Attention is currently required from: plaisthos.
Hello plaisthos,
I'd like you to do a code review.
Please visit
http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1774?usp=email
to review the following change.
Change subject: options: Factor out file access code from options.c
......................................................................
options: Factor out file access code from options.c
options.c is a huge, unwieldly file. So remove some
closely related code that has no direct dependencies
with the other functions in the file.
This time it is the code that checks file accessibility.
Change-Id: I6dafab74b82fbf770c1798b4851a0fd5e4b5d81e
Signed-off-by: Frank Lichtenheld <[email protected]>
---
M CMakeLists.txt
M src/openvpn/Makefile.am
A src/openvpn/check_file_access.c
A src/openvpn/check_file_access.h
M src/openvpn/options.c
5 files changed, 412 insertions(+), 334 deletions(-)
git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/74/1774/1
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index 3981bae..a4f20c9 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@
src/openvpn/basic.h
src/openvpn/buffer.c
src/openvpn/buffer.h
+ src/openvpn/check_file_access.c
+ src/openvpn/check_file_access.h
src/openvpn/circ_list.h
src/openvpn/clinat.c
src/openvpn/clinat.h
diff --git a/src/openvpn/Makefile.am b/src/openvpn/Makefile.am
index 9778f32..1fbcad4 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/openvpn/Makefile.am
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
base64.c base64.h \
basic.h \
buffer.c buffer.h \
+ check_file_access.c check_file_access.h \
circ_list.h \
clinat.c clinat.h \
common.h \
diff --git a/src/openvpn/check_file_access.c b/src/openvpn/check_file_access.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c86cc97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openvpn/check_file_access.c
@@ -0,0 +1,372 @@
+/*
+ * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
+ * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
+ * session authentication and key exchange,
+ * packet encryption, packet authentication, and
+ * packet compression.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2026 OpenVPN Inc <[email protected]>
+ * Copyright (C) 2008-2026 David Sommerseth <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ * with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Check file/directory sanity
+ *
+ */
+/* Expect people using the stripped down version to know what they do */
+#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+#include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "syshead.h"
+
+#include "argv.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "error.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+#include "ssl_common.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define CHKACC_FILE (1 << 0) /**< Check for a file/directory presence */
+#define CHKACC_DIRPATH (1 << 1) /**< Check for directory presence where a
file should reside */
+#define CHKACC_FILEXSTWR (1 << 2) /**< If file exists, is it writable? */
+#define CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN (1 << 3) /**< If filename is stdin, it's allowed and
"exists" */
+#define CHKACC_PRIVATE (1 << 4) /**< Warn if this (private) file is
group/others accessible */
+#define CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI (1 << 5) /**< Do not check URIs, unless they start
with file: */
+
+static bool
+check_file_access(const int type, const char *file, const int mode, const char
*opt)
+{
+ int errcode = 0;
+
+ /* If no file configured, no errors to look for */
+ if (!file)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* If stdin is allowed and the file name is 'stdin', then do no
+ * further checks as stdin is always available
+ */
+ if ((type & CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN) && streq(file, "stdin"))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* file name is a URI if its first segment has ":" (i.e., before any "/")
+ * Then no checks done if CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI is set and the URI does not
start with "file:"
+ */
+ if ((type & CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI) && strchr(file, ':'))
+ {
+ if (!strncmp(file, "file:", 5))
+ {
+ file += 5;
+ }
+ else if (!strchr(file, '/') || strchr(file, '/') > strchr(file, ':'))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Is the directory path leading to the given file accessible? */
+ if (type & CHKACC_DIRPATH)
+ {
+ char *fullpath =
+ string_alloc(file, NULL); /* POSIX dirname() implementation may
modify its arguments */
+ const char *dirpath = dirname(fullpath);
+
+ if (platform_access(dirpath, mode | X_OK) != 0)
+ {
+ errcode = errno;
+ }
+ free(fullpath);
+ }
+
+ /* Is the file itself accessible? */
+ if (!errcode && (type & CHKACC_FILE) && (platform_access(file, mode) != 0))
+ {
+ errcode = errno;
+ }
+
+ /* If the file exists and is accessible, is it writable? */
+ if (!errcode && (type & CHKACC_FILEXSTWR) && (platform_access(file, F_OK)
== 0))
+ {
+ if (platform_access(file, W_OK) != 0)
+ {
+ errcode = errno;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Warn if a given private file is group/others accessible. */
+ if (type & CHKACC_PRIVATE)
+ {
+ platform_stat_t st;
+ if (platform_stat(file, &st))
+ {
+ msg(M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "WARNING: cannot stat file '%s'", file);
+ }
+#ifndef _WIN32
+ else
+ {
+ if (st.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO))
+ {
+ msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: file '%s' is group or others
accessible", file);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Scream if an error is found */
+ if (errcode > 0)
+ {
+ msg(M_NOPREFIX | M_OPTERR | M_ERRNO, "%s fails with '%s'", opt, file);
+ }
+
+ /* Return true if an error occurred */
+ return (errcode != 0 ? true : false);
+}
+
+/* A wrapper for check_file_access() which also takes a chroot directory.
+ * If chroot is NULL, behaviour is exactly the same as calling
check_file_access() directly,
+ * otherwise it will look for the file inside the given chroot directory
instead.
+ */
+static bool
+check_file_access_chroot(const char *chroot, const int type, const char *file,
const int mode,
+ const char *opt)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ /* If no file configured, no errors to look for */
+ if (!file)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* If chroot is set, look for the file/directory inside the chroot */
+ if (chroot)
+ {
+ struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+ struct buffer chroot_file;
+
+ chroot_file = prepend_dir(chroot, file, &gc);
+ ret = check_file_access(type, BSTR(&chroot_file), mode, opt);
+ gc_free(&gc);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* No chroot in play, just call core file check function */
+ ret = check_file_access(type, file, mode, opt);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A wrapper for check_file_access_chroot() that returns false immediately if
+ * the file is inline (and therefore there is no access to check)
+ */
+static bool
+check_file_access_chroot_inline(bool is_inline, const char *chroot, const int
type,
+ const char *file, const int mode, const char
*opt)
+{
+ if (is_inline)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return check_file_access_chroot(chroot, type, file, mode, opt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A wrapper for check_file_access() that returns false immediately if the file
+ * is inline (and therefore there is no access to check)
+ */
+static bool
+check_file_access_inline(bool is_inline, const int type, const char *file,
const int mode,
+ const char *opt)
+{
+ if (is_inline)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return check_file_access(type, file, mode, opt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that the path in the "command" that comes after certain script
options (e.g., --up) is a
+ * valid file with appropriate permissions.
+ *
+ * "command" consists of a path, optionally followed by a space, which may be
+ * followed by arbitrary arguments. It is NOT a full shell command line --
shell expansion is not
+ * performed.
+ *
+ * The path and arguments in "command" may be single- or double-quoted or
escaped.
+ *
+ * The path is extracted from "command", then check_file_access() is called to
check it. The
+ * arguments, if any, are ignored.
+ *
+ * Note that the type, mode, and opt arguments to this routine are the same as
the corresponding
+ * check_file_access() arguments.
+ */
+bool
+check_cmd_access(const char *command, const char *opt, const char *chroot)
+{
+ struct argv argv;
+ bool return_code;
+
+ /* If no command was set, there are no errors to look for */
+ if (!command)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract executable path and arguments */
+ argv = argv_new();
+ argv_parse_cmd(&argv, command);
+
+ /* if an executable is specified then check it; otherwise, complain */
+ if (argv.argv[0])
+ {
+ /* Scripts requires R_OK as well, but that might fail on binaries which
+ * only requires X_OK to function on Unix - a scenario not unlikely to
+ * be seen on suid binaries.
