@ parse_int: options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; + case oKexDHMin: + intptr = &options->kex_dhmin; + goto parse_int; + case oHostKeyAlgorithms: charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms; parse_keytypes: @@ -1835,6 +1844,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->kex_dhmin = -1; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->num_identity_files = 0; options->num_certificate_files = 0; @@ -1988,6 +1998,13 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; + if (options->kex_dhmin == -1) + options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN; + else { + options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); + options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX); + } + dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin; /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) options->add_keys_to_agent = 0; Index: openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/readconf.h +++ openssh-7.8p1/readconf.h @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ typedef struct { char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ + int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c @@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "dh.h" + +/* import from dh.c */ +extern int dh_grp_min; static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *, const char *, int); @@ -146,6 +150,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; + options->kex_dhmin = -1; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; @@ -263,6 +268,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1) options->use_pam_check_locks = 0; + if (options->kex_dhmin == -1) + options->kex_dhmin = DH_GRP_MIN; + else { + options->kex_dhmin = MAXIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MIN_RFC); + options->kex_dhmin = MINIMUM(options->kex_dhmin, DH_GRP_MAX); + } + dh_grp_min = options->kex_dhmin; + /* Standard Options */ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ @@ -490,7 +503,7 @@ typedef enum { sHostCertificate, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, - sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, + sKexAlgorithms, sKexDHMin, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, @@ -631,6 +644,7 @@ static struct { { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "kexdhmin", sKexDHMin }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, @@ -1726,6 +1740,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; + case sKexDHMin: + intptr = &options->kex_dhmin; + goto parse_int; + case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", @@ -2540,6 +2558,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); + dump_cfg_int(sKexDHMin, o->kex_dhmin); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h +++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h @@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ typedef struct { char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ + int kex_dhmin; /* minimum bit length of the DH group parameter */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ # list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the # ssh_config(5) man page. +# Minimum accepted size of the DH parameter p. By default this is set to 1024 +# to maintain compatibility with RFC4419, but should be set higher. +# Upstream default is identical to setting this to 2048. +#KexDHMin 1024 + Host * # ForwardAgent no # ForwardX11 no Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.0 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.0 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.0 @@ -595,6 +595,23 @@ DESCRIPTION The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using "ssh -Q kex". + KexDHMin + Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group + parameter p. + + As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly + been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits. + Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter + than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits. + Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that + only know short DH group parameters. + + Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain + maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact + security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last + resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) + counterparty. + LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh_config.5 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh_config.5 @@ -1025,6 +1025,22 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q kex . +.It Cm KexDHMin +Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group +parameter p. +.Pp +As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly +been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits. +Setting this option allows the client to accept parameters shorter +than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits. +Using this option may be needed when connecting to servers that +only know short DH group parameters. +.Pp +Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain +maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact +security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last +resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) +counterparty. .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config @@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +# Minimum accepted size of the DH parameter p. The default, which replicates +# upstream behaviour, is 2048. To maintain compatibility with RFC4419 it should +# be set to 1024. +# You will also need to add a HostKey directive to load a DSA key (typically +# located in /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key), which is not loaded by default. +#KexDHMin 2048 + # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.0 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0 @@ -545,6 +545,23 @@ DESCRIPTION The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using "ssh -Q kex". + KexDHMin + Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group + parameter p. + + As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly + been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits. + Setting this option allows the server to accept parameters shorter + than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits. + Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong + clients only know short DH group parameters. + + Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain + maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact + security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last + resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) + counterparty. + ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The following forms may be used: Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 @@ -912,6 +912,22 @@ diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hel .