Hello community, here is the log from the commit of package ghc-tls for openSUSE:Factory checked in at 2015-09-02 00:36:10 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/ghc-tls (Old) and /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.ghc-tls.new (New) ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Package is "ghc-tls" Changes: -------- --- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/ghc-tls/ghc-tls.changes 2015-08-25 08:48:26.000000000 +0200 +++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.ghc-tls.new/ghc-tls.changes 2015-09-02 00:36:11.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,0 +2,11 @@ +Mon Aug 31 08:14:19 UTC 2015 - [email protected] + +- update to 1.3.2 +* Add cipher suites for forward secrecy on more clients (Aaron Friel) +* Maintain more handshake information to be queried by protocol (Adam Wick) +* handle SCSV on client and server side (Kazu Yamamoto) +* Cleanup renegotiation logic (Kazu Yamamoto) +* Various testing improvements with the openssl test parts +* Cleanup AEAD handling for future support of other ciphers + +------------------------------------------------------------------- Old: ---- tls-1.3.1.tar.gz New: ---- tls-1.3.2.tar.gz ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Other differences: ------------------ ++++++ ghc-tls.spec ++++++ --- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.hUQrlS/_old 2015-09-02 00:36:11.000000000 +0200 +++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.hUQrlS/_new 2015-09-02 00:36:11.000000000 +0200 @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ %bcond_with tests Name: ghc-tls -Version: 1.3.1 +Version: 1.3.2 Release: 0 Summary: TLS/SSL protocol native implementation (Server and Client) License: BSD-3-Clause ++++++ tls-1.3.1.tar.gz -> tls-1.3.2.tar.gz ++++++ diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Cipher.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ { bulkName :: String , bulkKeySize :: Int , bulkIVSize :: Int + , bulkExplicitIV :: Int -- Explicit size for IV for AEAD Cipher, 0 otherwise + , bulkAuthTagLen :: Int -- Authentication tag length in bytes for AEAD Cipher, 0 otherwise , bulkBlockSize :: Int , bulkF :: BulkFunctions } diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Context/Internal.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -76,9 +76,12 @@ -- | Information related to a running context, e.g. current cipher data Information = Information - { infoVersion :: Version - , infoCipher :: Cipher - , infoCompression :: Compression + { infoVersion :: Version + , infoCipher :: Cipher + , infoCompression :: Compression + , infoMasterSecret :: Maybe Bytes + , infoClientRandom :: Maybe ClientRandom + , infoServerRandom :: Maybe ServerRandom } deriving (Show,Eq) -- | A TLS Context keep tls specific state, parameters and backend information. @@ -125,9 +128,15 @@ contextGetInformation :: Context -> IO (Maybe Information) contextGetInformation ctx = do ver <- usingState_ ctx $ gets stVersion + hstate <- getHState ctx + let (ms, cr, sr) = case hstate of + Just st -> (hstMasterSecret st, + Just (hstClientRandom st), + hstServerRandom st) + Nothing -> (Nothing, Nothing, Nothing) (cipher,comp) <- failOnEitherError $ runRxState ctx $ gets $ \st -> (stCipher st, stCompression st) case (ver, cipher) of - (Just v, Just c) -> return $ Just $ Information v c comp + (Just v, Just c) -> return $ Just $ Information v c comp ms cr sr _ -> return Nothing contextSend :: Context -> Bytes -> IO () diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Extra/Cipher.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ , cipher_DHE_DSS_RC4_SHA1 , cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 + , cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA ) where import qualified Data.ByteString as B @@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ { bulkName = "null" , bulkKeySize = 0 , bulkIVSize = 0 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 , bulkBlockSize = 0 , bulkF = BulkStreamF passThrough } @@ -161,6 +165,8 @@ { bulkName = "RC4-128" , bulkKeySize = 16 , bulkIVSize = 0 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 , bulkBlockSize = 0 , bulkF = BulkStreamF rc4 } @@ -169,6 +175,8 @@ { bulkName = "AES128" , bulkKeySize = 16 , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 , bulkBlockSize = 16 , bulkF = BulkBlockF aes128cbc } @@ -177,6 +185,8 @@ { bulkName = "AES128GCM" , bulkKeySize = 16 -- RFC 5116 Sec 5.1: K_LEN , bulkIVSize = 4 -- RFC 5288 GCMNonce.salt, fixed_iv_length + , bulkExplicitIV = 8 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 16 , bulkBlockSize = 0 -- dummy, not used , bulkF = BulkAeadF aes128gcm } @@ -185,6 +195,8 @@ { bulkName = "AES256" , bulkKeySize = 32 , bulkIVSize = 16 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 , bulkBlockSize = 16 , bulkF = BulkBlockF aes256cbc } @@ -193,6 +205,8 @@ { bulkName = "3DES-EDE-CBC" , bulkKeySize = 24 , bulkIVSize = 8 + , bulkExplicitIV = 0 + , bulkAuthTagLen = 0 , bulkBlockSize = 8 , bulkF = BulkBlockF tripledes_ede } @@ -374,6 +388,27 @@ , cipherHash = SHA256 , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 + } + +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA = Cipher + { cipherID = 0xc013 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-RSA-AES128CBC-SHA" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA1 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS10 + } + +--TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 :: Cipher +cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256 = Cipher + { cipherID = 0xc027 + , cipherName = "ECDHE-RSA-AES128CBC-SHA" + , cipherBulk = bulk_aes128 + , cipherHash = SHA256 + , cipherKeyExchange = CipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSA + , cipherMinVer = Just TLS12 -- RFC 5288 Sec 4 } {- diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Handshake/Common.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -60,8 +60,15 @@ sessionData <- getSessionData ctx liftIO $ sessionEstablish (sharedSessionManager $ ctxShared ctx) sessionId (fromJust "session-data" sessionData) _ -> return () - -- forget all handshake data now and reset bytes counters. - liftIO $ modifyMVar_ (ctxHandshake ctx) (return . const Nothing) + -- forget most handshake data and reset bytes counters. + liftIO $ modifyMVar_ (ctxHandshake ctx) $ \ mhshake -> + case mhshake of + Nothing -> return Nothing + Just hshake -> + return $ Just (newEmptyHandshake (hstClientVersion hshake) (hstClientRandom hshake)) + { hstServerRandom = hstServerRandom hshake + , hstMasterSecret = hstMasterSecret hshake + } updateMeasure ctx resetBytesCounters -- mark the secure connection up and running. setEstablished ctx True diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Handshake/Process.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Handshake/Process.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Handshake/Process.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Handshake/Process.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -30,14 +30,19 @@ import Network.TLS.Handshake.State import Network.TLS.Handshake.Key import Network.TLS.Extension +import Network.TLS.Parameters import Data.X509 (CertificateChain(..), Certificate(..), getCertificate) processHandshake :: Context -> Handshake -> IO () processHandshake ctx hs = do role <- usingState_ ctx isClientContext case hs of - ClientHello cver ran _ _ _ ex _ -> when (role == ServerRole) $ do + ClientHello cver ran _ cids _ ex _ -> when (role == ServerRole) $ do mapM_ (usingState_ ctx . processClientExtension) ex + -- RFC 5746: secure renegotiation + -- TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV: {0x00, 0xFF} + when (secureRenegotiation && (0xff `elem` cids)) $ + usingState_ ctx $ setSecureRenegotiation True startHandshake ctx cver ran Certificates certs -> processCertificates role certs ClientKeyXchg content -> when (role == ServerRole) $ do @@ -49,8 +54,10 @@ let encoded = encodeHandshake hs when (certVerifyHandshakeMaterial hs) $ usingHState ctx $ addHandshakeMessage encoded when (finishHandshakeTypeMaterial $ typeOfHandshake hs) $ usingHState ctx $ updateHandshakeDigest encoded - where -- secure renegotiation - processClientExtension (0xff01, content) = do + where secureRenegotiation = supportedSecureRenegotiation $ ctxSupported ctx + -- RFC5746: secure renegotiation + -- the renegotiation_info extension: 0xff01 + processClientExtension (0xff01, content) | secureRenegotiation = do v <- getVerifiedData ClientRole let bs = extensionEncode (SecureRenegotiation v Nothing) unless (bs `bytesEq` content) $ throwError $ Error_Protocol ("client verified data not matching: " ++ show v ++ ":" ++ show content, True, HandshakeFailure) diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Handshake/Server.