If I were to set up a machine with any information worth hiding behind Tor, I wouldn't have made it accessible other than through Tor's hidden service.
Even if such a machine is accessible from the Internet, the risk is still manageable because timestamps could have come from only a limited number of places (please supplement if I miss any): (1) Applications that are deliberately giving up the timestamp, e.g. a web application, or even NTP server - just don't expose these to the Internet directly, if your machine contains anything worth hiding behind Tor; (2) HTTP reply headers - these can be filtered out or altered; (3) TCP timestamp - these can be disabled either by firewall rules or in the kernel (in Linux, by setting net/ipv4/tcp_timestamps=0 in sysctl). ...Unless the very fact that your machine is unusually sanitary is already incriminating, of course. - John On 12/30/06, Dan Collins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Anil Gulecha wrote: > I wanted to know what the developers think : > > http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,72375-0.html?tw=rss.technology > > > Regards > A very interesting and unique idea, though I can't believe that the change due to a little heat would be detectable? -- GnuPG key ID is 0x84189146 on subkeys.pgp.net
