On Sat, 12 Aug 2006 17:00:17 -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Secret rendezvous addresses for tor dir servers aren't necessary. In China, > for > example, all network traffic goes through government-owned firewalls and > routers, just like the traffic at your workplace goes through company-owned > routers and firewalls. The traffic can be sniffed and logged without blocking > it. That way they know who's using tor. It's probably valuable to know who's > trying to be a dissedent and what it is they think they're discussing > privately. > > As for a protocol to keep that hidden, SSL comes to mind. Personally, though, > I > don't believe you can ever be truly anonymous or secret, so I act accordingly. > I'm seeing this as a nightmare. If it isn't possible to disguise the fact you're using or serving tor--and last time I did a tcpdump on my outside interface, it stuck out like a sore thumb--doesn't that undermine its usefulness? (And I assume you mean SSL could be used to encrypt content, not the destination of a tor server.)
-- David Benfell, LCP [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Resume available at http://www.parts-unknown.org/
