The IESG has received a request from the Operational Security Capabilities
for IP Network Infrastructure WG (opsec) to consider the following document:
- 'Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Filtering'
  <draft-ietf-opsec-urpf-improvements-03.txt> as Best Current Practice

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
[email protected] mailing lists by 2019-08-15. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to [email protected] instead. In either case, please retain the beginning of
the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   This document identifies a need for improvement of the unicast
   Reverse Path Filtering techniques (uRPF) (see BCP 84) for detection
   and mitigation of source address spoofing (see BCP 38).  The strict
   uRPF is inflexible about directionality, the loose uRPF is oblivious
   to directionality, and the current feasible-path uRPF attempts to
   strike a balance between the two (see BCP 84).  However, as shown in
   this draft, the existing feasible-path uRPF still has shortcomings.
   This document describes an enhanced feasible-path uRPF technique,
   which aims to be more flexible (in a meaningful way) about
   directionality than the feasible-path uRPF.  It can potentially
   alleviate ISPs' concerns about the possibility of disrupting service
   for their customers, and encourage greater deployment of uRPF
   techniques.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsec-urpf-improvements/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsec-urpf-improvements/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information: 
    rfc4271: A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4) (Draft Standard - IETF stream)



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