From: Frank Lichtenheld <[email protected]> * Continue BLEN -> BLENZ replacement * Remove some unneeded casts * Some trivial type fixes
Change-Id: I02f8df01f8f33cb9cd04cd844d1f1893688f51e8 Signed-off-by: Frank Lichtenheld <[email protected]> Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/2157 --- This change was reviewed on Gerrit and approved by at least one developer. I request to merge it to master. Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/2157 This mail reflects revision 4 of this Change. Acked-by according to Gerrit (reflected above): Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> diff --git a/src/openvpn/acc.c b/src/openvpn/acc.c index e21891d..b8d7c3d 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/acc.c +++ b/src/openvpn/acc.c @@ -148,11 +148,6 @@ return parse_acc_message_flags(flags, err_reason, gc); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion" -#endif - void receive_acc_message(struct context *c, const struct buffer *buffer) { @@ -236,15 +231,10 @@ msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Received malformed custom app control channel " "message (%s): %s", err_reason, - format_hex(CBPTR(buffer), BLEN(buffer), 80, &gc)); + format_hex(CBPTR(buffer), BLENZ(buffer), 80, &gc)); gc_free(&gc); } - -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -#endif - bool send_acc_message(struct context *c, struct tls_multi *multi, diff --git a/src/openvpn/auth_token.c b/src/openvpn/auth_token.c index 211af90..b69092c 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/auth_token.c +++ b/src/openvpn/auth_token.c @@ -36,11 +36,6 @@ * padding */ static_assert(TOKEN_DATA_LEN % 3 == 0, "TOKEN_DATA_LEN is not a multiple of 3"); -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion" -#endif - bool is_auth_token(const char *password) { @@ -67,7 +62,7 @@ return; } - int auth_token_state_flags = session->key[KS_PRIMARY].auth_token_state_flags; + unsigned int auth_token_state_flags = session->key[KS_PRIMARY].auth_token_state_flags; const char *state; @@ -188,7 +183,7 @@ { struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); - int64_t timestamp = htonll((uint64_t)now); + int64_t timestamp = (int64_t)htonll((uint64_t)now); int64_t initial_timestamp = timestamp; hmac_ctx_t *ctx = multi->opt.auth_token_key.hmac; @@ -273,7 +268,7 @@ alloc_buf_gc(strlen(SESSION_ID_PREFIX) + strlen(b64output) + 1, &gc); ASSERT(buf_write(&session_token, SESSION_ID_PREFIX, strlen(SESSION_ID_PREFIX))); - ASSERT(buf_write(&session_token, b64output, (int)strlen(b64output))); + ASSERT(buf_write(&session_token, b64output, strlen(b64output))); ASSERT(buf_write_u8(&session_token, 0)); free(b64output); @@ -296,10 +291,6 @@ gc_free(&gc); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -#endif - static bool check_hmac_token(hmac_ctx_t *ctx, const uint8_t *b64decoded, const char *username) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/base64.h b/src/openvpn/base64.h index be7aa64..800e569 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/base64.h +++ b/src/openvpn/base64.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ #define _BASE64_H_ /** Compute resulting base64 length. 6 bits per byte, padded to 4 bytes. */ -#define OPENVPN_BASE64_LENGTH(binary_length) ((((8 * binary_length) / 6) + 3) & ~3) +#define OPENVPN_BASE64_LENGTH(binary_length) ((((8 * binary_length) / 6) + 3) & ~3u) /** Compute the maximal number of bytes encoded in a base64 string. */ #define OPENVPN_BASE64_DECODED_LENGTH(base64_length) ((base64_length / 4) * 3) diff --git a/src/openvpn/console_builtin.c b/src/openvpn/console_builtin.c index dc71d12..0353ade 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/console_builtin.c +++ b/src/openvpn/console_builtin.c @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ if (!echo && (tcgetattr(fileno(fp), &tty_tmp) == 0)) { tty_save = tty_tmp; - tty_tmp.