Maybe openvas should at least write log entry with warning, if anything below TLSv1.2 is enabled?
-- Eero 2015-10-22 12:09 GMT+03:00 Reindl Harald <[email protected]>: > > > Am 22.10.2015 um 09:58 schrieb Jan-Oliver Wagner: > >> On Dienstag, 20. Oktober 2015, Reindl Harald wrote: >> >>> Am 20.10.2015 um 14:15 schrieb Eero Volotinen: >>> >>>> You need to configure gnutls-priority string for each daemon, now you >>>> just configured it for gsad (greenbone security assistant) >>>> >>> >>> the main question remains why a vulnerability scanner complaining about >>> other services not at least starts with secure defaults itself without >>> user intervention >>> >> >> The local TLS installation defines the default regarded as secure. >> Overriding it by default by a application just creates other >> types of unwanted/surprising circumstances. >> >> For example a system or a system administrator might have decided to >> define a even stricter global /etc/gnutls/default-priorities. >> Then OpenVAS might silently downgrade the chosen security level >> if we set it to some value. >> >> I agree that either way (not using system default by default and using >> system default by default) shows disadvantages. >> But calling it "pervert" because we honor system default by default seems >> inadequate to me >> > > system TLS defaults are mostly to never up-to-date and hence anybody who > does not proper configure a webserver adn verify it against > https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ is doing things wrong > > that's fine for a hobby administrator but not a piece of software having > the same goal as ssllabs > > eat your own dogfood! > > that something is going wrong in that context also showed last year many > months after heartbleed www.openvas.org was still vulnerable and the > excuse was "some hobby administrator donated the hosting" which is no > excuse at all - frankly i expect at least own domains are audited by the > developers as well as their own software > > here you go as exmaple with a httpd and RSA certificates > > SSLProtocol All -SSLv2 -SSLv3 > SSLFIPS Off > SSLCompression Off > SSLInsecureRenegotiation Off > SSLSessionTickets Off > SSLVerifyClient none > SSLHonorCipherOrder On > SSLCipherSuite > ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:!LOW:!MEDIUM > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Openvas-discuss mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openvas-discuss >
_______________________________________________ Openvas-discuss mailing list [email protected] https://lists.wald.intevation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openvas-discuss
