> I would not like _one_ list as it could be single point of failure. E.g. > someone could be > threatened or required by a court to remove a site from the white-list.
I agree that having a central list is highly problematic, because several sites will request to take them off that list. But I also think that the Tor network will benefit from such a list in the long term by having more exit nodes that at least allow many po****r sites. It might even stimulate people to try out running an exit node and turn it into a less restricted node later on. > When there is a new development in e.g., Iran and new free-speech blogs > appearing every > day, these blogs should be accessible though TOR from day one. Sure, and they of course still should be. I don't think the number of "open" exits will drop, and in theory there's more available bandwidth because other exit nodes take all the "heavy" traffic (search engines and the like). > > Some exit operators would likely switch to safe-mode, reducing the > > total amount of universal-exit capacity but if the safe list included > > enough high traffic sites it would probably more than offset the loss > > and arguably anyone who switched was likely to quit in any case. I must say that I like the idea behind this. -Alex -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- www.posta.ro - Romanias first free webmail since 1998! _____________________________________________________ - powered by www.posta.ro
