Hi Victor, (please keep the ospawg list in the reply as not all WG participants are in this list)
The document will point to rfc9525#section-7.1 for a discussion of the wildcard risks. > Even if wildcards are supported, they should at least be > discouraged. The proposed text adheres to the restrictions set in rfc9525. Is there any reason tacacs+ has to deviate from the guards/restrictions in rfc9525#section-6.3? Thank you. Cheers, Med > -----Message d'origine----- > De : Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]> > Envoyé : mardi 29 avril 2025 16:05 > À : [email protected] > Objet : [Last-Call] Re: Change to draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13 > > > On Tue, Apr 29, 2025 at 01:48:21PM +0000, Douglas Gash (dcmgash) > wrote: > > > PROPOSED NEW TEXT: > > > > For the client-side validation of presented TLS TACACS+ server > > identities, implementations MUST follow [RFC9525] validation > > techniques. Identifier types DNS-ID, IP-ID, or SRV-ID are > applicable > > for use with the TLS TACACS+ protocol, selected by operators > > depending upon the deployment design. TLS TACACS+ does not > use URI- > > IDs for TLS TACACS+ server identity verification. > > > > Wildcards in TLS TACACS+ server identities simplify > certificate > > management by allowing a single certificate to secure multiple > > servers in a deployment. However, this introduces security > risks, as > > compromising the private key of a wildcard certificate impacts > all > > servers using it. To address these risks, the guidelines in > > Section 6.3 of [RFC9525] MUST be followed, and the wildcard > > SHOULD be confined to a subdomain dedicated solely to > > TLS TACACS+ servers. > > Shared private key compromise isn't the only risk of wildcard > certificates, it is also possible for active MiTM attacks or DNS > cache poisoning to transparently redirect connections between the > various devices that share a wildcard certificate, an operator or > automated script might then make configuration changes to the wrong > device. > > Also replacement of wildcard certificates is often performed in > concert across all the devices that share the certificate, creating > a potential single point of failure. > > Even if wildcards are supported, they should at least be > discouraged. > How common is use of wildcard certificates in this context? Are > they really needed? Or is this "convenience" a marginal behaviour > to avoid? > > -- > Viktor. > > -- > last-call mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an > email to [email protected] ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Ce message et ses pieces jointes peuvent contenir des informations confidentielles ou privilegiees et ne doivent donc pas etre diffuses, exploites ou copies sans autorisation. Si vous avez recu ce message par erreur, veuillez le signaler a l'expediteur et le detruire ainsi que les pieces jointes. Les messages electroniques etant susceptibles d'alteration, Orange decline toute responsabilite si ce message a ete altere, deforme ou falsifie. Merci. This message and its attachments may contain confidential or privileged information that may be protected by law; they should not be distributed, used or copied without authorisation. If you have received this email in error, please notify the sender and delete this message and its attachments. As emails may be altered, Orange is not liable for messages that have been modified, changed or falsified. Thank you. _______________________________________________ OPSAWG mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
