Alan, T+ authors, and opsawg,

Sorry for the noticeable absence from this thread.  I've been focused on
some dayjob projects these past couple of weeks.

I have followed the threads, though.  I want to hopefully bring some
things to closure and get us all to move forward to come to consensus on
this doc.


On 4/17/18 11:07, Alan DeKok wrote:
> On Apr 17, 2018, at 10:15 AM, Douglas Gash (dcmgash) <dcmg...@cisco.com> 
> wrote:
>> Initially (up to around version 5) we included just a very simple security 
>> section admitting that T+ was insecure and that the second document would 
>> address the issue. This was deemed to be insufficient, and instead the WG 
>> collectively determined that more detail should be added to enumerate some 
>> of the issues, you kindly catalogued some of these, providing a proposed 
>> text which we took to be a genuine suggestion for text for the document.
> 
>   Which it was.
> 
>   The point I've been trying to make for over a year is apparently still 
> unclear.
> 
>   There was no excuse for plagiarizing the text in the first place.  Using it 
> verbatim was fine, so long as attribution was given.
> 
>   There was no excuse for ignoring every single email I made to the list 
> asking about this issue.
> 
>   There was no excuse for *continuing* to plagiarize the text for over a 
> year, across four separate revisions of the document.

I agree this was not handled well on many fronts, but we can only learn
and move forward.  As a co-chair, I take responsibility for our part and
apologize it took this long to get sorted.  The authors have added
attribution to your excellent contribution and apologized.

I would like to consider the matter, albeit belatedly, closed.

>> 2) Reactivity of the Authors.
>>
>> As far as I know, we have responded to most posts regarding the content of 
>> the document, with point-by-point replies,
> 
>   No.
> 
>   See the list archives, especially May 2017.  There are multiple people 
> suggesting that you have *not* done this, and that you *should* do this.

I for one have asked for a summary of changes when I did my last review.
 I did not see it.  There was a subsequent revision that did seem to
absorb my comments, but there wasn't a response to me email.  Typically,
when authors receive feedback, they respond in line to either ack or
discuss points (typos notwithstanding).

> 
>   See line-by-line reviews done by me, which were generally ignored.  Despite 
> that, I did *multiple* such reviews, until such time as it became clear that 
> such reviews were entirely unproductive.
> 
>> but there has been, for various logistic reasons, long delays in submitting 
>> the resulting new documents. Hopefully this has been addresses in last 
>> versions and we will continue with more rapid uploads until process 
>> completes one way or other.
> 
>   The issue isn't rapid uploads.  The issue is engagement.  It's not 
> productive to ignore the messages on the mailing list for 6 months, and then 
> to issue a new release saying "we fixed stuff".

Spot on.  One needs to engage.  I am pleased with the authors' attempts
to do better these past couple of weeks.  I want to see this momentum
continue.

>> 3) Change Tracking
>>
>> The uploads have generally had extensive changes relating to comments (which 
>> should generally have been summarized by previous email responses to 
>> comments). 
> 
>   Which I admit did happen sometimes, but not nearly as often as it should 
> have.  Again, see mailing list archives from May 2017.  I'm not the only 
> person who holds this opinion.  I'm just the main one pushing the point.
> 
>> Because of this, unless the updates have been for specific purposes (such as 
>> the recent update of the security section) then I would leave the changes to 
>> the diff tool which works pretty effectively.
> 
>   The diff tool lets us know what changed in the document.  It doesn't let us 
> know if those changes addressed issues raise on the mailing list.
> 
>   To summarize:
> 
> * we have no idea if this revision of the document addresses multiple WG 
> reviews
> 
> * we have no idea if the document even describes TACACS+ as currently 
> implemented
> 
>   As such, it should not be put into working group last call, or much less 
> published until such time as those issues are addressed.

I'm not sure what line-item changes are still outstanding.  Authors, I'm
sure you could look back at your revisions and spot anything that needs
to be addressed here.

I will be submitting an individual review of the new security
requirements soon, and I would like to see this renewed sense of
engagement on the list.

Joe

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