From: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> 0a8e80aa ("Avoid unbounded allocations in pkcs11_mbedtls.c") capped the certificate blob size reported by the PKCS#11 provider only in the mbedTLS backend. pkcs11_management_id_get() still allocated whatever size the provider returned. Move the limit to pkcs11_backend.h as PKCS11_MAX_CERT_SIZE and check it there too.
Change-Id: Ia9f328b1c0ea29adf811a933d1fd22cb32e35e6d Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]> Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]> Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/2121 --- This change was reviewed on Gerrit and approved by at least one developer. I request to merge it to master. Gerrit URL: https://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/2121 This mail reflects revision 3 of this Change. Acked-by according to Gerrit (reflected above): Gert Doering <[email protected]> diff --git a/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c b/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c index b4bed12..3610224 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c +++ b/src/openvpn/pkcs11.c @@ -509,6 +509,13 @@ goto cleanup; } + if (certificate_blob_size > PKCS11_MAX_CERT_SIZE) + { + msg(M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Certificate too large: %zu bytes, maximum is %zu", + certificate_blob_size, PKCS11_MAX_CERT_SIZE); + goto cleanup; + } + if ((certificate_blob = (unsigned char *)malloc(certificate_blob_size)) == NULL) { msg(M_FATAL, "PKCS#11: Cannot allocate memory"); diff --git a/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h b/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h index b8b0eb0..972c3a2 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h +++ b/src/openvpn/pkcs11_backend.h @@ -37,6 +37,20 @@ #include <pkcs11-helper-1.0/pkcs11h-certificate.h> +/* + * Maximum size of a certificate retrieved from a PKCS #11 provider, so that + * the provider cannot crash OpenVPN by making it try to allocate 2^64 bytes. + * The maximum of 100.000 bytes is picked as a round number that easily + * accomodates the currently standardized quantum-safe signature algorithms. + * It is twice the size of a SLH-DSA (aka SPHINCS+) signature plus public key. + * + * However, there are additional digital signature schemes currently on the + * NIST on-ramp (e.g., some parameter settings for LESS) that have even larger + * public keys or signatures, so if those ever see use on smartcards, we will + * need to increase this number. + */ +#define PKCS11_MAX_CERT_SIZE ((size_t)100000) + /** * Retrieve PKCS #11 Certificate's DN in a printable format. * diff --git a/src/openvpn/pkcs11_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/pkcs11_mbedtls.c index 2183217..3ee3837 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/pkcs11_mbedtls.c +++ b/src/openvpn/pkcs11_mbedtls.c @@ -42,16 +42,6 @@ static bool pkcs11_get_x509_cert(pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11_cert, mbedtls_x509_crt *cert) { - /* We set a maximum size for certificates so that the PKCS provider cannot crash OpenVPN by - * making it try to allocate 2^64 bytes. The maximum of 100.000 bytes is picked as a round - * number that easily accomodates the currently standardized quantum-safe signature algorithms. - * It is twice the size of a SLH-DSA (aka SPHINCS+) signature plus public key. - * - * However, there are additional digital signature schemes currently on the NIST on-ramp - * (e.g., some parameter settings for LESS) that have even larger public keys or signatures, so - * if those ever see use on smartcards, we will need to increase this number. */ - const size_t max_cert_size = 100000; - unsigned char *cert_blob = NULL; size_t cert_blob_size = 0; bool ret = false; @@ -62,9 +52,10 @@ goto cleanup; } - if (cert_blob_size > max_cert_size) + if (cert_blob_size > PKCS11_MAX_CERT_SIZE) { - msg(M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Certificate too large: %zu bytes, maximum is %zu", cert_blob_size, max_cert_size); + msg(M_WARN, "PKCS#11: Certificate too large: %zu bytes, maximum is %zu", cert_blob_size, + PKCS11_MAX_CERT_SIZE); goto cleanup; } _______________________________________________ Openvpn-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel
