Hi Deb,
Please see inline.
Cheers,
Med
> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Deb Cooley via Datatracker <nore...@ietf.org>
> Envoyé : lundi 7 juillet 2025 12:54
> À : The IESG <i...@ietf.org>
> Cc : draft-ietf-opsawg-secure-tacacs-y...@ietf.org; opsawg-
> cha...@ietf.org; opsawg@ietf.org; jcla...@cisco.com;
> jcla...@cisco.com
> Objet : Deb Cooley's Discuss on draft-ietf-opsawg-secure-tacacs-
> yang-13: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>
>
> Deb Cooley has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-opsawg-secure-tacacs-yang-13: Discuss
>
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to
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> cut this introductory paragraph, however.)
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Section 6: Any mention of raw private key, epsk, shared secret MUST
> be
> protected from disclosure (i.e. encrypted in transit, and in
> storage). Any
> configuration which specifies TLS1.3 cipher suites, epsk hash, epsk
> KDFs MUST
> be protected from modification - change of these can be a downgrade
> attack.
> While I see mention of 'shared-secret', I see nothing about epsk,
> raw private
> key, or TLS1.3 cipher suite negotiation.
[Med] The text calls the parent nodes, not child ones. All those nodes you
cited fall under:
'client-identity' and 'server-authentication': Any modification to a
key or reference to a key may dramatically alter the implemented
security policy. For this reason, the NACM extension "default-
deny-write" has been set.
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Thanks to Robert Sparks for their secdir review.
>
> Section 4, grouping tls13-epsk: 'Selfie-style reflection' attacks?
> Reference?
>
[Med] The reference is already provided in the text:
identities to mitigate Selfie-style reflection attacks.";
reference
"RFC 9258: Importing External Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) for
TLS 1.3, Section 5.1 ";
5.1 of 9258 has the following:
ImportedIdentity.context MUST include the context used to determine
the EPSK, if any exists. For example, ImportedIdentity.context may
include information about peer roles or identities to mitigate
Selfie-style reflection attacks [Selfie]. See Appendix A for more
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
details.
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