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL | ISIG); + tty_tmp.c_lflag &= ~(unsigned int)(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL | ISIG); restore_tty = (tcsetattr(fileno(fp), TCSAFLUSH, &tty_tmp) == 0); } diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c index 88c2c52..a4c2683 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ ASSERT(cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv)); } - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf), 80, &gc)); /* Buffer overflow check */ if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + mac_len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ /* For AEAD ciphers, authenticate Additional Data, including opcode */ ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update_ad(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work))); - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT AD: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 0, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT AD: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLENZ(&work), 0, &gc)); if (!use_epoch_data_format) { @@ -170,8 +170,8 @@ /* update number of plaintext blocks encrypted. Use the (x + (n-1))/n trick * to round up the result to the number of blocks used */ - const int blocksize = AEAD_LIMIT_BLOCKSIZE; - opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.plaintext_blocks += (BLEN(&work) + (blocksize - 1)) / blocksize; + const unsigned int blocksize = AEAD_LIMIT_BLOCKSIZE; + opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.plaintext_blocks += (BLENZ(&work) + (blocksize - 1)) / blocksize; /* if the tag is at end the end, allocate it now */ if (use_epoch_data_format) @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ *buf = work; - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf), 80, &gc)); gc_free(&gc); return; @@ -257,13 +257,13 @@ ASSERT(buf_write(&work, iv_buf, iv_size)); dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT IV: %s", format_hex(iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc)); - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf), 80, &gc)); /* cipher_ctx was already initialized with key & keylen */ ASSERT(cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv_buf)); /* Buffer overflow check */ - if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) + if (!buf_safe(&work, BLENZ(buf) + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) { msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT: buffer size error, bc=%d bo=%d bl=%d wc=%d wo=%d wl=%d cbs=%u", @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ *buf = work; - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLENZ(&work), 80, &gc)); } gc_free(&gc); @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ ASSERT(buf->len > 0); ASSERT(ctx->cipher); - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf), 80, &gc)); ASSERT(ad_start >= buf->data && ad_start <= BPTR(buf)); @@ -558,10 +558,10 @@ } dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT MAC: %s", format_hex(tag_ptr, tag_size, 0, &gc)); - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 0, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf), 0, &gc)); /* Buffer overflow check (should never fail) */ - if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) + if (!buf_safe(&work, BLENZ(buf) + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) { CRYPT_ERROR("potential buffer overflow"); } @@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ } ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen)); - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLENZ(&work), 80, &gc)); if (!crypto_check_replay(opt, &pin, epoch, error_prefix, &gc)) { @@ -594,8 +594,8 @@ /* update number of plaintext blocks decrypted. Use the (x + (n-1))/n trick * to round up the result to the number of blocks used. */ - const int blocksize = AEAD_LIMIT_BLOCKSIZE; - opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt.plaintext_blocks += (BLEN(&work) + (blocksize - 1)) / blocksize; + const unsigned int blocksize = AEAD_LIMIT_BLOCKSIZE; + opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt.plaintext_blocks += (BLENZ(&work) + (blocksize - 1)) / blocksize; *buf = work; @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ struct packet_id_net pin; bool have_pin = false; - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf), 80, &gc)); /* Verify the HMAC */ if (ctx->hmac) @@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ } /* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */ - if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) + if (!buf_safe(&work, BLENZ(buf) + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher))) { CRYPT_ERROR("packet too big to decrypt"); } @@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ } ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen)); - dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 80, &gc)); + dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLENZ(&work), 80, &gc)); /* Get packet ID from plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */ { @@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ crypto_max_overhead(void) { return packet_id_size(true) + OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH + OPENVPN_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE - + max_int(OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE, OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH); + + max_uint(OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE, OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH); } static void @@ -1366,7 +1366,7 @@ size_t buf_size = strlen(file) + 1; ASSERT(buf_size <= INT_MAX); size = (int)buf_size; - buf_set_read(&in, (const uint8_t *)file, size); + buf_set_read(&in, (const uint8_t *)file, buf_size); } else /* 'file' is a filename which refers to a file containing the ascii key */ { @@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc(2048, &gc); /* how to format the ascii file representation of key */ - const int bytes_per_line = 16; + const unsigned int bytes_per_line = 16; /* write header */ buf_printf(&out, "#\n# %d bit OpenVPN static key\n#\n", nbits); diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h index dbe0802..fd632be 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h @@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ * to read. */ static inline bool -aead_usage_limit_reached(const uint64_t limit, const struct key_ctx *key_ctx, int64_t higest_pid) +aead_usage_limit_reached(const uint64_t limit, const struct key_ctx *key_ctx, uint64_t higest_pid) { /* This is the q + s <= p^(1/2) * 2^(129/2) - 1 calculation where * q is the number of protected messages (highest_pid) * s Total plaintext length in all messages (in blocks) */ - return (limit > 0 && key_ctx->plaintext_blocks + (uint64_t)higest_pid > limit); + return (limit > 0 && key_ctx->plaintext_blocks + higest_pid > limit); } #endif /* CRYPTO_H */ diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_epoch.c b/src/openvpn/crypto_epoch.c index 312cf6f..243b5a2 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_epoch.c +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_epoch.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ const uint8_t *label_prefix = (const uint8_t *)("ovpn "); uint8_t prefix_len = 5; - size_t hkdf_label_len = 2 + prefix_len + 1 + label_len + 1 + context_len; + size_t hkdf_label_len = 2u + prefix_len + 1u + label_len + 1u + context_len; struct buffer hkdf_label = alloc_buf_gc(hkdf_label_len, &gc); buf_write_u16(&hkdf_label, (uint16_t)out_len); diff --git a/src/openvpn/manage.c b/src/openvpn/manage.c index 4809532..1760c90 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/manage.c +++ b/src/openvpn/manage.c @@ -2758,7 +2758,7 @@ else { int status; - int resolve_flags = GETADDR_RESOLVE | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL | GETADDR_FATAL; + unsigned int resolve_flags = GETADDR_RESOLVE | GETADDR_WARN_ON_SIGNAL | GETADDR_FATAL; if (!