Hi Eric,

Thanks for incorporating my comments. See one inline. 

On 2/9/21, 6:10 AM, "Eric Vyncke (evyncke)" <[email protected]> wrote:

    Hello Acee,

    Thank you for your directorate review and sorry for such a belated reply!

    Special thanks for the DIFF containing suggestions for improving the text. 
Most of them have been applied (none of the authors is English native so such 
assistance is welcome)

    Look below for EV> for more comments.

    Regards

    -éric

    -----Original Message-----
    From: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <[email protected]>
    Date: Tuesday, 3 December 2019 at 17:21
    To: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>, 
"[email protected]" <[email protected]>
    Cc: Routing Directorate <[email protected]>, "[email protected]" 
<[email protected]>
    Subject: [OPSEC] RtgDir: Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsec-v6-21.txt - 
"Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks"

         Hello,

        I have been selected as the Routing Directorate reviewer for this draft.
        The Routing Directorate seeks to review all routing or routing-related
        drafts as they pass through IETF last call and IESG review, and
        sometimes on special request. The purpose of the review is to provide
        assistance to the Routing ADs. For more information about the Routing
        Directorate, please see ​

          http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/rtg/trac/wiki/RtgDir

        Although these comments are primarily for the use of the Routing ADs,
        it would be helpful if you could consider them along with any other
        IETF Early Review/Last Call  comments that you receive, and strive to
        resolve them through discussion or by updating the draft.

        Document: draft-ietf-opsec-v6-21.txt
        Reviewer: Acee Lindem
        Review Date: 12/2/2019
        IETF LC End Date: Soon
        Intended Status:  Informational

        Summary: The document contains a lot of useful recommendations and
                 references for Operational Security in IPv6 networks. Since
                        the document has "Informational" status, none of the 
text is
                        normative.

                        While the information content is very good, parts of the
                        document are very hard to read and need revision. In 
general,
                        the usage of long clauses connected by semicolons 
should be
                        discouraged and the lists connected in this manner 
should
                        be replaced with complete sentences. I've attached a 
diffs
                        with editorial suggests but didn't try and rewrite all 
the
                        semicolon connected text segments.

    EV> let's hope that the RFC Editor will find and remediate those long 
constructs.

                        There are also minor issues that need to be addressed.

        Major Issues: None

        Minor Issues:

            1. Section 1.0 - What do you mean by "updating it with that have 
been
               standardized since 2007."? It just doesn't read right.

    EV> text has been simplified in -23

            2. Section 2.1 - IPv4 also allows multiple addresses per interface,
               i.e., secondary addresses. So what is new?

    EV>  last sentence now reads as
     "Having by default multiple
       IPv6 addresses per interface is a major change compared to the unique
       IPv4 address per interface for hosts (secondary IPv4 addresses are
       not common); especially for audits (see section Section 2.6.2.3)."

            3. Section 2.1.5 - The whole discussion on how to use Router
               Advertisement (RA) messages lacks enough context to understand.
               Also, expand RA in the first occurrence.

    EV> text was not clear indeed, changed

            4. Section 2.2.3 - Expand out NDP since it is not clear that it is
               Neighbor Discovery Protocol from the context. It is expanded 
later
               in section 2.3.

    EV> thanks, fixed

            5. Section 2.4 - RFC 6192 not only defines the "router control 
plane"
                but provides much better guidance for control plane filtering 
than
                section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.

    EV> text updated

            6. Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 - The ingress ACL should only be applied 
on
               the packets punted to the RP.

    EV> indeed, added

            7. Section 2.4.1 - If OSPFv3 vitual links are used, the destination
               address will not be a link-local address.

    EV> trusting you on this one, text modified

            8. Section 2.4.3 - Suggest references for Path MTU Discovery
               and traceroute.

    EV> good idea

            9. Section 2.5.1 - HMAC MD5 is considered vulnerable.

    EV> let's indeed remove this paragraph

           10. Section 2.5.2 - What prior section describes the operational
               costs of IPsec?

    EV> oups the previous section was deleted revisions ago...

           11. Section 2.5.3 - Need expansion and reference for RADB.

    EV> indeed, added reference to https://www.radb.net/ 

           12. Section 2.6 - Need expansion and reference for GDPR.

    EV> indeed, added reference to https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj

           13. Section 2.7.1 - ACLs are typically per address family so this
               recommendation isn't
               really feasible. Please revise.

    EV> I disagree, this is a platform limitation. Text unchanged.

ACEE> I don't know of a platform that doesn't have this limitation. Also, the 
IETF YANG model is organized with all ACL entries in an ACL being the same 
type. 

See excerpt from RFC 8519:

  list acl {
      key "name";
      description
        "An ACL is an ordered list of ACEs.  Each ACE has a
         list of match criteria and a list of actions.
         Since there are several kinds of ACLs implemented
         with different attributes for different vendors,
         this model accommodates customizing ACLs for
         each kind and for each vendor.";
      leaf name {
        type string {
          length "1..64";
        }
        description
          "The name of the access list.  A device MAY further
           restrict the length of this name; space and special
           characters are not allowed.";
      }
      leaf type {
        type acl-type;
        description
          "Type of ACL.  Indicates the primary intended
           type of match criteria (e.g., Ethernet, IPv4, IPv6, mixed,
           etc.) used in the list instance.";
      }

However, I don't feel that strongly. 

Thanks,
Acee


           14. Section 2.7.2.6 - Expand MAP-E and MAP-T.

    EV> done

           15. Section 3.1 and 4.1 - Define bogon and provide reference.

    EV> done, added reference to CYMRU

           16. Section 3.2 - Bad reference in fourth paragraph.

    EV> fixed in -22

           17. Section 5 - Suggest references for Teredo tunnels and NAT-PT.
               Also, expand NAT-PT on first occurrence.

    EV> good idea for Teredo (added) and NAPT is now defined in section 1

        Nits: Attached diff with suggested edits.

    EV> big thanks for them

        Thanks,
        Acee


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