Another ACK from me.
I'm not sure I understand all the intricacies of our buffer/frame handling
and *why* there is always enough "capacity" present, but since we're never
reading more bytes than we have capacity, this is definitely *safe*.
Obviously the old code never requested more bytes than capacity (buf_safe()),
so the new code will read() "at least as many bytes as before" - and since
I remember that there is quite a bit of headroom in the frame stuff, the
goal should be achieved.
Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.3 branch (the latter
because it helps with certain incompatibilities in --*-mtu setup, which
otherwise lead to hard-to-debug TLS failures).
commit 3c1b19e04745177185decd14da82c71458442b82 (master)
commit 358f513c008bf01fadb82759ac75ffb8613fc785 (release/2.3)
Author: Steffan Karger
List-Post: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Date: Wed Jun 8 14:20:39 2016 +0200
Don't limit max incoming message size based on c2->frame
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <stef...@karger.me>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <a...@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <g...@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1465388443-15484-2-git-send-email-stef...@karger.me>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11850
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <g...@greenie.muc.de>
--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
