* Michael Richardson <[email protected]> [24.12.2015 22:14]: > >> > till the real keys are generated? it can last several minutes on some > >> > routers and it feels like the box is broken. also: if really > something > >> > goes wrong during key generating we can at least login. > >> > >> you have a very bizarre understanding of securing a device. > > > in this stage the box is still without password. > > okay. So the impersonator machine lets the user in without a password, and > the impersonator machine has ALREADY connected to the new machine with no > password, and trojan'ed some binaries.
yes, if somebody wants to upload some binaries it's possible. > > the only issue i can think of is, that one can > > read on the wire to which password somebody changes > > with 'passwd' - but i'am pretty sure this is not > > the case, because each session has it's own privacy. > > No, since the impersonator (MITM) has involved itself with the session. > Effectively, the MITM creates: > > ssh mitm 'tee /badguy | ssh target' > > (but, bidirectionally, and inside the SSH transport layer) > > A new ICMP port-unreachable code would be nice to have here. interesting idea, but this is also possible with the current approach. the user has to accept a new unknown key and has no idea from which box it comes from. but really, this is really hypothetical - normally you have 1 box on your desk and you are connected via wire to it. what is your usecase? bye, bastian _______________________________________________ openwrt-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.openwrt.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openwrt-devel
