Hi Tim,

Thanks very much for raising these questions.  Although they are not on
my slides for tomorrow (already submitted) I propose to address them
first in person then if you can make it, or otherwise on list.

Regards,

Eliot


On 3/29/17 5:09 PM, Tim Polk wrote:
> After a hallway conversation with one of the authors, I have reviewed
> mud-05 in some depth and skimmed mud-net-lifecycle-00 and
> mud-manu-lifecycle-01 for context.
>
> I think that the MUD protocol fills a very important gap in the supply
> chain, in a reasonably elegant manner.  Emitting a stable URI for the
> MUD file provides a very low overhead mechanism to integrate a new
> component into your network along with appropriate access controls. 
> The goals laid out in the introduction are largely satisfied, and
> security controls seem appropriate.  I am especially excited about the
> application to IoT devices for the home consumer, but believe this has
> distinct advantages for the enterprise as well.
>
> In short, I support advancing the document.  
>
> That said, I have some issues with the draft I would like to raise.
>
> (1) Why are we excluding legacy devices from the benefits of MUD?  If
> the device does not emit the MUD URI, which is every legacy device,
> then it is excluded from the system.  If I obtain a MUD controller, I
> would definitely want to apply this functionality to my previously
> purchased legacy devices.  Yes there are risks in obtaining this
> information out-of-band, and the management overhead is much lower if
> my devices convey the URI, but once I provision the controller with a
> URI and identify the devices I will obtain many of the same benefits
> to security.
>
> Supporting MUD files for legacy devices also allows me to maximize my
> near-term ROI, which promote adoption...
>
> I would suggest adding a brief section 1.7 on legacy devices, simply
> stating that manufacturers MAY make MUD files available for legacy
> devices to support appropriate network configuration, and MUD
> controllers MAY accept URIs for devices through out-of-band means.
>
> (2a) [Section 3.3] This draft uses a cache-validity period rather than
> a next-update time to indicate when to check back.  Given that
> cache-validity prohibits checking back during the specified period,
> are we comfortable with a recommended maximum value of 1440 hours (60
> days!)?
>
> Okay, that was a rhetorical question - I'm not comfortable with that
> at all.  Assume a revised MUD file is posted to address a new
> vulnerability, and the controller always retrieves a fresh copy at the
> first permissible moment, the average network supporting the
> corresponding device will experience a post-discovery window of
> vulnerability of 30 days on average.  Given the expected size of the
> file, why prohibit checking for so long?  I understand that there are
> concerns about MUD controllers hammering servers at high frequency,
> but 7 days (168 hours) seems like a reasonable maximum to me.
>
> In more brevity, I suggest:
> OLD
> It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and no
> more than 1440 for any device that is supported.
> NEW
> It is RECOMMENDED that this value be no less than 24 and no
> more than 168 for any device that is supported.
>
> (2b) Better yet, should there be a MAXIMUM amount of time before the
> checking for a new MUD file?  As written, the MUD controller could
> choose to never look for updates and be "conformant".  We could add a
> field to MUD file specifying the MAXIMUM amount of time, but a lighter
> weight solution might be a recommendation that the MUD controller
> refresh all MUD files whose cache-validity period has been exhausted:
>
> Append to the end of Section 3.3:
> The MUD controller SHOULD refresh any MUD file whose cache-validity
> period has been exhausted.
>
> (3) The introduction (section 1, top of pg 4, bullet 3) states that
> MUD is intended to:
>         o Provide a means to address at least some vulnerabilities in away
>         that is faster than it might take to update systems. This will be
>         particularly true for systems that are no longer supported by
>         their manufacturer.
>
> In practice, this is probably true since so many devices are never
> updated or are used beyond the supported lifetime.  For this statement
> to be more broadly correct, we would need a way to push a new MUD file
> since cache-validity prohibits early checking.  That is, once the
> vulnerability is known and we post the new MUD file, the average time
> to download and implementation of access rules is 50% of the
> cache-validity period.
>
> Is this a reason to support subscription of a MUD-controller to a MUD
> file distributor for emergency changes?  I do not advocate changing
> the MUD draft to incorporate this level of complexity, but if this is
> our goals perhaps this should be addressed in a future draft...
>
> (4) I request a bit of indulgence here; I admit that this one is a bit
> of a rant.
>
> The MUD protocol may have the unexpected consequence of perpetuating
> bad developer behavior.  There is no reason a baby monitor should
> include a web browser, but the lazy developer just leaves the code in
> their distribution.  Removing the unnecessary code (so messages sent
> to the offending port would be rejected) should provide stronger
> security than constraints implicitly specified in the MUD file, and
> both in concert would be ideal.
>
> Does this incentivize developers to make weak security choices and
> "fix" them in the MUD file?  I think that some text in the security
> considerations stating that MUD is intended to complement and
> strengthen well designed systems and does not relieve vendors of the
> obligation to produce decent code is in order.
>
> (5) This may be a bridge too far for initial deployment, but (based on
> my limited understanding of YANG) the architecture assumes that the
> access controls are independent of device configuration.  (That is, I
> don't see any conditionals.)  Is that really the case?  For example,
> if the devices still use the default administrator password I might
> want to be more restrictive than after the passwords have been
> updated.  If I am a large enterprise, I might also want to substitute
> infrastructure I own for the vendor supplied cloud that supports
> operations.
>
> How do people envision dealing with this situation?  If the network
> operator has decided to override certain settings, does this preclude
> use of future updates?
>
>
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