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ -- handshakeServerWith :: ServerParams -> Context -> Handshake -> IO () handshakeServerWith sparams ctx clientHello@(ClientHello clientVersion _ clientSession ciphers compressions exts _) = do + -- rejecting client initiated renegotiation to prevent DOS. + unless (supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation (ctxSupported ctx)) $ do + established <- ctxEstablished ctx + eof <- ctxEOF ctx + when (established && not eof) $ + throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("renegotiation is not allowed", False, NoRenegotiation) -- check if policy allow this new handshake to happens handshakeAuthorized <- withMeasure ctx (onNewHandshake $ serverHooks sparams) unless handshakeAuthorized (throwCore $ Error_HandshakePolicy "server: handshake denied") @@ -90,6 +96,12 @@ processHandshake ctx clientHello when (clientVersion == SSL2) $ throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("ssl2 is not supported", True, ProtocolVersion) + -- Fallback SCSV: RFC7507 + -- TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV: {0x56, 0x00} + when (supportedFallbackScsv (ctxSupported ctx) && + (0x5600 `elem` ciphers) && + clientVersion /= maxBound) $ + throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("fallback is not allowed", True, InappropriateFallback) chosenVersion <- case findHighestVersionFrom clientVersion (supportedVersions $ ctxSupported ctx) of Nothing -> throwCore $ Error_Protocol ("client version " ++ show clientVersion ++ " is not supported", True, ProtocolVersion) Just v -> return v diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Parameters.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -118,10 +118,22 @@ -- | All supported hash/signature algorithms pair for client -- certificate verification, ordered by decreasing priority. , supportedHashSignatures :: [HashAndSignatureAlgorithm] - -- | Set if we support secure renegotiation. + -- | Secure renegotiation defined in RFC5746. + -- If 'True', clients send the renegotiation_info extension. + -- If 'True', servers handle the extension or the renegotiation SCSV + -- then send the renegotiation_info extension. , supportedSecureRenegotiation :: Bool + -- | If 'True', renegotiation is allowed from the client side. + -- This is vulnerable to DOS attacks. + -- If 'False', renegotiation is allowed only from the server side + -- via HelloRequest. + , supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation :: Bool -- | Set if we support session. , supportedSession :: Bool + -- | Support for fallback SCSV defined in RFC7507. + -- If 'True', servers reject handshakes which suggest + -- a lower protocol than the highest protocol supported. + , supportedFallbackScsv :: Bool } deriving (Show,Eq) defaultSupported :: Supported @@ -137,7 +149,9 @@ , (Struct.HashSHA1, SignatureDSS) ] , supportedSecureRenegotiation = True + , supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = False , supportedSession = True + , supportedFallbackScsv = True } instance Default Supported where diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Receiving.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -28,16 +28,14 @@ import Network.TLS.Cipher import Network.TLS.Util -import Data.Byteable - processPacket :: Context -> Record Plaintext -> IO (Either TLSError Packet) -processPacket _ (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ Right $ AppData $ toBytes fragment +processPacket _ (Record ProtocolType_AppData _ fragment) = return $ Right $ AppData $ fragmentGetBytes fragment -processPacket _ (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ fragment) = return (Alert `fmapEither` (decodeAlerts $ toBytes fragment)) +processPacket _ (Record ProtocolType_Alert _ fragment) = return (Alert `fmapEither` (decodeAlerts $ fragmentGetBytes fragment)) processPacket ctx (Record ProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpec _ fragment) = - case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ toBytes fragment of + case decodeChangeCipherSpec $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of Left err -> return $ Left err Right _ -> do switchRxEncryption ctx return $ Right ChangeCipherSpec @@ -54,7 +52,7 @@ -- get back the optional continuation, and parse as many handshake record as possible. mCont <- gets stHandshakeRecordCont modify (\st -> st { stHandshakeRecordCont = Nothing }) - hss <- parseMany currentParams mCont (toBytes fragment) + hss <- parseMany currentParams mCont (fragmentGetBytes fragment) return $ Handshake hss where parseMany currentParams mCont bs = case maybe decodeHandshakeRecord id mCont $ bs of @@ -68,7 +66,7 @@ Right hh -> (hh:) `fmap` parseMany currentParams Nothing left processPacket _ (Record ProtocolType_DeprecatedHandshake _ fragment) = - case decodeDeprecatedHandshake $ toBytes fragment of + case decodeDeprecatedHandshake $ fragmentGetBytes fragment of Left err -> return $ Left err Right hs -> return $ Right $ Handshake [hs] diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record/Disengage.