Hah. But thats an even earlier step than what i was thinking of. Yes,
attestation during voucher setup is an interesting option to. It just
would put the pledge into the "even more under control by the manufacturer"
bucket. Which some users will prefer, and some will not like.
Cheers
Toerless
On Fri, May 28, 2021 at 06:12:17PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote:
>
> Eliot Lear <[email protected]> wrote:
> > This having been said, I think you may be applying the right policy at
> > the wrong time. It may make more sense to first establish trust, but
> > limit access to the device until you have the SBOM. In fact you want
> > to do it that way, because at any time the posture of a device can be
> > found to be wanting.
>
> No, it's the right time.
>
> We specifically designed the voucher flow such that it could contain
> attestation artifacts (evidence). Max was quite articulate about that!
>
> The evidence is communicated through the registrar to the MASA. This is
> identically the background check flow from the RATS architecture.
> The MASA is the Verifier. The Verifier is who needs access to the SBOM, and
> conveniently, that's also the manufacturer.
>
> The Registrar is the Relying Party.
>
> What we didn't document is how we do freshness for the evidence.
> There are a number of choices.
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <[email protected]> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
> Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
--
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