On Wed, Nov 11, 2009 at 12:59:21PM -0500, Andrew S. Lists wrote: > On 11/05/09 15:52, Nick Mathewson wrote: > > On Thu, Nov 05, 2009 at 02:10:00PM -0500, Marcus Griep wrote: > >> Don't know if any one else has seen or taken a look at this. I don't know > >> if > >> this affects Tor, though I believe that we do use certificate renegotiation > >> in the protocol, and that is the entry vector for this particular > >> vulnerability: > > > > FWIW, this doesn't affect Tor. The problem here is not renegotiation > > per se; the problem is doing renegotiation, then acting as though data > > sent _before_ the renegotiation were authenticated with the > > rengotiated credentials. > > > > The Tor protocol isn't vulnerable here because 1) it doesn't allow data > > to be sent before the renegotiation step, and 2) it doesn't treat a > > renegotiation as authenticating previously exchanged data (because > > there isn't any). > > The vulnerability itself might not effect Tor, but the OpenSSL > workaround for this vulnerability of disabling renegotiation by default > in 0.9.8l [1] might not play nice with a Tor implementation.
Indeed it will not. We have a fix in svn to make the 0.2.1.x and 0.2.2.x-alpha series both work correctly with OpenSSL 0.9.8l. With any luck, we should get releases out before too long. yrs, -- Nick *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