+ */
+ return_code = check_file_access_chroot(chroot, CHKACC_FILE,
argv.argv[0], X_OK, opt);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ msg(M_NOPREFIX | M_OPTERR, "%s fails with '%s': No path to
executable.", opt, command);
+ return_code = true;
+ }
+
+ argv_free(&argv);
+
+ return return_code;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanity check of all file/dir options. Checks that file/dir
+ * is accessible by OpenVPN
+ */
+void
+options_postprocess_filechecks(struct options *options)
+{
+ bool errs = false;
+
+ /* ** SSL/TLS/crypto related files ** */
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->dh_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
options->dh_file, R_OK,
+ "--dh");
+
+ if (!options->verify_hash_no_ca)
+ {
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->ca_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
options->ca_file,
+ R_OK, "--ca");
+ }
+
+ errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->ca_path, R_OK,
+ "--capath");
+
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->cert_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE |
CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI,
+ options->cert_file, R_OK, "--cert");
+
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->extra_certs_file, CHKACC_FILE,
+ options->extra_certs_file, R_OK,
"--extra-certs");
+
+ if (!(options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY))
+ {
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->priv_key_file_inline,
+ CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE |
CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI,
+ options->priv_key_file, R_OK,
"--key");
+ }
+
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->pkcs12_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE
| CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ options->pkcs12_file, R_OK, "--pkcs12");
+
+ if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR)
+ {
+ errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->crl_file,
+ R_OK | X_OK, "--crl-verify
directory");
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ errs |=
+ check_file_access_chroot_inline(options->crl_file_inline,
options->chroot_dir,
+ CHKACC_FILE, options->crl_file,
R_OK, "--crl-verify");
+ }
+
+ if (options->tls_export_peer_cert_dir)
+ {
+ errs |=
+ check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
+ options->tls_export_peer_cert_dir, W_OK,
"--tls-export-cert");
+ }
+
+ ASSERT(options->connection_list);
+ for (int i = 0; i < options->connection_list->len; ++i)
+ {
+ const struct connection_entry *ce = options->connection_list->array[i];
+
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(ce->tls_auth_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE
| CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ ce->tls_auth_file, R_OK,
"--tls-auth");
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(ce->tls_crypt_file_inline,
CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ ce->tls_crypt_file, R_OK,
"--tls-crypt");
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(ce->tls_crypt_v2_file_inline,
CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ ce->tls_crypt_v2_file, R_OK,
"--tls-crypt-v2");
+ }
+
+ errs |=
+ check_file_access_inline(options->shared_secret_file_inline,
CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ options->shared_secret_file, R_OK,
"--secret");
+
+ errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_DIRPATH | CHKACC_FILEXSTWR,
options->packet_id_file,
+ R_OK | W_OK, "--replay-persist");
+
+ /* ** Password files ** */
+ errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ options->key_pass_file, R_OK, "--askpass");
+#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
+ errs |=
+ check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ options->management_user_pass, R_OK, "--management
user/password file");
+#endif /* ENABLE_MANAGEMENT */
+ errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->auth_user_pass_file_inline,
+ CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN |
CHKACC_PRIVATE,
+ options->auth_user_pass_file, R_OK,
"--auth-user-pass");
+ /* ** System related ** */
+ errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE, options->chroot_dir, R_OK | X_OK,
"--chroot directory");
+ errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_DIRPATH | CHKACC_FILEXSTWR,
options->writepid, R_OK | W_OK,
+ "--writepid");
+
+ /* ** Log related ** */
+ errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_DIRPATH | CHKACC_FILEXSTWR,
options->status_file, R_OK | W_OK,
+ "--status");
+
+ /* ** Config related ** */
+ errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->client_config_dir,
+ R_OK | X_OK, "--client-config-dir");
+ errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->tmp_dir,
+ R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "Temporary directory
(--tmp-dir)");
+
+ if (errs)
+ {
+ msg(M_USAGE, "Please correct these errors.");
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* !ENABLE_SMALL */
diff --git a/src/openvpn/check_file_access.h b/src/openvpn/check_file_access.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af057bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openvpn/check_file_access.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
+ * over a single UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
+ * session authentication and key exchange,
+ * packet encryption, packet authentication, and
+ * packet compression.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2026 OpenVPN Inc <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ * with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CHECK_FILE_ACCESS_H
+#define CHECK_FILE_ACCESS_H
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL
+
+#include "options.h"
+
+bool check_cmd_access(const char *command, const char *opt, const char
*chroot);
+
+void options_postprocess_filechecks(struct options *options);
+
+#endif /* !ENABLE_SMALL */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c
index 6e314a1..03cda5a 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/options.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include "tun_afunix.h"
#include "domain_helper.h"
#include "mbuf.h"
+#include "check_file_access.h"
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -3336,340 +3337,6 @@
}
/*
- * Check file/directory sanity
- *
- */
-/* Expect people using the stripped down version to know what they do */
-#ifndef ENABLE_SMALL
-
-#define CHKACC_FILE (1 << 0) /**< Check for a file/directory presence */
-#define CHKACC_DIRPATH (1 << 1) /**< Check for directory presence where a
file should reside */
-#define CHKACC_FILEXSTWR (1 << 2) /**< If file exists, is it writable? */
-#define CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN (1 << 3) /**< If filename is stdin, it's allowed and
"exists" */
-#define CHKACC_PRIVATE (1 << 4) /**< Warn if this (private) file is
group/others accessible */
-#define CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI (1 << 5) /**< Do not check URIs, unless they start
with file: */
-
-static bool
-check_file_access(const int type, const char *file, const int mode, const char
*opt)
-{
- int errcode = 0;
-
- /* If no file configured, no errors to look for */
- if (!file)
- {
- return false;
- }
-
- /* If stdin is allowed and the file name is 'stdin', then do no
- * further checks as stdin is always available
- */
- if ((type & CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN) && streq(file, "stdin"))
- {
- return false;
- }
-
- /* file name is a URI if its first segment has ":" (i.e., before any "/")
- * Then no checks done if CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI is set and the URI does not
start with "file:"
- */
- if ((type & CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI) && strchr(file, ':'))
- {
- if (!strncmp(file, "file:", 5))
- {
- file += 5;
- }
- else if (!strchr(file, '/') || strchr(file, '/') > strchr(file, ':'))
- {
- return false;
- }
- }
-
- /* Is the directory path leading to the given file accessible? */
- if (type & CHKACC_DIRPATH)
- {
- char *fullpath =
- string_alloc(file, NULL); /* POSIX dirname() implementation may
modify its arguments */
- const char *dirpath = dirname(fullpath);
-
- if (platform_access(dirpath, mode | X_OK) != 0)
- {
- errcode = errno;
- }
- free(fullpath);
- }
-
- /* Is the file itself accessible? */
- if (!errcode && (type & CHKACC_FILE) && (platform_access(file, mode) != 0))
- {
- errcode = errno;
- }
-
- /* If the file exists and is accessible, is it writable? */
- if (!errcode && (type & CHKACC_FILEXSTWR) && (platform_access(file, F_OK)
== 0))
- {
- if (platform_access(file, W_OK) != 0)
- {
- errcode = errno;
- }
- }
-
- /* Warn if a given private file is group/others accessible. */
- if (type & CHKACC_PRIVATE)
- {
- platform_stat_t st;
- if (platform_stat(file, &st))
- {
- msg(M_WARN | M_ERRNO, "WARNING: cannot stat file '%s'", file);
- }
-#ifndef _WIN32
- else
- {
- if (st.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO))
- {
- msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: file '%s' is group or others
accessible", file);
- }
- }
-#endif
- }
-
- /* Scream if an error is found */
- if (errcode > 0)
- {
- msg(M_NOPREFIX | M_OPTERR | M_ERRNO, "%s fails with '%s'", opt, file);
- }
-
- /* Return true if an error occurred */
- return (errcode != 0 ? true : false);
-}
-
-/* A wrapper for check_file_access() which also takes a chroot directory.
