2017-08-14 15:36 GMT+05:00 David Sommerseth <
open...@sf.lists.topphemmelig.net>:

> On 01/07/17 13:29, Steffan Karger wrote:
> > The --keysize option can only be used with already deprecated ciphers,
> > such as CAST5, RC2 or BF.  Deviating from the default keysize is
> > generally not a good idea (see man page text), and otherwise only
> > complicates our code.>
> > (If this patch is accepted, I'll send a follow-up patch to remove the
> > option from the master branch.)
>
> I agree to the wanted intention of this change.  But, it hits badly if
> we remove --keysize on configurations still enforcing BF-CBC with
> --keysize 256.  I don't have any numbers of how many users uses it; but
> I know many have preferred BF-CBC for a long time - at least before
> SWEET32 came and hit us all.  Bare in mind that BF-CBC was the default
> since 2002-ish (probably even longer, if considering the OpenVPN v1.x
> branch). And many have added --cipher BF-CBC in their configs despite it
> was the default.
>
> As long as BF-CBC is available, we cannot remove --keysize.  And to
> remove BF-CBC support, I think that needs a bit longer timespan than
> v2.5.  Users *must* be far better prepared for that and we need to make
> loud and clear announcements with such a change.
>
> Yes, in all this, I know that NCP is a nice rescue.  As long as everyone
> either runs v2.4 everywhere or deploys --ncp-ciphers and starts the
> migration.  But I've lost confidence that the vast majority of our users
> pays closely attention to such feature changes - thus they won't notice
> until it stops working.  We need to PUSH this information into their
> faces, with large posters carrying promises of rainbow coloured unicorns
> if they comply today(!).  In addition to adding clear warnings in the
> log files for a looong time.
>
> So I propose:
>
> - We add the warning about removing --keysize for both v2.4 and v2.5.
>
> - Add a warning in v2.4 and v2.5 that ciphers with block sizes < 128
>   bits will be *removed* in v2.6
>
> - When removing those ciphers in v2.6, we can remove --keysize together
>   with the ciphers, as it will no longer be valid.  But --keysize needs
>   to be a NOP for some time (with a warning it has no effect), to avoid
>   OpenVPN stopping to run on upgrades.
>
> - Ensure these changes are synchronised within OpenVPN 3 as well
>
> - Start a new wiki page: "How-To: Migrate to secure and modern
>   OpenVPN configurations" where we list all deprecated features/options
>   and their replacement (including examples).  We also need to have a
>   description on the reasoning for deprecating and removing these
>   options.
>

there are special cases like Mikrotik openvpn (pretty popular), where
user simply use what hardware vendor installed (without possibility to
recompile).

should we contact such hardware vendors as well ?


>
> - And the most tricky one: Get some publicity that OpenVPN is going to
>   deprecate and remove support for weak ciphers out to the public.  Not
>   just on crypto focused sites, but more broadly reaching "media
>   channels".   (I believe we can facilitate some of the PR work done by
>   the company, but we do need more than that).  Channels/sites I'm
>   pondering on:
>
>    ~ An official Press Release by the company? (Samuli and I can check)
>    ~ twitter (via the @OpenVPN account)
>    ~ reddit? (and similar sites)
>    ~ LWN.net
>    ~ arstechnica
>    ~ ThreatPost
>    ~ OS Distribution channels (blog posts, mailing lists, etc)
>    ~ Our own wiki and web pages
>    ~ others?
>
>   The first round is to clearly state that BF-CBC, CAST and RC2 are
>   deprecated and their support will be removed in a coming release (not
>   mentioning version, on purpose!).  Users are strongly advised to
>   upgrade to OpenVPN v2.4 or server and client side instantly, to
>   benefit from NCP (byt more less-tech worded) and to point at the
>   "How-To" described above.
>
>   And then we try to re-iterate this once again with the release of
>   v2.5 and v2.6.
>
>
> I know and understand this hurts security focused people, and probably
> in even more those who understand crypto very well.  But my personal
> experience is that the average users are usually less understanding than
> security minded people.  (Yes, I've burnt my, and other's, fingers
> within the Fedora community with the v2.4 upgrade)
>
>
> --
> kind regards,
>
> David Sommerseth
> OpenVPN Technologies, Inc
>
>
>
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