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using .Qq ssh -Q kex . +.It Cm KexDHMin +Specifies the minimum accepted bit length of the DH group +parameter p. +.Pp +As per RFC4419, this is 1024 bits, however this has increasingly +been seen as insecure, which prompted the change to 2048 bits. +Setting this option allows the server to accept parameters shorter +than the current minimum, down to the RFC specified 1024 bits. +Using this option may be needed when some of the connectiong +clients only know short DH group parameters. +.Pp +Note, that while by default this option is set to 1024 to maintain +maximum backward compatibility, using it can severly impact +security and thus should be viewed as a temporary fix of last +resort and all efforts should be made to fix the (broken) +counterparty. .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-eal3.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 8fd4e445c3a5c823568661a4f71b064cbcb217a9 fix paths and references in sshd man pages diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in b/openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in --- openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in +++ openssh-7.7p1/Makefile.in @@ -127,17 +127,18 @@ MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli PATHSUBS = \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \ - -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \ + -e 's|login\.conf|login.defs|g' \ + -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/ssh/shosts.equiv|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \ -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-enable_PAM_by_default.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 5c1e122e31b601de64d81085294216af33f31aed # force PAM in defaullt install (this was removed from upstream in 3.8p1) # bnc#46749 # --used to be called '-pam-fix2' diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config @@ -74,17 +74,17 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. -#UsePAM no +UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch ++++++ ++++ 1010 lines (skipped) ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-fips_checks.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent e9b69da9a0f8dca923f8fc2836b38fe6590c791a # # Simple implementation of FIPS 140-2 selfchecks. Use OpenSSL to generate and # verify checksums of binaries. Any hash iused in OpenSSH can be used (MD5 would # obviously be a poor choice, since OpenSSL would barf and abort immediately in # FIPS mode). SHA-2 seems to be a reasonable choice. # # The logic of the checks is as follows: decide whether FIPS mode is mandated # (either by checking /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled or envoroinment variable # SSH_FORCE_FIPS. In FIPS mode, checksums are required to match (inability to # retrieve pre-calculated hash is a fatal error). In non-FIPS mode the checks # still must be performed, unless the hashes are not installed. Thus if the hash # file is not found (or the hash matches), proceed in non-FIPS mode and abort # otherwise. Index: openssh-7.8p1/fips-check.c =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ openssh-7.8p1/fips-check.c @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#include "includes.h" +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "digest.h" +#include "fips.h" + +#include <openssl/err.h> + +#define PROC_NAME_LEN 64 + +static const char *argv0; + +void +print_help_exit(int ev) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "%s <-c|-w> <file> <checksum_file>\n", argv0); + fprintf(stderr, " -c verify hash of 'file' against hash in 'checksum_file'\n"); + fprintf(stderr, " -w write hash of 'file' into 'checksum_file'\n"); + exit(ev); +} + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + fips_ssh_init(); + return 0; +} Index: openssh-7.8p1/fips.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/fips.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/fips.c @@ -35,33 +35,296 @@ #include "log.h" #include "xmalloc.h" +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <unistd.h> #include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/hmac.h> /* import from dh.c */ extern int dh_grp_min; static int fips_state = -1; +/* calculates HMAC of contents of a file given by filename using the hash + * algorithm specified by FIPS_HMAC_EVP in fips.h and placing the result into + * newly allacated memory - remember to free it when not needed anymore */ static int -fips_check_required_env(void) +hmac_file(const char *filename, u_char **hmac_out) +{ + int check = -1; + int fd; + struct stat fs; + void *hmap; + unsigned char *hmac; + unsigned char *hmac_rv = NULL; + + hmac = xmalloc(FIPS_HMAC_LEN); + + fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); + if (-1 == fd) + goto bail_out; + + if (-1 == fstat(fd, &fs)) + goto bail_out; + + hmap = mmap(NULL, fs.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); + + if ((void *)(-1) != hmap) { + hmac_rv = HMAC(FIPS_HMAC_EVP(), FIPS_HMAC_KEY + , strlen(FIPS_HMAC_KEY), hmap, fs.st_size, hmac, NULL); + check = CHECK_OK; + munmap(hmap, fs.st_size); + } + close(fd); + +bail_out: + if (hmac_rv) { + check = CHECK_OK; + *hmac_out = hmac; + } else { + check = CHECK_FAIL; + *hmac_out = NULL; + free(hmac); + } + return check; +} + +/* find pathname of binary of process with PID pid. exe is buffer expected to + * be capable of holding at least max_pathlen characters + */ +static int +get_executable_path(pid_t pid, char *exe, int max_pathlen) +{ + char exe_sl[PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN]; + int n; + int rv = -1; + + n = snprintf(exe_sl, sizeof(exe_sl), "/proc/%u/exe", pid); + if ((n <= 10) || (n >= max_pathlen)) { + fatal("error compiling filename of link to executable"); + } + + exe[0] = 0; + n = readlink(exe_sl, exe, max_pathlen); + /* the file doesn't need to exist - procfs might not be mounted in + * chroot */ + if (n == -1) { + rv = CHECK_MISSING; + } else { + if (n < max_pathlen) { + exe[n] = 0; + rv = CHECK_OK; + } else { + rv = CHECK_FAIL; + } + } + return rv; +} + +/* Read HMAC from file chk, allocating enough memory to hold the HMAC and + * return it in *hmac. + * Remember to free() it when it's not needed anymore. + */ +static int +read_hmac(const char *chk, u_char **hmac) +{ + int check = -1; + int fdh, n; + u_char *hmac_in; + + *hmac = NULL; + + fdh = open(chk, O_RDONLY); + if (-1 == fdh) { + switch (errno) { + case ENOENT: + check = CHECK_MISSING; + debug("fips: checksum file %s is missing\n", chk); + break; + default: + check = CHECK_FAIL; + debug("fips: ckecksum file %s not accessible\n", chk); + break; + + } + goto bail_out; + } + + hmac_in = xmalloc(FIPS_HMAC_LEN); + + n = read(fdh, (void *)hmac_in, FIPS_HMAC_LEN); + if (FIPS_HMAC_LEN != n) { + debug("fips: unable to read whole checksum from checksum file\n"); + free (hmac_in); + check = CHECK_FAIL; + } else { + check = CHECK_OK; + *hmac = hmac_in; + } +bail_out: + return check; +} + +static int +fips_hmac_self(void) +{ + int check = -1; + u_char *hmac = NULL, *hmac_chk = NULL; + char *exe, *chk; + + exe = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); + chk = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); + + /* we will need to add the suffix and the null terminator */ + check = get_executable_path(getpid(), exe + , PATH_MAX - strlen(CHECKSUM_SUFFIX) - 1); + if (CHECK_OK != check) + goto cleanup; + + strncpy(chk, exe, PATH_MAX); + strlcat(chk, CHECKSUM_SUFFIX, PATH_MAX); + + check = read_hmac(chk, &hmac_chk); + if (CHECK_OK != check) + goto cleanup; + + check = hmac_file(exe, &hmac); + if (CHECK_OK != check) + goto cleanup; + + check = memcmp(hmac, hmac_chk, FIPS_HMAC_LEN); + if (0 == check) { + check = CHECK_OK; + debug("fips: checksum matches\n"); + } else { + check = CHECK_FAIL; + debug("fips: checksum mismatch!\n"); + } + +cleanup: + free(hmac); + free(hmac_chk); + free(chk); + free(exe); + + return check; +} + +static int +fips_check_required_proc(void) { int fips_required = 0; - char *env = getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV); + int fips_fd; + char fips_sys = 0; - if (env) { - errno = 0; - fips_required = strtol(env, NULL, 10); - if (errno) { - debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, ignoring\n" - , SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV); - fips_required = 0; - } else - fips_required = 1; + struct stat dummy; + if (-1 == stat(FIPS_PROC_PATH, &dummy)) { + switch (errno) { + case ENOENT: + case ENOTDIR: + break; + default: + fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot" + " be accessed for reason other than non-existence - aborting" + , FIPS_PROC_PATH); + break; + } + } else { + if (-1 == (fips_fd = open(FIPS_PROC_PATH, O_RDONLY))) + fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s cannot" + " be opened for reading - aborting" + , FIPS_PROC_PATH); + if (1 > read(fips_fd, &fips_sys, 1)) + fatal("Check for system-wide FIPS mode is required and %s doesn't" + " return at least one character - aborting" + , FIPS_PROC_PATH); + close(fips_sys); + switch (fips_sys) { + case '0': + case '1': + fips_required = fips_sys - '0'; + break; + default: + fatal("Bogus character %c found in %s - aborting" + , fips_sys, FIPS_PROC_PATH); + } } return fips_required; } +static int +fips_check_required_env(void) +{ + return (NULL != getenv(SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV)); +} + +static int +fips_required(void) +{ + int fips_requests = 0; + fips_requests += fips_check_required_proc(); + fips_requests += fips_check_required_env(); + return fips_requests; +} + +/* check whether FIPS mode is required and perform selfchecksum/selftest */ +void +fips_ssh_init(void) +{ + int checksum; + + checksum = fips_hmac_self(); + + if (fips_required()) { + switch (checksum) { + case CHECK_OK: + debug("fips: mandatory checksum ok"); + break; + case CHECK_FAIL: + fatal("fips: mandatory checksum failed - aborting"); + break; + case CHECK_MISSING: + fatal("fips: mandatory checksum data missing - aborting"); + break; + default: + fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u" + , __FILE__, __LINE__); + break; + } + fips_state = FIPS_mode_set(1); + if (1 != fips_state) { + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + u_long err = ERR_get_error(); + error("fips: OpenSSL error %lx: %s" + , err, ERR_error_string(err, NULL)); + fatal("fips: unable to set OpenSSL into FIPS mode - aborting"); + } + } else { + switch (checksum) { + case CHECK_OK: + debug("fips: checksum ok"); + break; + case CHECK_FAIL: + fatal("fips: checksum failed - aborting"); + break; + case CHECK_MISSING: + debug("fips: checksum data missing, but not required - continuing non-FIPS"); + break; + default: + fatal("Fatal error: internal error at %s:%u", + __FILE__, __LINE__); + break; + } + } + return; +} + int fips_mode(void) { @@ -234,4 +497,3 @@ fips_dh_grp_min(void) } return dh; } - Index: openssh-7.8p1/fips.h =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/fips.h +++ openssh-7.8p1/fips.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2012 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Petr Cerny. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -27,6 +27,15 @@ #include "sshkey.h" #define SSH_FORCE_FIPS_ENV "SSH_FORCE_FIPS" +#define FIPS_PROC_PATH "/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled" + +#define PROC_EXE_PATH_LEN 64 +#define CHECKSUM_SUFFIX ".hmac" +#define FIPS_HMAC_KEY "HMAC_KEY:OpenSSH-FIPS@SLE" +#define FIPS_HMAC_EVP EVP_sha256 +#define FIPS_HMAC_LEN 32 + +void fips_ssh_init(void); typedef enum { FIPS_FILTER_CIPHERS, @@ -34,6 +43,12 @@ typedef enum { FIPS_FILTER_KEX_ALGS } fips_filters; +typedef enum { + CHECK_OK = 0, + CHECK_FAIL, + CHECK_MISSING +} fips_checksum_status; + int fips_mode(void); int fips_correct_dgst(int); int fips_dgst_min(void); @@ -42,4 +57,3 @@ enum fp_type fips_correct_fp_type(enum int fips_filter_crypto(char **, fips_filters); #endif - Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp-server.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp-server.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp-server.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" +#include "fips.h" + /* Our verbosity */ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; @@ -1509,6 +1511,9 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, extern char *optarg; extern char *__progname; + /* initialize fips */ + fips_ssh_init(); + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh.c @@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif +#include "fips.h" + extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ @@ -593,6 +595,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + /* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a + * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */ + fips_ssh_init(); + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c @@ -1486,6 +1486,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL; + /* initialize fips - can go before ssh_malloc_init(), since that is a + * OpenBSD-only thing (as of OpenSSH 7.6p1) */ + fips_ssh_init(); + ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-gssapi_key_exchange.patch ++++++ ++++ 3319 lines (skipped) ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-host_ident.