Author: nbd
Date: 2015-04-23 10:01:51 +0200 (Thu, 23 Apr 2015)
New Revision: 45567

Added:
   
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
Modified:
   trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch
   trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch
   trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch
   trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch
Log:
hostapd: backport fix for CVE-2015-1863, refresh patches

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>

Added: 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
===================================================================
--- 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
                               (rev 0)
+++ 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/001-P2P-Validate-SSID-element-length-before-copying-it-C.patch
       2015-04-23 08:01:51 UTC (rev 45567)
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it
+ (CVE-2015-1863)
+
+This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in
+p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes)
+was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in
+arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the
+dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the
+heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P
+peer discovery purposes.
+
+This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program
+behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service
+due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation,
+and potentially arbitrary code execution.
+
+Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart
+hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
+---
+ src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/p2p/p2p.c
++++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p,
+       if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0)
+               os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
+       if (msg.ssid &&
++          msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) &&
+           (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN ||
+            os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN)
+            != 0)) {

Modified: trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch      
2015-04-22 19:07:24 UTC (rev 45566)
+++ trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/120-daemonize_fix.patch      
2015-04-23 08:01:51 UTC (rev 45567)
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  
  #ifdef ANDROID
  #include <sys/capability.h>
-@@ -155,59 +156,46 @@ int os_gmtime(os_time_t t, struct os_tm 
+@@ -155,59 +156,46 @@ int os_gmtime(os_time_t t, struct os_tm
        return 0;
  }
  
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
 -#else /* __APPLE__ */
 -#define os_daemon daemon
 -#endif /* __APPLE__ */
+ 
 -
- 
 -int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file)
 -{
 -#if defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__)

Modified: 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch     
2015-04-22 19:07:24 UTC (rev 45566)
+++ trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/370-ap_sta_support.patch     
2015-04-23 08:01:51 UTC (rev 45567)
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@
  #include "drivers/driver.h"
  #include "wpa_supplicant_i.h"
  #include "config.h"
-@@ -277,6 +278,10 @@ static void calculate_update_time(const 
+@@ -277,6 +278,10 @@ static void calculate_update_time(const
  static void wpa_bss_copy_res(struct wpa_bss *dst, struct wpa_scan_res *src,
                             struct os_reltime *fetch_time)
  {

Modified: 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch
===================================================================
--- 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch   
    2015-04-22 19:07:24 UTC (rev 45566)
+++ 
trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/410-limit_debug_messages.patch   
    2015-04-23 08:01:51 UTC (rev 45567)
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@
  
  /**
   * wpa_hexdump_ascii_key - conditional hex dump, hide keys
-@@ -144,8 +179,14 @@ void wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level, const 
+@@ -144,8 +179,14 @@ void wpa_hexdump_ascii(int level, const
   * bytes per line will be shown. This works like wpa_hexdump_ascii(), but by
   * default, does not include secret keys (passwords, etc.) in debug output.
   */

Modified: trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch  
2015-04-22 19:07:24 UTC (rev 45566)
+++ trunk/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/450-scan_wait.patch  
2015-04-23 08:01:51 UTC (rev 45567)
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
        /* Initialize the driver interface */
        if (!(b[0] | b[1] | b[2] | b[3] | b[4] | b[5]))
                b = NULL;
-@@ -381,8 +393,6 @@ static void hostapd_global_deinit(const 
+@@ -381,8 +393,6 @@ static void hostapd_global_deinit(const
  #endif /* CONFIG_NATIVE_WINDOWS */
  
        eap_server_unregister_methods();
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