(flags & MF_CONNECT_AS_CLIENT)) { @@ -4001,11 +4001,11 @@ desc = "rsa-sign"; } - buf_write(&buf_data, b64_data, (int)strlen(b64_data)); + buf_write(&buf_data, b64_data, strlen(b64_data)); if (man->connection.client_version >= MCV_PKSIGN_ALG) { - buf_write(&buf_data, ",", (int)strlen(",")); - buf_write(&buf_data, algorithm, (int)strlen(algorithm)); + buf_write(&buf_data, ",", strlen(",")); + buf_write(&buf_data, algorithm, strlen(algorithm)); } char *ret = management_query_multiline_flatten(man, (char *)buf_bptr(&buf_data), prompt, desc, &man->connection.ext_key_state, diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c index cbc3118..f4e142b 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c @@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ return 0; } - retval = endless_buf_write(&ks->bio_ctx->in, BPTR(buf), buf->len); + retval = endless_buf_write(&ks->bio_ctx->in, BPTR(buf), BLENZ(buf)); if (retval < 0) { diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c index bea51b5..37f6218 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_crypto.c @@ -52,11 +52,6 @@ static const char testtext[] = "Dummy text to test PEM encoding"; -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion" -#endif - static void crypto_pem_encode_decode_loopback(void **state) { @@ -467,14 +462,14 @@ * current mode (FIPS), this will still return -1 */ assert_int_equal(cipher_get_aead_limits("CHACHA20-POLY1305"), 0); - int64_t aeslimit = cipher_get_aead_limits("AES-128-GCM"); + uint64_t aeslimit = cipher_get_aead_limits("AES-128-GCM"); assert_int_equal(aeslimit, (1ull << 36) - 1); /* Check if this matches our exception for 1600 size packets assuming * AEAD_LIMIT_BLOCKSIZE (128 bits/ 16 bytes). Gives us 100 blocks * + 1 for the packet */ - int64_t L = 101; + uint64_t L = 101; /* 2 ^ 29.34, using the result here to avoid linking to libm */ assert_int_equal(aeslimit / L, 680390858); @@ -520,7 +515,7 @@ 0xec, 0xed, 0xee, 0xef, 0xf0, 0xf1, 0xf2, 0xf3, 0xf4, 0xf5, 0xf6, 0xf7, 0xf8, 0xf9, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0xfd, 0xfe, 0xff }; - const int L = 82; + const size_t L = 82; uint8_t okm[82] = { 0xb1, 0x1e, 0x39, 0x8d, 0xc8, 0x03, 0x27, 0xa1, 0xc8, 0xe7, 0xf7, 0x8c, 0x59, 0x6a, 0x49, 0x34, 0x4f, 0x01, 0x2e, 0xda, 0x2d, 0x4e, 0xfa, 0xd8, 0xa0, 0x50, 0xcc, 0x4c, 0x19, 0xaf, 0xa9, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x04, 0x5a, 0x99, @@ -545,7 +540,7 @@ const uint8_t info[] = { 0 }; - int L = 42; + const size_t L = 42; uint8_t okm[42] = { 0x8d, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x75, 0xa5, 0x63, 0xc1, 0x8f, 0x71, 0x5f, 0x80, 0x2a, 0x06, 0x3c, 0x5a, 0x31, 0xb8, 0xa1, 0x1f, 0x5c, 0x5e, 0xe1, 0x87, 0x9e, 0xc3, 0x45, 0x4e, 0x5f, 0x3c, 0x73, 0x8d, 0x2d, 0x9d, @@ -570,7 +565,7 @@ uint8_t info[18] = { 0x00, 0x1b, 0x0e, 0x6f, 0x76, 0x70, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x00 }; - int L = 27; + const size_t L = 27; uint8_t okm[27] = { 0x87, 0x5a, 0x8e, 0xec, 0x18, 0x55, 0x63, 0x80, 0xb8, 0xd9, 0x33, 0xed, 0x32, 0x3c, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0xec, 0xcf, 0x49, 0x72, 0xe6, 0x83, 0xf0, 0x6a, 0x83, 0xac }; @@ -782,7 +777,7 @@ /* lookup some wacky things that should fail */ assert_null(epoch_lookup_decrypt_key(co, 2000)); - assert_null(epoch_lookup_decrypt_key(co, -1)); + assert_null(epoch_lookup_decrypt_key(co, UINT16_MAX)); assert_null(epoch_lookup_decrypt_key(co, 0xefff)); /* Lookup the edges of the current window */ @@ -833,10 +828,6 @@ assert_null(epoch_lookup_decrypt_key(co, 23)); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -#endif - void crypto_test_epoch_key_overflow(void **state) { diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_networking.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_networking.c index ae75386..3699a2a1 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_networking.