Commit 3c1b19e0 changed the maximum size of accepted control channel packets. This was needed for crypto negotiation (which is needed for a nice transition to a new default cipher), but exposed a DoS vulnerability. The vulnerability was found during the OpenVPN 2.4 code audit by Quarkslab (commisioned by OSTIF).
To fix the issue, we should not ASSERT() on external input (in this case the received packet size), but instead gracefully error out and drop the invalid packet. Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.kar...@fox-it.com> --- Changes.rst | 8 ++++++++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Changes.rst b/Changes.rst index 3dba7e0..734ef73 100644 --- a/Changes.rst +++ b/Changes.rst @@ -327,3 +327,11 @@ Bugfixes -------- - Fix memory leak introduced in 2.4.1: if --remote-cert-tls is used, we leaked some memory on each TLS (re)negotiation. + +Security +-------- +- Fix a pre-authentication denial-of-service attack on both clients and servers. + By sending a too-large control packet, OpenVPN 2.4.0 or 2.4.1 can be forced + to hit an ASSERT() and stop the process. If ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt`` + is used, only attackers that have the ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt`` key + can mount an attack. (OSTIF/Quarkslab audit finding 5.1, CVE-2017-7478) diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c index b1f0f6b..4fca283 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -3716,7 +3716,12 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, /* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */ struct buffer *in = reliable_get_buf(ks->rec_reliable); ASSERT(in); - ASSERT(buf_copy(in, buf)); + if(!buf_copy(in, buf)) + { + msg(D_MULTI_DROPPED, + "Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping."); + goto error; + } reliable_mark_active_incoming(ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op); } -- 2.7.4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Check out the vibrant tech community on one of the world's most engaging tech sites, Slashdot.org! http://sdm.link/slashdot _______________________________________________ Openvpn-devel mailing list Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel