From: Arne Schwabe <a...@rfc2549.org> To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications.
Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <a...@rfc2549.org> Acked-by: MaxF <m...@max-fillinger.net> --- This change was reviewed on Gerrit and approved by at least one developer. I request to merge it to master. Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843 This mail reflects revision 5 of this Change. Acked-by according to Gerrit (reflected above): MaxF <m...@max-fillinger.net> diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c @@ -405,7 +405,13 @@ { static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error"; struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 }; - const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt; + struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt; + + if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx)) + { + CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached."); + } + int outlen; struct gc_arena gc; @@ -511,6 +517,7 @@ if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen, &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size)) { + ctx->failed_verifications++; CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed"); } ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen)); diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h index 3ad31c5..fe81c7f 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h @@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for * AEAD ciphers) */ uint64_t plaintext_blocks; + /** number of failed verification using this cipher */ + uint64_t failed_verifications; }; #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */ @@ -661,6 +663,32 @@ cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername); /** + * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit. + */ +static inline bool +cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx) +{ + /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guarantees + * the security margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes) + * but we accept slightly lower security bound for the edge + * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k are + * extremely rarely used */ + return ctx->failed_verifications > (1ull << 36); +} + +/** + * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we + * should try to move to a new key + */ +static inline bool +cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx) +{ + /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */ + return ctx->failed_verifications > (1ull << 35); +} + + +/** * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation * * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c index cf7f34f..e4a7b57 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@ return true; } + if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt)) + { + return true; + } + return false; } /* _______________________________________________ Openvpn-devel mailing list Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel