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_networking.c @@ -40,23 +40,14 @@ return net_iface_del(NULL, name); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion" -#endif - static int -net__iface_mtu_set(int mtu) +net__iface_mtu_set(uint32_t mtu) { - printf("CMD: ip link set %s mtu %d\n", iface, mtu); + printf("CMD: ip link set %s mtu %u\n", iface, mtu); return net_iface_mtu_set(NULL, iface, mtu); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -#endif - static int net__addr_v4_add(const char *addr_str, int prefixlen) { diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c index 5ace810..fbbb40f 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c @@ -618,11 +618,6 @@ assert_memory_equal(server_id2_p1.id, server_id_p2.id, SID_SIZE); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic push -#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion" -#endif - static void test_generate_reset_packet_plain(void **ut_state) { @@ -701,10 +696,6 @@ free_tas(&tas_server); } -#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) -#pragma GCC diagnostic pop -#endif - /* A peer can ask us to append the wrapped client key (WKc) to our next * control packet. Only a tls-crypt-v2 client has one, so check that we * refuse to build such a packet when we have no key instead of walking diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c index ab90ea5..2d31c00 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ skip_if_tls_crypt_not_supported(ctx); buf_clear(&ctx->source); - assert_non_null(buf_write_alloc(&ctx->source, TESTBUF_SIZE - BLEN(&ctx->ciphertext) + assert_non_null(buf_write_alloc(&ctx->source, TESTBUF_SIZE - BLENZ(&ctx->ciphertext) - tls_crypt_buf_overhead())); assert_true(tls_crypt_wrap(&ctx->source, &ctx->ciphertext, &ctx->co)); @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ skip_if_tls_crypt_not_supported(ctx); buf_clear(&ctx->source); - assert_non_null(buf_write_alloc(&ctx->source, TESTBUF_SIZE - BLEN(&ctx->ciphertext) + assert_non_null(buf_write_alloc(&ctx->source, TESTBUF_SIZE - BLENZ(&ctx->ciphertext) - tls_crypt_buf_overhead() + 1)); assert_false(tls_crypt_wrap(&ctx->source, &ctx->ciphertext, &ctx->co)); } @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ assert_false(tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(&ctx->wkc, &wrap_ctx, NULL)); /* add a opcode in front of the key to make it valid to extract */ - struct buffer wkcop = alloc_buf_gc(buf_len(&ctx->wkc) + 1, &ctx->gc); + struct buffer wkcop = alloc_buf_gc(BLENZ(&ctx->wkc) + 1, &ctx->gc); buf_write_u8(&wkcop, 0x50); buf_copy(&wkcop, &ctx->wkc); assert_true(tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(&wkcop, &wrap_ctx, NULL)); @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int64_t create_time = now - (days_ago * 24 * 60 * 60); assert_true(create_time > 0); - int64_t timestamp = htonll((uint64_t)create_time); + uint64_t timestamp = htonll((uint64_t)create_time); ASSERT(buf_write(&metadata, &TLS_CRYPT_METADATA_TYPE_TIMESTAMP, 1)); ASSERT(buf_write(&metadata, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp))); @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ &ctx->server_keys.encrypt, &ctx->gc)); /* add a opcode in front of the key to make it valid to extract */ - struct buffer pseudo_packet = alloc_buf_gc(buf_len(&ctx->wkc) + 1, &ctx->gc); + struct buffer pseudo_packet = alloc_buf_gc(BLENZ(&ctx->wkc) + 1, &ctx->gc); buf_write_u8(&pseudo_packet, 0x50); buf_copy(&pseudo_packet, &ctx->wkc); @@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ struct buffer expected_metadata = create_metadata_days_ago(&ctx->gc, 29); buf_advance(&expected_metadata, 1); - expect_memory(__wrap_buffer_write_file, pem, buf_bptr(&expected_metadata), buf_len(&expected_metadata)); + expect_memory(__wrap_buffer_write_file, pem, buf_bptr(&expected_metadata), BLENZ(&expected_metadata)); will_return(__wrap_buffer_write_file, true); tmp = create_client_key_input(ctx, 29); @@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ } expect_string(__wrap_buffer_write_file, filename, tmpfile_path); - expect_memory(__wrap_buffer_write_file, pem, buf_bptr(&expected_metadata), buf_len(&expected_metadata)); + expect_memory(__wrap_buffer_write_file, pem, buf_bptr(&expected_metadata), BLENZ(&expected_metadata)); will_return(__wrap_buffer_write_file, true); tmp = create_client_key_input(ctx, 29); _______________________________________________ Openvpn-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel