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -85,7 +85,10 @@ decryptOf :: BulkState -> RecordM Bytes decryptOf (BulkStateBlock decryptF) = do let minContent = (if explicitIV then bulkIVSize bulk else 0) + max (macSize + 1) blockSize + + -- check if we have enough bytes to cover the minimum for this cipher when ((econtentLen `mod` blockSize) /= 0 || econtentLen < minContent) $ sanityCheckError + {- update IV -} (iv, econtent') <- if explicitIV then get2 econtent (bulkIVSize bulk, econtentLen - bulkIVSize bulk) @@ -103,7 +106,9 @@ } decryptOf (BulkStateStream (BulkStream decryptF)) = do + -- check if we have enough bytes to cover the minimum for this cipher when (econtentLen < macSize) $ sanityCheckError + let (content', bulkStream') = decryptF econtent {- update Ctx -} let contentlen = B.length content' - macSize @@ -116,13 +121,17 @@ } decryptOf (BulkStateAEAD decryptF) = do - let authtaglen = 16 -- FIXME: fixed_iv_length + record_iv_length - nonceexplen = 8 -- FIXME: record_iv_length - econtentlen = B.length econtent - authtaglen - nonceexplen - (enonce, econtent', authTag) <- get3 econtent (nonceexplen, econtentlen, authtaglen) + let authTagLen = bulkAuthTagLen bulk + nonceExpLen = bulkExplicitIV bulk + cipherLen = econtentLen - authTagLen - nonceExpLen + + -- check if we have enough bytes to cover the minimum for this cipher + when (econtentLen < (authTagLen + nonceExpLen)) $ sanityCheckError + + (enonce, econtent', authTag) <- get3 econtent (nonceExpLen, cipherLen, authTagLen) let encodedSeq = encodeWord64 $ msSequence $ stMacState tst Header typ v _ = recordToHeader record - hdr = Header typ v $ fromIntegral econtentlen + hdr = Header typ v $ fromIntegral cipherLen ad = B.concat [ encodedSeq, encodeHeader hdr ] nonce = cstIV (stCryptState tst) `B.append` enonce (content, authTag2) = decryptF nonce econtent' ad diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record/Engage.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -36,10 +36,9 @@ onRecordFragment record $ fragmentCompress $ \bytes -> do withCompression $ compressionDeflate bytes -{- - - when Tx Encrypted is set, we pass the data through encryptContent, otherwise - - we just return the packet - -} +-- when Tx Encrypted is set, we pass the data through encryptContent, otherwise +-- we just return the compress payload directly as the ciphered one +-- encryptRecord :: Record Compressed -> RecordM (Record Ciphertext) encryptRecord record = onRecordFragment record $ fragmentCipher $ \bytes -> do st <- get @@ -100,15 +99,12 @@ cst <- getCryptState encodedSeq <- encodeWord64 <$> getMacSequence - let hdr = recordToHeader record - ad = B.concat [ encodedSeq, encodeHeader hdr ] - let salt = cstIV cst - processorNum = encodeWord32 1 -- FIXME - counter = B.drop 4 encodedSeq -- FIXME: probably OK - nonce = B.concat [salt, processorNum, counter] - let (e, AuthTag authtag) = encryptF nonce content ad + let hdr = recordToHeader record + ad = B.concat [encodedSeq, encodeHeader hdr] + nonce = B.concat [cstIV cst, encodedSeq] + (e, AuthTag authtag) = encryptF nonce content ad modify incrRecordState - return $ B.concat [processorNum, counter, e, B.convert authtag] + return $ B.concat [encodedSeq, e, B.convert authtag] getCryptState :: RecordM CryptState getCryptState = stCryptState <$> get diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record/Types.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ , Record(..) -- * TLS Record fragment and constructors , Fragment + , fragmentGetBytes , fragmentPlaintext , fragmentCiphertext , Plaintext @@ -40,13 +41,12 @@ import Network.TLS.Struct import Network.TLS.Record.State import qualified Data.ByteString as B -import Data.Byteable import Control.Applicative ((<$>)) -- | Represent a TLS record. data Record a = Record !ProtocolType !Version !(Fragment a) deriving (Show,Eq) -newtype Fragment a = Fragment Bytes deriving (Show,Eq) +newtype Fragment a = Fragment { fragmentGetBytes :: Bytes } deriving (Show,Eq) data Plaintext data Compressed @@ -58,9 +58,6 @@ fragmentCiphertext :: Bytes -> Fragment Ciphertext fragmentCiphertext bytes = Fragment bytes -instance Byteable (Fragment a) where - toBytes (Fragment b) = b - onRecordFragment :: Record a -> (Fragment a -> RecordM (Fragment b)) -> RecordM (Record b) onRecordFragment (Record pt ver frag) f = Record pt ver <$> f frag diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Record.