Thus spake Roger Dingledine ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > It's certainly hard to pin down the exact risks here -- there are > clearly huge risks on both sides. Somebody should write up a clear > concise explanation, perhaps based on some statements from this thread. :)
I'd like to also add that it is possible for rogue Tor servers to go beyond simply evesdropping on traffic. On one occasion I recieved a corrupt .exe file via Tor.. It appeared to be just noise, but it woke me up to the possibility that it is quite feasible that Tor exit nodes can do all sorts of things to traffic: modifiying .exes, injecting browser/media format exploits, etc etc. Since the Tor client scrubbs logs, it can be difficult to tell which exit server was in fact responsible, especially if they only target a small percentage of connections. It might be nice if Vidalia had an option to retain some connection history in-memory only for a period of time on the order of 10s of minutes for the purposes of monitoring for malicious/censored exit nodes. -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs