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 0f731d0b541b8a919d24ac91098f560a49712822 Suggest command line for removal of offending keys from known_hosts file diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c --- openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshconnect.c @@ -1147,16 +1147,21 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so } /* The host key has changed. */ warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfiles[0]); error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", sshkey_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); + error("You can use following command to remove the offending key:"); + if (host_found->file) + error("ssh-keygen -R %s -f %s", host, host_found->file); + else + error("ssh-keygen -R %s", host); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking != SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) { error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-hostname_changes_when_forwarding_X.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 5e19a205fa03584bb0d829ecbba7495ce1899b65 # -- uset do be called '-xauthlocalhostname' handle hostname changes when forwarding X bnc#98627 Index: openssh-7.8p1/session.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/session.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/session.c @@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char *** } static char ** -do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) +do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell, int *env_size) { char buf[256]; size_t n; @@ -1213,6 +1213,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } + + *env_size = envsize; return env; } @@ -1221,7 +1223,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s * first in this order). */ static void -do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell) +do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell, char **env, int *env_size) { FILE *f = NULL; char cmd[1024]; @@ -1276,12 +1278,20 @@ do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, options.xauth_location); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { + char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); + if (gethostname(hostname,sizeof(hostname)) >= 0) + child_set_env(&env,env_size,"XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME", + hostname); + else + debug("Cannot set up XAUTHLOCALHOSTNAME %s\n", + strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); @@ -1534,6 +1544,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co { extern char **environ; char **env; + int env_size; char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; const char *shell, *shell0; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; @@ -1591,7 +1602,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ - env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell); + env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell, &env_size); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); @@ -1655,7 +1666,7 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); - do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell); + do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell, env, &env_size); /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-ldap.patch ++++++ ++++ 2710 lines (skipped) ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-no_fork-no_pid_file.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent bad0c8b3b8d72abb6960ed85b57ee42352371738 Do not write a PID file when not daemonizing (e.g. when running from systemd) diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd.c @@ -1996,17 +1996,17 @@ main(int ac, char **av) signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler * is setup and the listen sockets are bound */ - if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { + if (!no_daemon_flag && options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); fclose(f); ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-openssl_1.1.0.patch ++++++ ++++ 3102 lines (skipped) ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-pam_check_locks.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 089f4fba0112d410a1bfa74398941f076681d446 new option UsePAMCheckLocks to enforce checking for locked accounts while UsePAM is used bnc#708678, FATE#312033 Index: openssh-7.8p1/auth.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/auth.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/auth.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) return 0; #ifdef USE_SHADOW - if (!options.use_pam) + if (!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) #endif /* check for locked account */ - if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { + if ((!options.use_pam || options.use_pam_check_locks) && passwd && *passwd) { int locked = 0; #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; + options->use_pam_check_locks = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; @@ -259,6 +260,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 0; + if (options->use_pam_check_locks == -1) + options->use_pam_check_locks = 0; /* Standard Options */ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { @@ -459,7 +462,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ - sUsePAM, + sUsePAM, sUsePAMChecklocks, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, @@ -509,8 +512,10 @@ static struct { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "usepamchecklocks", sUsePAMChecklocks, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "usepamchecklocks", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ @@ -1250,6 +1255,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; + case sUsePAMChecklocks: + intptr = &options->use_pam_check_locks; + goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: Index: openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/servconf.h +++ openssh-7.8p1/servconf.h @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct { char *adm_forced_command; int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ + int use_pam_check_locks; /* internally check for locked accounts even when using PAM */ int permit_tun; Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.0 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.0 @@ -961,6 +961,14 @@ DESCRIPTION If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a non-root user. The default is no. + UsePAMCheckLocks + When set to ``yes'', the checks whether the account has been + locked with `passwd -l' are performed even when PAM authentication + is enabled via UsePAM. This is to ensure that it is not possible + to log in with e.g. a public key (in such a case PAM is used only + to set up the session and some PAM modules will not check whether + the account is locked in this scenario). The default is ``no''. + VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd_config.5 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd_config.5 @@ -1613,6 +1613,18 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run as a non-root user. The default is .Cm no . +.It Cm UsePAMCheckLocks +When set to +.Dq yes +, the checks whether the account has been locked with +.Pa passwd -l +are performed even when PAM authentication is enabled via +.Cm UsePAM . +This is to ensure that it is not possible to log in with e.g. a +public key (in such a case PAM is used only to set up the session and some PAM +modules will not check whether the account is locked in this scenario). The +default is +.Dq no . .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-pts_names_formatting.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 7cd948c83939479d1ba88a3161991cb561306f3f # use same lines naming as utempter (prevents problems with using different # formats in ?tmp? files) # --used to be called '-pts' diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c b/openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c --- openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/loginrec.c @@ -541,17 +541,17 @@ getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li) /* * 'line' string utility functions * * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms: * * 1. The full filename (including '/dev') * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev') * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00 - * /dev/pts/1 -> ts/1 ) + * /dev/pts/1 -> /1 ) * * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok. */ @@ -602,16 +602,20 @@ line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *s /* Always skip prefix if present */ if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) src += 5; #ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0) src += 3; #endif + if (strncmp(src, "pts/", 4) == 0) { + src += 3; + if (strlen(src) > 4) src++; + } len = strlen(src); if (len > 0) { if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0) src += ((int)len - dstsize); /* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */ ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-remove_xauth_cookies_on_exit.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent a60c0d88667efe0a64c030168950b69476af1622 # --used to be called '-xauth' try to remove xauth cookies on logout bnc#98815 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/session.c b/openssh-7.7p1/session.c --- openssh-7.7p1/session.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/session.c @@ -2302,16 +2302,44 @@ session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session * u_int i; verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d", s->pw->pw_name, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), s->self); + if ((s->display != NULL) && (s->auth_proto != NULL) && + (s->auth_data != NULL) && (options.xauth_location != NULL)) { + pid_t pid; + FILE *f; + char cmd[1024]; + struct passwd * pw = s->pw; + + if (!(pid = fork())) { + permanently_set_uid(pw); + + /* Remove authority data from .Xauthority if appropriate. */ + debug("Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", + options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); + + snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "unset XAUTHORITY && HOME=\"%.200s\" %s -q -", + s->pw->pw_dir, options.xauth_location); + f = popen(cmd, "w"); + if (f) { + fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); + pclose(f); + } else + error("Could not run %s\n", cmd); + exit(0); + } else if (pid > 0) { + waitpid(pid, NULL, 0); + } + } + if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ioctl_s390_EP11.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent a7b18fdd68dba10349e59a9085fd822343311f45 Patch from IBM enabling use of EP11 hw crypto accelerator, submitted upstreams: From: Eduardo Barretto <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390) Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 14:27:15 -0300 The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <[email protected]> diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c --- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -248,16 +248,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES), #endif #if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */ SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO), SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT), + /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */ + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB), #endif #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) /* * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g. * https://bugs.debian.org/849923 */ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT), ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_ipc_flock.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 9d38b7292619a6d5faf554b1a88888fdfa535de7 Patch from IBM enabling the use of OpenCryptoki, submitted upstreams: From: Eduardo Barretto <[email protected]> To: [email protected] Subject: [PATCH 1/3] Allow flock and ipc syscall for s390 architecture Date: Tue, 9 May 2017 14:27:13 -0300 In order to use the OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11 engine it is needed to allow flock and ipc calls, because this engine calls OpenCryptoki (a PKCS#11 implementation) which calls the libraries that will communicate with the crypto cards. OpenCryptoki makes use of flock and ipc and, as of now, this is only need on s390 architecture. Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <[email protected]> diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c --- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -167,16 +167,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), #endif #ifdef __NR_geteuid SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), #endif #ifdef __NR_geteuid32 SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), #endif +#if defined(__NR_flock) && defined(__s390__) + SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock), +#endif #ifdef __NR_getpgid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getpid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getrandom SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), @@ -185,16 +188,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), #endif #ifdef __NR_getuid SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), #endif #ifdef __NR_getuid32 SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), #endif +#if defined(__NR_ipc) && defined(__s390__) + SC_ALLOW(__NR_ipc), +#endif #ifdef __NR_madvise SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap2 SC_ALLOW(__NR_mmap2), ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-seccomp_stat.