- * If chroot is NULL, behaviour is exactly the same as calling
check_file_access() directly,
- * otherwise it will look for the file inside the given chroot directory
instead.
- */
-static bool
-check_file_access_chroot(const char *chroot, const int type, const char *file,
const int mode,
- const char *opt)
-{
- bool ret = false;
-
- /* If no file configured, no errors to look for */
- if (!file)
- {
- return false;
- }
-
- /* If chroot is set, look for the file/directory inside the chroot */
- if (chroot)
- {
- struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
- struct buffer chroot_file;
-
- chroot_file = prepend_dir(chroot, file, &gc);
- ret = check_file_access(type, BSTR(&chroot_file), mode, opt);
- gc_free(&gc);
- }
- else
- {
- /* No chroot in play, just call core file check function */
- ret = check_file_access(type, file, mode, opt);
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
- * A wrapper for check_file_access_chroot() that returns false immediately if
- * the file is inline (and therefore there is no access to check)
- */
-static bool
-check_file_access_chroot_inline(bool is_inline, const char *chroot, const int
type,
- const char *file, const int mode, const char
*opt)
-{
- if (is_inline)
- {
- return false;
- }
-
- return check_file_access_chroot(chroot, type, file, mode, opt);
-}
-
-/**
- * A wrapper for check_file_access() that returns false immediately if the file
- * is inline (and therefore there is no access to check)
- */
-static bool
-check_file_access_inline(bool is_inline, const int type, const char *file,
const int mode,
- const char *opt)
-{
- if (is_inline)
- {
- return false;
- }
-
- return check_file_access(type, file, mode, opt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Verifies that the path in the "command" that comes after certain script
options (e.g., --up) is a
- * valid file with appropriate permissions.
- *
- * "command" consists of a path, optionally followed by a space, which may be
- * followed by arbitrary arguments. It is NOT a full shell command line --
shell expansion is not
- * performed.
- *
- * The path and arguments in "command" may be single- or double-quoted or
escaped.
- *
- * The path is extracted from "command", then check_file_access() is called to
check it. The
- * arguments, if any, are ignored.
- *
- * Note that the type, mode, and opt arguments to this routine are the same as
the corresponding
- * check_file_access() arguments.
- */
-static bool
-check_cmd_access(const char *command, const char *opt, const char *chroot)
-{
- struct argv argv;
- bool return_code;
-
- /* If no command was set, there are no errors to look for */
- if (!command)
- {
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Extract executable path and arguments */
- argv = argv_new();
- argv_parse_cmd(&argv, command);
-
- /* if an executable is specified then check it; otherwise, complain */
- if (argv.argv[0])
- {
- /* Scripts requires R_OK as well, but that might fail on binaries which
- * only requires X_OK to function on Unix - a scenario not unlikely to
- * be seen on suid binaries.
- */
- return_code = check_file_access_chroot(chroot, CHKACC_FILE,
argv.argv[0], X_OK, opt);
- }
- else
- {
- msg(M_NOPREFIX | M_OPTERR, "%s fails with '%s': No path to
executable.", opt, command);
- return_code = true;
- }
-
- argv_free(&argv);
-
- return return_code;
-}
-
-/*
- * Sanity check of all file/dir options. Checks that file/dir
- * is accessible by OpenVPN
- */
-static void
-options_postprocess_filechecks(struct options *options)
-{
- bool errs = false;
-
- /* ** SSL/TLS/crypto related files ** */
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->dh_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
options->dh_file, R_OK,
- "--dh");
-
- if (!options->verify_hash_no_ca)
- {
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->ca_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE,
options->ca_file,
- R_OK, "--ca");
- }
-
- errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->ca_path, R_OK,
- "--capath");
-
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->cert_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE |
CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI,
- options->cert_file, R_OK, "--cert");
-
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->extra_certs_file, CHKACC_FILE,
- options->extra_certs_file, R_OK,
"--extra-certs");
-
- if (!(options->management_flags & MF_EXTERNAL_KEY))
- {
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->priv_key_file_inline,
- CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE |
CHKACC_ACCEPT_URI,
- options->priv_key_file, R_OK,
"--key");
- }
-
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->pkcs12_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE
| CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- options->pkcs12_file, R_OK, "--pkcs12");
-
- if (options->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR)
- {
- errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->crl_file,
- R_OK | X_OK, "--crl-verify
directory");
- }
- else
- {
- errs |=
- check_file_access_chroot_inline(options->crl_file_inline,
options->chroot_dir,
- CHKACC_FILE, options->crl_file,
R_OK, "--crl-verify");
- }
-
- if (options->tls_export_peer_cert_dir)
- {
- errs |=
- check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
- options->tls_export_peer_cert_dir, W_OK,
"--tls-export-cert");
- }
-
- ASSERT(options->connection_list);
- for (int i = 0; i < options->connection_list->len; ++i)
- {
- const struct connection_entry *ce = options->connection_list->array[i];
-
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(ce->tls_auth_file_inline, CHKACC_FILE
| CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- ce->tls_auth_file, R_OK,
"--tls-auth");
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(ce->tls_crypt_file_inline,
CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- ce->tls_crypt_file, R_OK,
"--tls-crypt");
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(ce->tls_crypt_v2_file_inline,
CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- ce->tls_crypt_v2_file, R_OK,
"--tls-crypt-v2");
- }
-
- errs |=
- check_file_access_inline(options->shared_secret_file_inline,
CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- options->shared_secret_file, R_OK,
"--secret");
-
- errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_DIRPATH | CHKACC_FILEXSTWR,
options->packet_id_file,
- R_OK | W_OK, "--replay-persist");
-
- /* ** Password files ** */
- errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- options->key_pass_file, R_OK, "--askpass");
-#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
- errs |=
- check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN | CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- options->management_user_pass, R_OK, "--management
user/password file");
-#endif /* ENABLE_MANAGEMENT */
- errs |= check_file_access_inline(options->auth_user_pass_file_inline,
- CHKACC_FILE | CHKACC_ACPTSTDIN |
CHKACC_PRIVATE,
- options->auth_user_pass_file, R_OK,
"--auth-user-pass");
- /* ** System related ** */
- errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_FILE, options->chroot_dir, R_OK | X_OK,
"--chroot directory");
- errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_DIRPATH | CHKACC_FILEXSTWR,
options->writepid, R_OK | W_OK,
- "--writepid");
-
- /* ** Log related ** */
- errs |= check_file_access(CHKACC_DIRPATH | CHKACC_FILEXSTWR,
options->status_file, R_OK | W_OK,
- "--status");
-
- /* ** Config related ** */
- errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->client_config_dir,
- R_OK | X_OK, "--client-config-dir");
- errs |= check_file_access_chroot(options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE,
options->tmp_dir,
- R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "Temporary directory
(--tmp-dir)");
-
- if (errs)
- {
- msg(M_USAGE, "Please correct these errors.");
- }
-}
-#endif /* !ENABLE_SMALL */
-
-/*
* Sanity check on options.
* Also set some options based on other
* options.
--
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Gerrit-MessageType: newchange
Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6dafab74b82fbf770c1798b4851a0fd5e4b5d81e
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1774
Gerrit-PatchSet: 1
Gerrit-Owner: flichtenheld <[email protected]>
Gerrit-Reviewer: plaisthos <[email protected]>
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