On 18/07/2017 10:45, Gert Doering wrote:
This is most likely not a "2.3 -> 2.4" regression, but "old 2.3.x to
more recent version".

As the default cipher (BF-CBC) is considered weak today, if you do not
renegotiate your keys ever so often, newer 2.3.x versions and 2.4 will
set "reneg-bytes 64MB" automatically if BF-CBC is in use - and if you
hit a renegotiation, you need to re-enter credentials.
Many thanks for the hint about the renegotiation that happens after 64MB when on BF-CBC cipher. I can indeed confirm we're on the default BF-CBC cipher and the issue occurs exactly once 64MB of data was downloaded.

On the other hand, this is really only an issue with 2.4. Both 2.3.17 & 2.4.3 log (twice) the warning "WARNING: INSECURE cipher with block size less than 128 bit (64 bit). This allows attacks like SWEET32. Mitigate by using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC)." but the warning "WARNING: cipher with small block size in use, reducing reneg-bytes to 64MB to mitigate SWEET32 attacks." is *only* seen in 2.4.

Let me know if I can be any help here?

One approach to handle this is to migrate to more modern crypto algorithms
- put 2.4 on the server, and it will negotiate AES-256-GCM with 2.4
clients, fixing this issue in multiple aspects.

Alternatively, you can put "reneg-bytes 0" in your configs while preparing
the migration away from BF-CBC (be aware that this weakens your crypto,
so this can only be a temporary thing).
Thanks for this! I can also confirm that reneg-bytes 0 fixes it with a 2.4 client on a 2.3 server.

With Stretch just released / OpenVPN 2.4 available in jessie-backports we're going to plan an upgrade somewhere soon. At the same time we will check out the auth-gen-token as it seems really useful in our setup.


Thanks again guys! This was really helpful.

Regards,
Geert

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