On 4/15/19 9:34 AM, Dario Faggioli wrote:
> point is this:
> - exploiting L1TF, it may be possible to read the host physical RAM
> from inside a VM. This means malicious code running inside a VM can
> read the memory of other applications inside the same VM, of other
> VMs and also of the hypervisor.
> It is not entirely trivial, even without mitigations applied, but
> it's possible, and proofs of contept do exist;
> - for Xen PV guests, if the guest has "PTE Inversion" and Xen has
> pv-l1tf enabled, the problem is fully mitigated;
> - for Xen HVM guests or KVM guests, on system without hyperthreading
> (or with hyperthreading properly disabled), if L1D flush is supported
> (by hardware and hypervisor) and enabled, the problem is fully
> mitigated;
> - for Xen HVM guests or KVM guests, on system with hypetrheading,
> the problem can't be fully mitigated.
That's really clear. And the 1st time I've read it all, so succinctly stated,
in one place.
It would, IMO, be very helpful on a 'Spectre on *Suse' doc/wiki page.
atm, on this particular host, my Xen cmd line includes:
spec-ctrl=ssbd,l1d-flush=true pv-l1tf=dom0=true,domu=true smt=true
which may, or not, be overkill/risky; still need to do some reading up on the
relative merits.
> For KVM guests and Xen HVM guests, can you paste the full output of the
> section "CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'" ?
Don't have a Xen HVM up right at the moment.
For KVM guest (@ Linode, fwiw),
spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
...
CVE-2018-3646 aka 'Foreshadow-NG (VMM), L1 terminal fault'
* Information from the /sys interface:
* This system is a host running an hypervisor: NO
* Mitigation 1 (KVM)
* EPT is disabled: N/A (the kvm_intel module is not loaded)
* Mitigation 2
* L1D flush is supported by kernel: YES (found flush_l1d in kernel
image)
* L1D flush enabled: UNKNOWN (unrecognized mode)
* Hardware-backed L1D flush supported: NO (flush will be done in
software, this is slower)
* Hyper-Threading (SMT) is enabled: NO
> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (this system is not running an hypervisor)
> SUMMARY: CVE-2017-5753:OK CVE-2017-5715:OK CVE-2017-5754:OK
CVE-2018-3640:OK CVE-2018-3639:OK CVE-2018-3615:OK CVE-2018-3620:OK
CVE-2018-3646:OK
IIUC from your comments above, the apparently *dis*abled SMT hyperthreading
leads, in this case, to the mitigation STATUS ==> NOT VULNERABLE
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