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 5034ae16f6a5c9c7151d931dc1cce2a541fe010e Allow the stat() syscall for OpenSSL re-seed patch (which causes OpenSSL use stat() on some file) bnc#912436 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c --- openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -224,16 +224,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ SC_ALLOW(__NR_select), #endif #ifdef __NR_shutdown SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown), #endif #ifdef __NR_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask), #endif +#ifdef __NR_stat + SC_ALLOW(__NR_stat), +#endif #ifdef __NR_time SC_ALLOW(__NR_time), #endif #ifdef __NR_write SC_ALLOW(__NR_write), #endif #ifdef __NR_socketcall SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-seed-prng.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent e655fcb8e89d19ce9e954d6fc330e5e3e093a848 # extended support for (re-)seeding the OpenSSL PRNG from /dev/random # bnc#703221, FATE#312172 Index: openssh-7.8p1/entropy.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/entropy.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/entropy.c @@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ seed_rng(void) memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ + + linux_seed(); + if (RAND_status() != 1) fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); } Index: openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in +++ openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ COMPAT= arc4random.o \ PORTS= port-aix.o \ port-irix.o \ port-linux.o \ + port-linux-prng.o \ port-solaris.o \ port-net.o \ port-uw.o Index: openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c =================================================================== --- /dev/null +++ openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Jan F. Chadima <[email protected]> + * (c) 2011 Petr Cerny <[email protected]> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Linux-specific portability code - prng support + */ + +#include "includes.h" +#include "defines.h" + +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> + +#include "log.h" +#include "port-linux.h" +#include "fips.h" + +#define RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT 6L +#define RNG_ENV_VAR "SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG" + +long rand_bytes = 0; +char *rand_file = NULL; + +static void +linux_seed_init(void) +{ + long elen = 0; + char *env = getenv(RNG_ENV_VAR); + + if (env) { + errno = 0; + elen = strtol(env, NULL, 10); + if (errno) { + elen = RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT; + debug("bogus value in the %s environment variable, " + "using %li bytes from /dev/random\n", + RNG_ENV_VAR, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT); + } + } + + if (elen || fips_mode()) + rand_file = "/dev/random"; + else + rand_file = "/dev/urandom"; + + rand_bytes = MAX(elen, RNG_BYTES_DEFAULT); +} + +void +linux_seed(void) +{ + long len; + if (!rand_file) + linux_seed_init(); + + errno = 0; + len = RAND_load_file(rand_file, rand_bytes); + if (len != rand_bytes) { + if (errno) + fatal ("cannot read from %s, %s", rand_file, strerror(errno)); + else + fatal ("EOF reading %s", rand_file); + } +} Index: openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h +++ openssh-7.8p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h @@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H #define _PORT_LINUX_H +extern long rand_bytes; +extern char *rand_file; +void linux_seed(void); + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-add.1 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-add.1 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-add.1 @@ -172,6 +172,20 @@ to make this work.) Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. +.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from +.Cm /dev/urandom . +If the +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +environment variable is set to value other than +.Cm 0 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from +.Cm /dev/random . +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. +Minimum is 6 bytes. +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to +be blocked until enough entropy is available. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-agent.1 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-agent.1 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-agent.1 @@ -214,6 +214,23 @@ sockets used to contain the connection t These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. .El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.Pp +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from +.Cm /dev/urandom . +If the +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +environment variable is set to value other than +.Cm 0 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from +.Cm /dev/random . +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. +Minimum is 6 bytes. +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to +be blocked until enough entropy is available. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keygen.1 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-keygen.1 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keygen.1 @@ -869,6 +869,23 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.Pp +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from +.Cm /dev/urandom . +If the +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +environment variable is set to value other than +.Cm 0 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from +.Cm /dev/random . +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. +Minimum is 6 bytes. +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to +be blocked until enough entropy is available. