Hi Warren,
Thanks for that, I'll publish the revision right after your confirmation
(for the security question). Please see inline ([JI] tag).
On 5/20/23 22:02, Warren Kumari wrote:
Hi there, authors (and WG),
Thank you for this document. In general I found it clear, useful, and
an easy read.
I do have a few comments/nits; addressing these now should help the IETF
LC and IESG evaluation go more smoothly.
The majority of these are simply readability comments, but it does end
with a more important question…
Please SHOUT loudly once you've had a chance to address these, and I'll
start IETF LC.
S1:
O: "Active measurements at Internet-scale can target either collaborating
parties or non-collaborating ones."
P: "Active measurements can target either collaborating
parties or non-collaborating ones."
C: Even at none Internet-scale the target can be collaborating, or not.
[JI] Applied 2 times (abstract and intro).
O: "This document suggests some simple techniques allowing any party or
organization to understand:"
P: "This document suggests some simple techniques to allow any party or
organization to understand:"
C: Flow / grammar.
[JI] Applied.
O: "Note: it is expected that only researchers with no bad intentions
will use these techniques, although anyone might use them. This is
discussed in Section 7."
C: "with no bd intentions" seems a bit clunky - perhaps "with good
intentions" instead?
[JI] Applied 2 times ("with good intentions").
S4:
O: "This could be:
* thing
* other thing
* more other thing
* etc."
P: "Examples of this include:
* thing
* other thing
* more other thing"
C: Having 'etc' as it's own bullet seems somewhat odd.
[JI] Applied ("etc" bullet removed).
O: "The probe description URI should start at the first octet of the
payload and should be terminated by an octet of 0x00, i.e., it must be
null terminated."
C: So, which is it? It should be null terminated. or it must be null
terminated?
[JI] Good catch! Applied ("must" for all).
S5:
O: "The advantage of using the in-band technique is to cover the cases
where the out-of-band technique is not possible, as listed above."
P: "The primary advantage of using the in-band technique is that it
covers the cases where the out-of-bounds technique is not feasible (as
[JI] you probably meant out-of-band, right? :-D
described above)"
C: Readability.
[JI] Applied.
P: "The primary disadvantage is that it potentially biases the
measurements, since packets with the Probe Description URI might be
discarded."
C: Readability
[JI] Applied.
S6:
O: "Executing some measurement experiences over the global Internet
obviously require some ethical considerations when transit/
destination non-solicited parties are involved."
P: "Executing measurement experiments over the global Internet
obviously requires ethical consideration, especially when transit/
destination non-solicited parties are involved."
C: Readability.
[JI] Applied (+ s/non-solicited/unsolicited/g).
S7: Security Considerations
C: I wonder if this should speak more about "false flag" operations? I
send 1Mpps, and include a probe-attribution saying that I'm Eric Vynke,
at +1-212-555-1212?? Suddenly you have hundreds of irate network admins
calling you at 3AM....
[JI] What about:
[JI] OLD: "This information is provided to identify the source and
intent of specific probes, but there is no authentication possible for
the inline information. As a result, a malevolent actor could provide
false information while conducting the probes, so that the action is
attributed to a third party. As a consequence, the recipient of this
information cannot trust this information without confirmation. If a
recipient cannot confirm the information or does not wish to do so, it
should treat the flows as if there were no attribution."
[JI] NEW: "This information is provided to identify the source and
intent of specific probes, but there is no authentication possible for
the inline information. Therefore, a malevolent actor could provide
false information while conducting the probes, so that the action is
attributed to a third party. In that case, not only this third party
would be wrongly accused, but it might also be exposed to unwanted
solicitations (e.g., angry emails or phone calls, if the malevolent
actor used someone else's email address or phone number). As a
consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it without
confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information or does not
wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were no attribution."
Thank you again; I know that making edits to address nits can be
annoying, but we are expecting many people to read and review the
document, and so having it polished is important and polite (also, once
people start commenting on nits, they seem to continue :-) )
[JI] Thank YOU!
Justin
W
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