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Record.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ ( Record(..) -- * Fragment manipulation types , Fragment + , fragmentGetBytes , fragmentPlaintext , fragmentCiphertext , recordToRaw diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Struct.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Struct.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Struct.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Struct.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -174,8 +174,8 @@ data Header = Header ProtocolType Version Word16 deriving (Show,Eq) -newtype ServerRandom = ServerRandom Bytes deriving (Show, Eq) -newtype ClientRandom = ClientRandom Bytes deriving (Show, Eq) +newtype ServerRandom = ServerRandom { unServerRandom :: Bytes } deriving (Show, Eq) +newtype ClientRandom = ClientRandom { unClientRandom :: Bytes } deriving (Show, Eq) newtype Session = Session (Maybe SessionID) deriving (Show, Eq) type FinishedData = Bytes @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ | ProtocolVersion | InsufficientSecurity | InternalError + | InappropriateFallback -- RFC7507 | UserCanceled | NoRenegotiation | UnsupportedExtension @@ -447,6 +448,7 @@ valOfType ProtocolVersion = 70 valOfType InsufficientSecurity = 71 valOfType InternalError = 80 + valOfType InappropriateFallback = 86 valOfType UserCanceled = 90 valOfType NoRenegotiation = 100 valOfType UnsupportedExtension = 110 @@ -476,6 +478,7 @@ valToType 70 = Just ProtocolVersion valToType 71 = Just InsufficientSecurity valToType 80 = Just InternalError + valToType 86 = Just InappropriateFallback valToType 90 = Just UserCanceled valToType 100 = Just NoRenegotiation valToType 110 = Just UnsupportedExtension diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Types.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Types.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS/Types.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS/Types.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ -- | Versions known to TLS -- -- SSL2 is just defined, but this version is and will not be supported. -data Version = SSL2 | SSL3 | TLS10 | TLS11 | TLS12 deriving (Show, Eq, Ord) +data Version = SSL2 | SSL3 | TLS10 | TLS11 | TLS12 deriving (Show, Eq, Ord, Bounded) -- | A session ID type SessionID = ByteString diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Network/TLS.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Network/TLS.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ -- * Information gathering , Information(..) + , unClientRandom + , unServerRandom , contextGetInformation -- * Credentials @@ -115,7 +117,8 @@ import Network.TLS.Struct ( TLSError(..), TLSException(..) , HashAndSignatureAlgorithm, HashAlgorithm(..), SignatureAlgorithm(..) , Header(..), ProtocolType(..), CertificateType(..) - , AlertDescription(..)) + , AlertDescription(..) + , ClientRandom(..), ServerRandom(..)) import Network.TLS.Crypto (KxError(..)) import Network.TLS.Cipher import Network.TLS.Hooks diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/Tests/Tests.hs new/tls-1.3.2/Tests/Tests.hs --- old/tls-1.3.1/Tests/Tests.hs 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/Tests/Tests.hs 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -100,8 +100,13 @@ prop_handshake_renegociation :: PropertyM IO () prop_handshake_renegociation = do - params <- pick arbitraryPairParams - runTLSPipe params tlsServer tlsClient + (cparams, sparams) <- pick arbitraryPairParams + let sparams' = sparams { + serverSupported = (serverSupported sparams) { + supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiation = True + } + } + runTLSPipe (cparams, sparams') tlsServer tlsClient where tlsServer ctx queue = do handshake ctx d <- recvDataNonNull ctx diff -urN '--exclude=CVS' '--exclude=.cvsignore' '--exclude=.svn' '--exclude=.svnignore' old/tls-1.3.1/tls.cabal new/tls-1.3.2/tls.cabal --- old/tls-1.3.1/tls.cabal 2015-06-20 09:31:09.000000000 +0200 +++ new/tls-1.3.2/tls.cabal 2015-08-24 07:44:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ Name: tls -Version: 1.3.1 +Version: 1.3.2 Description: Native Haskell TLS and SSL protocol implementation for server and client. . @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ , transformers , cereal >= 0.4 , bytestring - , byteable , network , data-default-class -- crypto related
