Clear error stack on successful certificate loading in
tls_ctx_load_cert_file_and_copy() and handle errors also for
PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() call in tls_ctx_load_priv_file().
Due to certificate loading possibly leaking non-fatal errors on OpenSSL
error stack, and some slight oversights in error handling, the
>PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'Private Key'
line was never produced on the management channel for PEM formatted keys.
Signed-off-by: Santtu Lakkala <santtu.lakk...@jolla.com>
---
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 11 +++++------
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
index 07916c3c..74c8fa65 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
@@ -921,6 +921,10 @@ end:
crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file);
}
}
+ else
+ {
+ crypto_print_openssl_errors(M_DEBUG);
+ }
if (in != NULL)
{
@@ -963,12 +967,7 @@ tls_ctx_load_priv_file(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const
char *priv_key_file,
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL,
SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(ctx->ctx),
SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx->ctx));
- if (!pkey)
- {
- goto end;
- }
-
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
+ if (!pkey || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey))
{
#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) ==
EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT))
--
2.20.1
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