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On 06/03/12 19:26, Alon Bar-Lev wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 6, 2012 at 7:42 PM, Russell Morris <open...@rkmorris.us> 
> wrote:
>> Hi,
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That makes sense - thanks! I'm not a security expert by any means, 
>> so the thread lost me when it diverged into this area ... :-(.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> At the risk of asking a stupid question (but that is my specialty 
>> ... :-)) - is there a conclusion of how to deal with this?
>> 
> 
> This is not a stupid question at all. In fact this is the correct 
> question... The wrong question is the privilege separation.
> 
> I rephrase the question: What is missing within openvpn to allow 
> proper UI management
> 
> Goal: To be able to support OpenVPN in complete privilege separation 
> from the end-user, delegating user specific credentials.
> 
> OpenVPN core tasks:
> 
> 1. Run without end-user credentials in OpenVPN configuration, meaning:
> (Side note: there is no reason not to support both client and server
> in this mode.) a. For each session accept certificate via management
> interface. b. Delegate signature operations to management interface.
> Although this is already implemented but undocumented, it only support
> RSA, needs to be extended to other algorithms such as EC.
> 
> 2. Run without peer certificate validation in OpenVPN configuration, 
> meaning: a. Delegate peer-certificate validation to the management 
> interface. b. No need for CA, EKU, Subject, CRL etc in configuration.
> 
> 3. Provide cross platform command-line tool to interact with the 
> management interface, this is the supported project tool. a. Support 
> passphrase. b. Support file based certificate/key (PKCS#1, PKCS#12). 
> c. Support CryptoAPI. d. Support PKCS#11. e. Support peer certificate 
> validation. f. Support basic logging. e. In future this simple CLI
> may transform to simple UI (Qt, GTK), similar to wpa_supplicant's 
> wpa_cli.
[...snip...]

I like these thoughts a lot.  It really makes a lot of sense.

However, how will this approach make sure that malware don't use such a
(new) openvpn service to redirect all Internet traffic via a third-party
which can analyse everything happening?  The malware would just be a
unprivileged process accessing the management interface, just like the
GUI, right?

<conspiracy_thoughts>
I'm just thinking this would be an interesting approach in some less open
countries, where OpenVPN is used to get access to the real free Internet.
 Distributing a suitable malware on computers with this kind of OpenVPN
would be make them able to do such MITM attacks.
</conspiracy_thoughts>


kind regards,

David Sommerseth
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