-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 M wrote: > Thanx Gregory and F.Fox...understood the concept. Just one note though: > > "Tor (like all current practical low-latency anonymity designs) fails > when the attacker can see both ends of the communications channel. For > example, suppose the attacker is watching the Tor relay you choose to > enter the network, and is also watching the website you visit." > > When it says "watching" does it mean? I thought the info was encrypted > (except the last hop) and the IP invisible? Does it mean timing attacks? (snip)
Yes, it's referring to end-to-end attacks - which are usually timing attacks; however, fingerprinting attacks (based on the total filesizes of known target downloads, since encryption doesn't change the size of data) are possible in theory, as well. - -- F. Fox Owner of Tor node "kitsune" http://fenrisfox.livejournal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJI7X98AAoJECxKjnsrYHNHe78QALS4cTWVcHxs9TdTTHfNsM94 3SuvgJgc3g6MCCy2xRkIvgO+Ww9wSHZogSlP7F0Z4m8F1/ldhQRBTR95Ve7ZBapn WFlAxxdHagh0sqKgnHDaUQJzCRRGO62n/aW+UrSIpNUEKCVsqsLzsPbpUI1vNzua M130ul+45Q/1lSfBbRQ4JoDa1T/C9RyK+c1qdioL1o7eyw036maqZqUHFe2GOKRQ /EmzQgehYghEQ2+IPjCVtTmY1NIWmRaZsa2HLmnQ/KJ2/SgXzIqicNLU/IqYVqQb BDTncvK1XlkXw6bBHK9BN33nF5zwybdxqBc4zO4+KyjM/tN3laUG+j9obx19B5od p/TMlC+b1QfbLUTBijxxIocfaTAl3saf6zu6LIV1SjcjOC5HcVcuUfceKvhsdBYN t6Pw1LOggMWuuEvE/kgWT9pZ+yEOHm4c47hZDIDfZ7aqQ7jhq3urigufkSE6iT3Q isUUXN5+nRGKGIHtQEaYfFczg28JNNtgZhQkWCYyasq+LFpLsDVaoa8mwse2NlIu xZbjXUmWJNtjhu+xWrM2oS5BIqMmYzi0jx6yFbTtqxBJx2HT6CO9cPDrQQlnSylN auc/E6IZUZA46aSRKEzpd9CWNx3GRMcmlkT6gyR8Bv7yxg+0ZKWjFv4KiyQFnTIm zV3yZRz/jIzXGj9x6/ZW =LHKE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