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keysign.8 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh-keysign.8 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh-keysign.8 @@ -80,6 +80,23 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authe If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate information corresponding with the private keys above. .El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.Pp +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from +.Cm /dev/urandom . +If the +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +environment variable is set to value other than +.Cm 0 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from +.Cm /dev/random . +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. +Minimum is 6 bytes. +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to +be blocked until enough entropy is available. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , Index: openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/ssh.1 +++ openssh-7.8p1/ssh.1 @@ -1432,6 +1432,20 @@ For more information, see the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . +.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from +.Cm /dev/urandom . +If the +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +environment variable is set to value other than +.Cm 0 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from +.Cm /dev/random . +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. +Minimum is 6 bytes. +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to +be blocked until enough entropy is available. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.rhosts Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.8 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.8 @@ -966,6 +966,23 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El +.Sh ENVIRONMENT +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact +.Pp +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from +.Cm /dev/urandom . +If the +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG +environment variable is set to value other than +.Cm 0 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from +.Cm /dev/random . +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value. +Minimum is 6 bytes. +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to +be blocked until enough entropy is available. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#include "openbsd-compat/port-linux.h" + #include <sys/wait.h> #include <errno.h> @@ -208,6 +210,13 @@ struct { int have_ssh2_key; } sensitive_data; +/* + * Every RESEED_AFTERth connection triggers call to linux_seed() to re-seed the + * random pool. + */ +#define RESEED_AFTER 100 +static int re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER; + /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; @@ -1252,6 +1261,10 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so startups++; break; } + if(!(--re_seeding_counter)) { + re_seeding_counter = RESEED_AFTER; + linux_seed(); + } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-send_locale.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent db426aecefd1f4f8a7f9b9b6e8936cd8dd2f17fa send locales in default configuration bnc#65747 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config b/openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config --- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config +++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config @@ -26,16 +26,21 @@ Host * # security reasons: Someone stealing the authentification data on the # remote side (the "spoofed" X-server by the remote sshd) can read your # keystrokes as you type, just like any other X11 client could do. # Set this to "no" here for global effect or in your own ~/.ssh/config # file if you want to have the remote X11 authentification data to # expire after twenty minutes after remote login. ForwardX11Trusted yes +# This enables sending locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see ssh_config(5). + SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES + SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT + SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL + # PasswordAuthentication yes # HostbasedAuthentication no # GSSAPIAuthentication no # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no # BatchMode no # CheckHostIP yes # AddressFamily any # ConnectTimeout 0 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config b/openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config @@ -104,14 +104,19 @@ X11Forwarding yes #VersionAddendum none # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server +# This enables accepting locale enviroment variables LC_* LANG, see sshd_config(5). +AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES +AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT +AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL + # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-sftp_force_permissions.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 37bba3ff816d9ab93ddcf23389a4eb29d7716006 additional option for sftp-server to force file mode for new files FATE#312774 http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2010-November/029044.html http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=128896838930893 diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8 b/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8 --- openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8 +++ openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.8 @@ -33,16 +33,17 @@ .Bk -words .Op Fl ehR .Op Fl d Ar start_directory .Op Fl f Ar log_facility .Op Fl l Ar log_level .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests .Op Fl u Ar umask +.Op Fl m Ar force_file_permissions .Ek .Nm .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. .Nm @@ -133,16 +134,20 @@ Places this instance of into a read-only mode. Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied. .It Fl u Ar umask Sets an explicit .Xr umask 2 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the user's default mask. +.It Fl m Ar force_file_permissions +Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead +of the default or client requested mode. Numeric values include: +777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Option -u is ineffective if -m is set. .El .Pp On some systems, .Nm must be able to access .Pa /dev/log for logging to work, and use of .Nm diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c b/openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c --- openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c +++ openssh-7.7p1/sftp-server.c @@ -71,16 +71,20 @@ static u_int version; static int init_done; /* Disable writes */ static int readonly; /* Requests that are allowed/denied */ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist; +/* Force file permissions */ +int permforce = 0; +long permforcemode; + /* portable attributes, etc. */ typedef struct Stat Stat; struct Stat { char *name; char *long_name; Attrib attrib; }; @@ -685,16 +689,20 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id) if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; + if (permforce == 1) { + mode = permforcemode; + (void)umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */ + } logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY || (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { @@ -1487,17 +1495,18 @@ sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) static void sftp_server_usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " - "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" + "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n\t" + "[-m force_file_permissions]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) { @@ -1516,17 +1525,17 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, - "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { + "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:m:cehR")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); @@ -1576,16 +1585,23 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, case 'u': errno = 0; mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; + case 'm': + permforce = 1; + permforcemode = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); + if (permforcemode < 0 || permforcemode > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || + cp == optarg || (permforcemode == 0 && errno != 0)) + fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); + break; case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-sftp_print_diagnostic_messages.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent 60bdbe6dd8d6bc011883472363d56e1d97f68835 Put back sftp client diagnostic messages in batch mode bsc#1023275 Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp.0 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp.0 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp.0 @@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ DESCRIPTION -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. + -Q Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages + in batch mode. + -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from ssh(1). Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp.1 =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp.1 +++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp.1 @@ -256,6 +256,9 @@ Specifies the port to connect to on the .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. +.It Fl Q +Not-so-quiet batch mode: forces printing of diagnostic messages +in batch mode. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from Index: openssh-7.8p1/sftp.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sftp.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/sftp.c @@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1; /* Suppress diagnositic messages */ int quiet = 0; +/* Force diagnositic messages in batch mode */ +int loud = 0; + /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; @@ -2373,7 +2376,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) infile = stdin; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, - "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) { + "1246afhpQqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ case '4': @@ -2389,6 +2392,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; + case 'Q': + loud = 1; + break; case 'q': ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; quiet = 1; @@ -2472,6 +2478,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) usage(); } } + if (batchmode && loud) + quiet = 0; if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-systemd-notify.patch ++++++ # HG changeset patch # Parent d296e85dc414b8cd1b4b55ad03d8216feb26531a Send signals to systemd to prevent various race conditions bsc#1048367 Index: openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/configure.ac +++ openssh-7.8p1/configure.ac @@ -4378,6 +4378,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) +# Check whether user wants systemd support +SYSTEMD_MSG="no" +AC_ARG_WITH(systemd, + [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support], + [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) + if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd]) + if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then + SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd` + SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd` + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS" + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS" + AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.]) + SYSTEMD_MSG="yes" + else + AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) + fi + fi + fi ] +) + + # Looking for programs, paths and files PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty @@ -5183,6 +5207,7 @@ echo " libldns support echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" +echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" Index: openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c =================================================================== --- openssh-7.8p1.orig/sshd.c +++ openssh-7.8p1/sshd.c @@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ #include <prot.h> #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD +#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h> +#endif + #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" @@ -308,6 +312,10 @@ sighup_handler(int sig) static void sighup_restart(void) { +#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD + /* Signal systemd that we are reloading */ + sd_notify(0, "RELOADING=1"); +#endif logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); @@ -1995,6 +2003,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } } +#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD + /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */ + sd_notify(0, "READY=1"); +#endif + /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); ++++++ openssh-7.7p1-SUSE_patches.tar.gz -> openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz ++++++ ++++ 230711 lines of diff (skipped) ++++++ sshd.pamd ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_old 2018-10-23 20:34:08.936991723 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.HFFcNM/_new 2018-10-23 20:34:08.936991723 +0200 @@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ password include common-password session required pam_loginuid.so session include common-session -session optional pam_lastlog.so silent noupdate showfailed +session optional pam_lastlog.so silent noupdate showfailed +session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke
