home:AndreasStieger:branches:openSUSE:Factory:Contrib/tor -> 
openSUSE:Factory:Contrib/tor

   https://build.opensuse.org/request/diff/89711

   Description: update to upstream 0.2.2.34

changes files:
--------------
--- tor.changes
+++ tor.changes
@@ -1,0 +2,119 @@
+Fri Oct 28 19:49:39 UTC 2011 - [email protected]
+
+- update to upstream 0.2.2.34
+
+Changes in version 0.2.2.34 - 2011-10-26
+  Tor 0.2.2.34 fixes a critical anonymity vulnerability where an attacker
+  can deanonymize Tor users. Everybody should upgrade.
+
+  The attack relies on four components: 1) Clients reuse their TLS cert
+  when talking to different relays, so relays can recognize a user by
+  the identity key in her cert. 2) An attacker who knows the client's
+  identity key can probe each guard relay to see if that identity key
+  is connected to that guard relay right now. 3) A variety of active
+  attacks in the literature (starting from "Low-Cost Traffic Analysis
+  of Tor" by Murdoch and Danezis in 2005) allow a malicious website to
+  discover the guard relays that a Tor user visiting the website is using.
+  4) Clients typically pick three guards at random, so the set of guards
+  for a given user could well be a unique fingerprint for her. This
+  release fixes components #1 and #2, which is enough to block the attack;
+  the other two remain as open research problems. Special thanks to
+  "frosty_un" for reporting the issue to us!
+
+  Clients should upgrade so they are no longer recognizable by the TLS
+  certs they present. Relays should upgrade so they no longer allow a
+  remote attacker to probe them to test whether unpatched clients are
+  currently connected to them.
+
+  This release also fixes several vulnerabilities that allow an attacker
+  to enumerate bridge relays. Some bridge enumeration attacks still
+  remain; see for example proposal 188.
+
+  o Privacy/anonymity fixes (clients):
+    - Clients and bridges no longer send TLS certificate chains on
+      outgoing OR connections. Previously, each client or bridge would
+      use the same cert chain for all outgoing OR connections until
+      its IP address changes, which allowed any relay that the client
+      or bridge contacted to determine which entry guards it is using.
+      Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on 0.0.9pre5; found by "frosty_un".
+    - If a relay receives a CREATE_FAST cell on a TLS connection, it
+      no longer considers that connection as suitable for satisfying a
+      circuit EXTEND request. Now relays can protect clients from the
+      CVE-2011-2768 issue even if the clients haven't upgraded yet.
+    - Directory authorities no longer assign the Guard flag to relays
+      that haven't upgraded to the above "refuse EXTEND requests
+      to client connections" fix. Now directory authorities can
+      protect clients from the CVE-2011-2768 issue even if neither
+      the clients nor the relays have upgraded yet. There's a new
+      "GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays" config option
+      to let us transition smoothly, else tomorrow there would be no
+      guard relays.
+
+  o Privacy/anonymity fixes (bridge enumeration):
+    - Bridge relays now do their directory fetches inside Tor TLS
+      connections, like all the other clients do, rather than connecting
+      directly to the DirPort like public relays do. Removes another
+      avenue for enumerating bridges. Fixes bug 4115; bugfix on 0.2.0.35.
+    - Bridges relays now build circuits for themselves in a more similar
+      way to how clients build them. Removes another avenue for
+      enumerating bridges. Fixes bug 4124; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha,
+      when bridges were introduced.
+    - Bridges now refuse CREATE or CREATE_FAST cells on OR connections
+      that they initiated. Relays could distinguish incoming bridge
+      connections from client connections, creating another avenue for
+      enumerating bridges. Fixes CVE-2011-2769. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
+      Found by "frosty_un".
+
+  o Major bugfixes:
+    - Fix a crash bug when changing node restrictions while a DNS lookup
+      is in-progress. Fixes bug 4259; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha. Bugfix
+      by "Tey'".
+    - Don't launch a useless circuit after failing to use one of a
+      hidden service's introduction points. Previously, we would
+      launch a new introduction circuit, but not set the hidden service
+      which that circuit was intended to connect to, so it would never
+      actually be used. A different piece of code would then create a
+      new introduction circuit correctly. Bug reported by katmagic and
+      found by Sebastian Hahn. Bugfix on 0.2.1.13-alpha; fixes bug 4212.
+
+  o Minor bugfixes:
+    - Change an integer overflow check in the OpenBSD_Malloc code so
+      that GCC is less likely to eliminate it as impossible. Patch
+      from Mansour Moufid. Fixes bug 4059.
+    - When a hidden service turns an extra service-side introduction
+      circuit into a general-purpose circuit, free the rend_data and
+      intro_key fields first, so we won't leak memory if the circuit
+      is cannibalized for use as another service-side introduction
+      circuit. Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha; fixes bug 4251.
+    - Bridges now skip DNS self-tests, to act a little more stealthily.
+      Fixes bug 4201; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha, which first introduced
+      bridges. Patch by "warms0x".
+    - Fix internal bug-checking logic that was supposed to catch
+      failures in digest generation so that it will fail more robustly
+      if we ask for a nonexistent algorithm. Found by Coverity Scan.
+      Bugfix on 0.2.2.1-alpha; fixes Coverity CID 479.
+    - Report any failure in init_keys() calls launched because our
+      IP address has changed. Spotted by Coverity Scan. Bugfix on
+      0.1.1.4-alpha; fixes CID 484.
+
+  o Minor bugfixes (log messages and documentation):
+    - Remove a confusing dollar sign from the example fingerprint in the
+      man page, and also make the example fingerprint a valid one. Fixes
+      bug 4309; bugfix on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
+    - The next version of Windows will be called Windows 8, and it has
+      a major version of 6, minor version of 2. Correctly identify that
+      version instead of calling it "Very recent version". Resolves
+      ticket 4153; reported by funkstar.
+    - Downgrade log messages about circuit timeout calibration from
+      "notice" to "info": they don't require or suggest any human
+      intervention. Patch from Tom Lowenthal. Fixes bug 4063;
+      bugfix on 0.2.2.14-alpha.
+
+  o Minor features:
+    - Turn on directory request statistics by default and include them in
+      extra-info descriptors. Don't break if we have no GeoIP database.
+      Backported from 0.2.3.1-alpha; implements ticket 3951.
+    - Update to the October 4 2011 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
+
+
+-------------------------------------------------------------------

old:
----
  tor-0.2.2.33.tar.bz2

new:
----
  tor-0.2.2.34.tar.bz2

spec files:
-----------
--- tor.spec
+++ tor.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # norootforbuild
 
 Name:           tor
-Version:        0.2.2.33
+Version:        0.2.2.34
 Release:        1
 BuildRoot:      %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-build
 License:        3-clause BSD

other changes:
--------------

++++++ tor-0.2.2.33.tar.bz2 -> tor-0.2.2.34.tar.bz2
(55271 lines skipped)


To REVIEW against the previous version:
   osc request show --diff 89711

To ACCEPT the request:
   osc request accept 89711 --message="reviewed ok."
   
To DECLINE the request:
   osc request decline 89711 --message="declined for reason xyz (see ... for 
background / policy / ...)."

To REVOKE the request:
   osc request revoke 89711 --message="retracted because ..., sorry / thx / see 
better version ..."

-- 
Hermes messaging (http://hermes.opensuse.org)
openSUSE Build Service (https://build.opensuse.org/)
Collaboration: http://en.opensuse.org/Build_Service/Collaboration

-- 
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected]
To contact the owner, e-mail: [email protected]

Reply via email to