Hello community,

here is the log from the commit of package ecryptfs-utils for openSUSE:Factory 
checked in at 2016-01-23 01:16:28
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Comparing /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/ecryptfs-utils (Old)
 and      /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.ecryptfs-utils.new (New)
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Package is "ecryptfs-utils"

Changes:
--------
--- /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/ecryptfs-utils/ecryptfs-utils.changes    
2015-10-20 00:06:15.000000000 +0200
+++ /work/SRC/openSUSE:Factory/.ecryptfs-utils.new/ecryptfs-utils.changes       
2016-01-23 01:16:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,0 +2,7 @@
+Wed Jan 20 16:31:19 UTC 2016 - meiss...@suse.com
+
+- validate-mount-destination-fs-type.patch: A local user could have
+  escalated privileges by mounting over special filesystems (bsc#962052
+  CVE-2016-1572)
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------

New:
----
  validate-mount-destination-fs-type.patch

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Other differences:
------------------
++++++ ecryptfs-utils.spec ++++++
--- /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.Q3W7rU/_old  2016-01-23 01:16:35.000000000 +0100
+++ /var/tmp/diff_new_pack.Q3W7rU/_new  2016-01-23 01:16:35.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #
 # spec file for package ecryptfs-utils
 #
-# Copyright (c) 2015 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
+# Copyright (c) 2016 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
 #
 # All modifications and additions to the file contributed by third parties
 # remain the property of their copyright owners, unless otherwise agreed
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 Patch0:         ecryptfs-setup-swap-SuSE.patch
 # PATCH-FIX-OPENSUSE build with -fpie/-pie
 Patch1:         ecryptfs-utils-src-utils-Makefile.patch
+Patch2:         validate-mount-destination-fs-type.patch
 BuildRequires:  autoconf
 BuildRequires:  automake
 BuildRequires:  fdupes
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@
 %setup -q
 %patch0 -p1
 %patch1 -p1
+%patch2 -p1
 
 %build
 export RPM_OPT_FLAGS="%{optflags} -fno-strict-aliasing"


++++++ validate-mount-destination-fs-type.patch ++++++
>From 8fcdb9ef8406cd05c45acef6210a3bfa0831e857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tyler Hicks <tyhi...@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 19:39:14 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] mount.ecryptfs_private: Validate mount destination fs type

Refuse to mount over non-standard filesystems. Mounting over
certain types filesystems is a red flag that the user is doing
something devious, such as mounting over the /proc/self symlink
target with malicious content in order to confuse programs that may
attempt to parse those files. (LP: #1530566)

https://launchpad.net/bugs/1530566
---
 debian/changelog                   |  8 +++++
 src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 69 insertions(+)

Index: ecryptfs-utils-108/src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c
===================================================================
--- ecryptfs-utils-108.orig/src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c
+++ ecryptfs-utils-108/src/utils/mount.ecryptfs_private.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <keyutils.h>
@@ -220,6 +221,62 @@ err:
        return NULL;
 }
 
+static int check_cwd_f_type()
+{
+       /**
+        * This is *not* a list of compatible lower filesystems list for
+        * eCryptfs. This is a list of filesystems that we reasonably expect to
+        * see mount.ecryptfs_private users mounting on top of. In other words,
+        * the filesystem type of the 'target' parameter of mount(2).
+        *
+        * This whitelist is to prevent malicious mount.ecryptfs_private users
+        * from mounting over filesystem types such as PROC_SUPER_MAGIC to
+        * deceive other programs with a crafted /proc/self/*. See
+        * https://launchpad.net/bugs/1530566 for more details.
+        */
+       __SWORD_TYPE f_type_whitelist[] = {
+               0x61756673 /* AUFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x9123683E /* BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x00C36400 /* CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0xFF534D42 /* CIFS_MAGIC_NUMBER */,
+               0x0000F15F /* ECRYPTFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x0000EF53 /* EXT[234]_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0xF2F52010 /* F2FS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x65735546 /* FUSE_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x01161970 /* GFS2_MAGIC */,
+               0x3153464A /* JFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x0000564C /* NCP_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x00006969 /* NFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x00003434 /* NILFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x5346544E /* NTFS_SB_MAGIC */,
+               0x794C7630 /* OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x52654973 /* REISERFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+               0x73717368 /* SQUASHFS_MAGIC */,
+               0x01021994 /* TMPFS_MAGIC */,
+               0x58465342 /* XFS_SB_MAGIC */,
+               0x2FC12FC1 /* ZFS_SUPER_MAGIC */,
+       };
+       struct statfs buf;
+       size_t i, whitelist_len;
+
+       if (statfs(".", &buf) != 0) {
+               fprintf(stderr, "Failed to check filesystem type: %m\n");
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       whitelist_len = sizeof(f_type_whitelist) / sizeof(*f_type_whitelist);
+       for (i = 0; i < whitelist_len; i++) {
+               if (buf.f_type == f_type_whitelist[i]) {
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       }
+
+       fprintf(stderr,
+               "Refusing to mount over an unapproved filesystem type: %#lx\n",
+               buf.f_type);
+       return 1;
+}
+
 int check_ownership_mnt(uid_t uid, char **mnt) {
 /* Check ownership of mount point, chdir into it, and
  * canonicalize the path for use in mtab updating.
@@ -682,6 +739,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
                goto fail;
        }
 
+       if (check_cwd_f_type() != 0) {
+               goto fail;
+       }
+
        if (mounting == 1) {
                /* Increment mount counter, errors non-fatal */
                if (increment(fh_counter) < 0) {

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