Am Freitag, 21. April 2006 15:23 schrieb Carl-Daniel Hailfinger:
> And back at the time it was said that dm-crypt had the same problems.
> Maybe these problems have been solved, maybe not.

There are two kinds of problems:

a) problems regarding the cryptoloop implementation
b) problems regarding the encryption mode

a) is solved because there is dm-crypt which may be used on-disk compatible 
with cryptoloop, but has the advantage that is actively maintained and using 
the device-mapper infrastructure.

as of b) when dm-crypt is used with plain IV mode, the encryption weakness 
still remain of course. The point is that it offers enhanced security (not 
PERFECT security of course!) because it offers other IV generation schemes, 
too.


> At the time SUSE 
> switched to cryptoloop, dm-crypt was still broken. So exchanging
> an out-of-tree disk encryption solution with an in-tree solution
> that worked was the best option back then.

dm-crypt is as intree as cryptoloop is. The difference is: cryptoloop is not 
maintained any more, whereas dm-crypt is. Moreover, have a look at the kernel 
cryptoloop help text:

"WARNING: This device is not safe for journaled file systems like               
             
ext3 or Reiserfs. Please use the Device Mapper crypto module                    
            
instead, which can be configured to be on-disk compatible with the              
            
cryptoloop device."  

>
> Since you refered to a quote from Jari Ruusu about the insecurity of
> cryptoloop, please try to find a quote from Rari Ruusu where he
> praises LUKS or dm-crypt. You won't find any. Instead you will find
> some quotes from Jari Ruusu where he criticizes them, too.
>

Maybe Jari Ruusi is not praising dm-crypt. But to be honest, Jari Ruusu has 
always been developing a competing project (loop-AES), so he may be biased.

The insecurity of cryptoloop is not founded on his statements alone, although 
his arguments are right by themselves. I may be allowed to refer you again to 
Clemens Frühwirth's homepage which is full of documentation about the 
weaknesses of plain IV scheme.

I may also refer to the one of the forthcoming issues of the German ct 
magazine where the subject is dwelt upon, too.

> So according to your own arguments, SUSE should NOT ship LUKS or dm-crypt.
>

I cannot follow this logic. According to you, as dm-crypt is not proven to be 
secure, one should switch to something which is proven to be certainly be 
insecure and unmaintained?

Best regards

Oliver


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